# 1NC---Round 2---Districts 22

## Off

### Off

Regs CP

**The Federal Maritime Commission should initiate a rulemaking proceeding to:**

**- Establish rules prohibiting global ocean carriers and marine terminal operators from adopting and applying unjust business practices in price fixing and service terms contexts.**

**- Mandate global ocean carriers to adhere to a minimum service standard.**

**Solves and avoids the DOJ DA---the CP creates internal rulemaking flexibility without expanding the scope of antitrust laws.**

**NITL 21** (National Industrial Transportation League, "PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE SHIPPING ACT OF 1984" National Industrial Transportation League – NITL, May 18, 2021. https://www.nitl.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/NITL-Proposed-Shipping-Act-Reforms-May-2021.pdf, accessed 11-26-2021

\*\*strike through and red included in original article

\*\*edited for language, brackets denote difference between article strikethrough and language edit

I. **UNREASONABLE DEMURRAGE AND DETENTION PRACTICES AND CHARGES**

(a) Within 60 days of enactment, the FMC shall initiate a **rulemaking** proceeding to establish rules prohibiting common carriers and marine terminal operators from adopting and applying unjust and unreasonable demurrage and detention rules and practices. The rulemaking shall address the issues identified in FMC Docket No. 19-05, Interpretive Rule on Demurrage and Detention Under the Shipping Act," including but not limited to:

i. Establishing clear and uniform definitions for demurrage, detention, cargo availability for retrieval and associated free time, and other terminology used in the rule. The definition for cargo availability for retrieval should account for government inspections.

ii. Establishing that demurrage and detention rules are not independent revenue sources but should incentivize efficiencies in the ocean transportation network, including the retrieval of cargo and return of equipment.

iii. Prohibiting the consumption of free time or collection of demurrage and detention charges when obstacles to the cargo retrieval or return of equipment are within the scope of responsibility of the carrier or their agent and beyond the control of the invoiced or contracting party.

iv. Prohibiting the commencement or continuation of free time unless cargo is available for retrieval and timely notice of cargo availability has been provided.

v. Prohibiting the consumption of free time or collection of demurrage charges when marine terminal appointments are not available during the free time period.

vi. Prohibiting the consumption of free time or collection of detention charges on containers when the terminal required for return is not open or available.

vii. Requiring common carriers to provide timely notice of (i) cargo availability after vessel discharge, (ii) container return locations, and (iii) advance notice for container early return dates.

viii. Establishing minimum billing requirements, including timeliness and supporting information that shall be included in or with invoices for demurrage and detention charges that will allow the invoiced party to validate the charges.

ix. Requiring common carriers and marine terminal operators to establish reasonable dispute resolution policies and practices.

x. Establishing the responsibilities of shippers, receivers, and dray~~men~~ [edited for language, strike through not included in original article] with respect to cargo retrieval and equipment return.

(b) A common carrier or marine terminal that assesses demurrage or detention charges shall maintain all records supporting the assessment of the demurrage or detention charges for a period of 3 years and provide such records to the invoiced party on request.

(c) In any complaint proceeding challenging common carrier demurrage or detention charges as unjust and unreasonable, the common carrier shall bear the burden of establishing that the charges are just and reasonable and comply with the rules to be established under Section I.(a) above.

II. **PROHIBITED ACTS**

The prohibited acts set forth at 46 U.S.C. § 41101(a) shall be modified as follows:

(a) IN GENERAL.—

A common carrier, or ocean common carrier where specified, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, directly or indirectly, may not—

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(14) fail to furnish or cause a contractor to furnish the facilities and instrumentalities needed to perform the transportation services, including containers;

(15) establish rules and practices for the allocation and interchange of containers, chassis or other equipment that unreasonably reduce accessibility to such equipment or efficiencies in performance of the transportation services;

(16) an ocean common carrier may not fail to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to the allocation of vessel space accommodations in consideration of foreseeable import and export demands.

III. **COMMON CARRIER SERVICE OBLIGATIONS**

A common carrier shall be obligated to adhere to minimum service standards that meet the public interest. The minimum service standards shall be developed in a rulemaking proceeding initiated by the FMC within 90 days of enactment of these amendments and shall include but not be limited to the following:

1. The obligation to adopt reasonable rules and practices related to or connected with the furnishing and allocation of adequate and suitable equipment, vessel space accommodations, and other instrumentalities necessary for the receiving, loading, carriage, unloading and delivery of cargo.
2. The duty to perform the contract of carriage with reasonable dispatch.
3. The requirement of ocean common carriers to establish contingency service plans to address and mitigate service disruptions and inefficiencies during periods of port congestion and other market disruptions.

### Off

DOJ DA

#### The Apple case is accelerating but in flux---resources are key.

Chance Miller 21. Lead Editor of 9to5Mac. “Report: Apple ‘very likely’ to face antitrust lawsuit from US Department of Justice”. 10-25-2021. https://9to5mac.com/2021/10/25/report-apple-very-likely-to-face-antitrust-lawsuit-from-us-department-of-justice/

A new report from The Information today indicates that Apple is “very likely” to face an antitrust lawsuit from the Department of Justice in the United States. The report explains that the US DOJ has “accelerated” the antitrust probe into Apple, which it first opened back in 2019.

Citing people familiar with the matter, the report says that there has been a “flurry of activity on the investigation” since the summer. This includes a new round of subpoenas being sent to Apple’s business partners, additional DOJ staff being assigned to the probe, and more.

The investigation thus far has revealed what DOJ lawyers believe are “serious issues.”

The investigation is very likely to lead to a lawsuit, though the specifics are still in flux, one of the people said. The DOJ has also assigned more staff to the probe, that person said. In late July two insurance companies abandoned their merger following a DOJ lawsuit, and some of the lawyers on that case moved to the Apple probe, the person said. DOJ lawyers are uncovering what they believe are serious issues and the investigation remains ongoing, the person said.

The DOJ probe is said to focus on a wide array of issues, with the broad focus being on Apple’s power as a technology market leader. Specific concerns raised in the report include App Tracking Transparency, Sign in with Apple, and the App Store. The DOJ is also looking into “complaints about how Apple places restrictions on location tracking that its own apps don’t have to follow.”

#### DOJ resources are finite---the plan forces tradeoffs.

Brian Blais 21. Partner in the litigation and enforcement practice group @ Ropes & Gray LLP and a former federal prosecutor, 3/26/21. “Podcast: 2021 DOJ Enforcement Priorities Under U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland.” Interview with Lisa Bebchick. https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/podcasts/2021/March/Podcast-2021-DOJ-Enforcement-Priorities-Under-US-Attorney-General-Merrick-Garland

Brian Blais: Well, as I referenced earlier, I think one real challenge for the Garland DOJ will be the many competing demands on the resources available to DOJ leadership. In addition to the many corporate-related priorities I just discussed, there are a large number of Biden administration priorities that implicate the DOJ, many of which represent a sharp break from the priorities of the Trump Department of Justice—so those include things like environmental justice and the prosecution of environmental cases; civil rights and voting act cases; the ongoing fight against domestic terrorism, including as we talked about earlier, the January 6th Capitol attack; immigration reform and potential shifts in immigration prosecution priorities; potentially heightened antitrust enforcement; and criminal justice reform writ large, just to name a few. And putting aside even all these priorities, there’s a huge backlog of cases in the Department more broadly due to pandemic-related shutdowns, including a substantial trial backlog. So there will be a significant amount of prosecutorial time and effort in the near-term devoted to resolving these already charged matters, as well as moving along already opened investigations, so that leaves reduced prosecutorial bandwidth to advance any new enforcement priorities. So all of that’s to say, one big question for the Garland DOJ is: Can it do it all, or will these various competing demands lead to a natural prioritization of certain enforcement priorities over others? We’ll certainly have a better sense in the coming weeks and months as the remaining DOJ leadership is confirmed, as priorities get communicated, and as the first round of investigations under the new leadership start to launch.

#### Apple’s market power collapses democracy, human rights, and competitiveness---that spreads global authoritarianism.

Andy Yen 20. The Founder and CEO of Proton. PhD in Particle Physics from Harvard University. "The App Store is a monopoly: Here's why the EU is correct to investigate Apple". ProtonMail Blog. 6-22-2020. https://protonmail.com/blog/apple-app-store-antitrust/

Apple is using its monopoly to hold all of us hostage

Apple’s iOS controls 25% of the global smartphone market (the other 75%, is largely controlled by Google’s Android). This means that for over a billion people (particularly in the US where their market share approaches 50%), the only way to install apps is through the App Store. This gives Apple enormous influence over the way software is created and consumed around the world.

Perhaps the most harmful expression of this power is Apple’s exorbitant 30% tax on developers, which is now the subject of antitrust investigations in both the United States and the European Union. To be clear, this is an enormous fee and would be intolerable in normal market conditions, but it’s particularly damaging if you offer a product that competes with Apple. It is hard to stay competitive if you are forced to pay your competitor 30% of all of your earnings.

Apple attempts to justify these fees by arguing that the App Store is no different from a mall, where companies seeking to offer their products must pay rent to the owner of the mall (in this case, Apple). This argument conveniently ignores the fact that there is just a single mall when it comes to iOS and no possibility of a competing mall to rent space from. It is not illegal for Apple to own a mall and rent space, nor is it illegal for Apple to own the only mall. What is illegal, is exploiting the fact that it owns the only mall to charge excessively high pricing which harms competitors.

This is virtually indistinguishable from a protection racket: It is a fee that developers must pay if they want to stay in business. And it is a fee which ultimately harms consumers because these fees are indirectly passed on to users, either through higher prices, or through fewer competing products in the marketplace.

After the European Commission launched its investigation on June 16, Apple released a statement saying “the European Commission is advancing baseless complaints from a handful of companies who simply want a free ride.”

This comment reveals the callousness with which Apple has hijacked and strangled the creativity that once flourished on the Internet. If only a handful of the most powerful companies have complained (such as Spotify), it is because Apple’s market dominance leaves small developers powerless to object: Either fall in line or be removed from the App Store, with no possibility to appeal.

Apple has now even gone so far as to ban apps from the App Store if they refuse to offer in-app purchases for paid features that are available for purchase elsewhere. In other words, Apple wants a nearly one-third cut of your sales, regardless of whether you want to sell on their platform or not. This was precisely what happened with Proton.

As we know from any mafia trial, the absence of witnesses willing to take the stand does not imply there was no crime, it only serves to highlight the power of the accused. By taking the stand today, we want to clearly refute Apple’s claim that only a “handful of companies” are objecting to these practices.

Apple helps propagate authoritarian laws globally

While it is improper (and illegal) to leverage market dominance for anti-competitive purposes, leveraging this power to suppress digital freedom is simply unethical, and it is long overdue that somebody called out Apple for this behavior. As first-hand witnesses to this behavior, we can share our story.

In January 2020, ProtonVPN submitted an update of its iOS app description in the App Store. The new description highlighted ProtonVPN’s features, including the ability to “unblock censored websites” with the app.

Even though ProtonVPN had been in the App Store since 2018 and the basic functionality of our VPN has not changed, Apple abruptly rejected the new app version and threatened to remove ProtonVPN entirely. They demanded that we remove this language around anti-censorship on the grounds that freedom of speech is severely limited in some countries. The options are comply or be removed from the App Store. What is most troubling is that Apple requested the removal of the language around censorship in ALL countries where our app is available, in effect doing the bidding of authoritarian governments even in countries where freedom of speech is protected.

It is true that in countries around the world, such as China, South Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, freedom of speech is indeed severely limited, and thousands of activists have been killed or imprisoned for expressing themselves. However, by conceding to tyrants and enforcing the lowest common denominator, Apple is ignoring internationally recognized human rights and forfeiting progress we all enjoy and which activists have paid for with their lives.

One of the biggest threats to democracy and freedom in the 21st century is Internet censorship, and in this regard VPNs are one of the best tools available to empower people with access to independent sources of accurate information. The free flow of ideas — along with the right to keep your ideas private — is one of the first principles of democracy.

This is apparently a principle that Apple no longer believes in. For example, Apple willingly complies with Chinese laws that restrict users’ access to thousands of apps and that require foreign companies to store the data of its citizens within the country and make them available to authorities. Even Google has gone further to resist such Chinese pressure.

What we find unacceptable, however, is that Apple is using its market dominance to also force other companies which might otherwise be willing to make a stand to also be complicit in human rights abuses. This extends beyond limiting our ability to fight against censorship with our app.

In China, Apple has censored news platforms such as The New York Times and Bloomberg News, while in Hong Kong it blocked the access to the HKMaps app that supported the local democracy protests. It has also agreed to delete dozens of apps, including podcasts, that China says violate local censorship laws.

As part of Proton’s mission to make privacy and digital freedom universally accessible, we developed ProtonVPN, the world’s first free and unlimited VPN service that does not track or log users’ activity. We are on the front lines of the global fight for freedom and recently ranked third in the Hong Kong App Store during the Hong Kong freedom protests. By censoring ProtonVPN’s app description in order to comply with authoritarian government requests, Apple is making it incrementally more difficult for people to exercise their fundamental human rights and sending a clear signal that profits come before people.

#### Democracy prevents extinction.

Larry Diamond 19. PhD in Sociology, professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University. “Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition and American Complacency,” Kindle Edition

In such a near future, my fellow experts would no longer talk of “democratic erosion.” We would be spiraling downward into a time of democratic despair, recalling Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s grim observation from the 1970s that liberal democracy “is where the world was, not where it is going.” 5 The world pulled out of that downward spiral—but it took new, more purposeful American leadership. The planet was not so lucky in the 1930s, when the global implosion of democracy led to a catastrophic world war, between a rising axis of emboldened dictatorships and a shaken and economically depressed collection of selfdoubting democracies. These are the stakes. Expanding democracy—with its liberal norms and constitutional commitments—is a crucial foundation for world peace and security. Knock that away, and our most basic hopes and assumptions will be imperiled. The problem is not just that the ground is slipping. It is that we are perched on a global precipice. That ledge has been gradually giving way for a decade. If the erosion continues, we may well reach a tipping point where democracy goes bankrupt suddenly—plunging the world into depths of oppression and aggression that we have not seen since the end of World War II. As a political scientist, I know that our theories and tools are not nearly good enough to tell us just how close we are getting to that point—until it happens.

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#### The Aff’s competitive state model reinforces taken-for-granted nationalism, which makes answering transnational questions impossible.

Pauli Kettunen 21. Professor of Political History in the Social Science Faculty of University of Helsinki. "Welfare state, competition state, security state: Nationalism in nation-state responses to crossborder mobilities." In Remapping Security on Europe’s Northern Borders, pp. 201-220. Routledge, 2021.

Democratic welfare nationalism, competitiveness-seeking nationalism, and security-seeking nationalism appear as rational nation-state policies and are generally not associated with nationalism. It is reasonable to argue that the persistent limits of the conventional use of “nationalism” outside specialist studies of nations and nationalism indicate the power of nationalism as a taken-for-granted mode of thought and action. Taken-for-granted nationalism seems to be reinforced by the intertwining of democratic welfare nationalism with competitiveness-seeking and security-seeking nationalism. There is thus a self-reinforcing circle. The extent to which globalisation is defined as a national challenge reinforces the role of competitiveness and security in political agenda setting, and the extent to which competitiveness and security frame the political agenda assists them to maintain national perspectives to globalisation.

From the welfare-state, competition-state, and security-state perspectives “nationalism” is not a tool for self-description, but for condemning xenophobic and racist far-right nationalism. However, the taken-for-granted nationalism justifying the nation-state limits of these perspectives provides a readymade framework for xenophobic nationalism. The distinctions between us and others and between the internal and external are a shared point of departure, but instead of policies recognising their interdependencies, xenophobic nationalism turns the us-other distinction into an exclusionary us-against-them divide, and the internal-external distinction into a motive for stricter borders.

The emphasis on the national “us” in mainstream modes of combining welfare-state, competition-state, and security-state arguments may facilitate populist protests that accuse the elite of betraying the people. There are similarities with how the nation as an imagined community provided subordinated social groups with the criteria for a collective critique of existing society and created preconditions for the labour movement. However, while the working class was able to motivate its demands by referring to its central role in the production of life’s necessities, the social divides associated with current projects for a national competitive community give little scope for such arguments.

We may find that an insoluble tension appears between what is recognised as the institutional preconditions of competitiveness, and how its content is conceived. At the same time as egalitarian institutions and participatory practices can be defended as preconditions for knowledge-based competitiveness, true membership in a competitive community is a matter of individual competitiveness. This in turn consists of communicative and innovative skills, talent, and a reflexive capacity to monitor oneself from the perspective of competitiveness. Besides winners and losers, some people cannot even participate in this competition.

Individual deficiencies or the unavoidable imperatives of the global economy tend to be offered as explanations for grievances. Welfare-state policies aim to improve individual capacities and compensate for job losses, yet it is far from self-evident that people willingly accept individualised or naturalised explanations. Political implications may be found in constructions demarcating collective threat images and in the support for right-wing populist parties that have managed, not least in the Nordic countries, to merge nostalgic welfare nationalism and xenophobic nationalism.

While the emphasis on “us” in the making of national competitive communities is an integral part of global capitalism, the same transformations may also either erode the solidarity based on common spatial ties or open new crossnational and crossterritorial perspectives for defining “us”. A multicircle non-divisive understanding of “us” would arguably require a transnational democratic dimension in defining problems and solutions. Inspiration may be found in the ideas of policy coordination beyond nation states and European regional integration that Gunnar Myrdal proposed in his 1950s critique of the nationalism of democratic Western welfare states. In any case, even good answers to questions of national competitiveness and security fail to answer questions of democracy, citizenship, social equality, and the ecological preconditions of life. There is a risk that the reinforced emphasis on the competition-state and security-state aspects of the nation state will make it even more difficult to formulate such questions to effectively recognise that they are simultaneously local, national, European, and global.

#### Competitiveness and leadership necessitate a state of global inequality.

William Davies 14. Senior Lecturer at Goldsmiths, University of London, where he is leading the development of a new PPE Degree. How ‘competitiveness’ became one of the great unquestioned virtues of contemporary culture http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-cult-of-competitiveness/

The years since the banking meltdown of 2008 have witnessed a dawning awareness, that our model of capitalism is not simply producing widening inequality, but is apparently governed by the interests of a tiny minority of the population. The post-crisis period has spawned its own sociological category – ‘the 1%’ – and recently delivered its first work of grand economic theory, in Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-first Century, a book dedicated to understanding why inequality keeps on growing.

What seems to be provoking the most outrage right now is not inequality as such, which has, after all, been rising in the UK (give or take Tony Blair’s second term) since 1979, but the sense that the economic game is now being rigged. If we can put our outrage to one side for a second, this poses a couple of questions, for those interested in the sociology of legitimation. Firstly, how did mounting inequality succeed in proving culturally and politically attractive for as long as it did? And secondly, how and why has that model of justification now broken down?

In some ways, the concept of inequality is unhelpful here. There has rarely been a political or business leader who has stood up and publicly said, “society needs more inequality”. And yet, most of the policies and regulations which have driven inequality since the 1970s have been publicly known. Although it is tempting to look back and feel duped by the pre-2008 era, it was relatively clear what was going on, and how it was being justified. But rather than speak in terms of generating more inequality, policy-makers have always favoured another term, which effectively comes to the same thing: competitiveness.

My new book, The Limits of Neoliberalism: Sovereignty, Authority & The Logic of Competition, is an attempt to understand the ways in which political authority has been reconfigured in terms of the promotion of competitiveness. Competitiveness is an interesting concept, and an interesting principle on which to base social and economic institutions. When we view situations as ‘competitions’, we are assuming that participants have some vaguely equal opportunity at the outset. But we are also assuming that they are striving for maximum inequality at the conclusion. To demand ‘competitiveness’ is to demand that people prove themselves relative to one other.

It struck me, when I began my Sociology PhD on which the book is based, that competitiveness had become one of the great unquestioned virtues of contemporary culture, especially in the UK. We celebrate London because it is a competitive world city; we worship sportsmen for having won; we turn on our televisions and watch contestants competitively cooking against each other. In TV shows such as the Dragons Den or sporting contests such as the Premier League, the division between competitive entertainment and capitalism dissolves altogether. Why would it be remotely surprising, to discover that a society in which competitiveness was a supreme moral and cultural virtue, should also be one which generates increasing levels of inequality?

Unless one wants to descend into biological reductionism, the question then has to be posed: how did this state of affairs come about? To answer this, we need to turn firstly to the roots of neoliberal thinking in the 1930s. For Friedrich Hayek in London, the ordoliberals in Freiburg and Henry Simons in Chicago, competition wasn’t just one feature of a market amongst many. It was the fundamental reason why markets were politically desirable, because it conserved the uncertainty of the future. What united all forms of totalitarianism and planning, according to Hayek, was that they refused to tolerate competition. And hence a neoliberal state would be defined first and foremost as one which used its sovereign powers to defend competitive processes, using anti-trust law and other instruments.

One way of understanding neoliberalism, as Foucault has best highlighted, is as the extension of competitive principles into all walks of life, with the force of the state behind them. Sovereign power does not recede, and nor is it replaced by ‘governance’; it is reconfigured in such a way that society becomes a form of ‘game’, which produces winners and losers. My aim in The Limits of Neoliberalism is to understand some of the ways in which this comes about.

In particular, I examine how the Chicago School Law and Economics tradition achieved an overhaul (and drastic shrinkage) in the role of market regulation. And I look at how Michael Porter’s theory of ‘national competitiveness’ led to a new form of policy orientation, as the search for competitive advantage. Both of these processes have their intellectual roots in the post-War period, but achieved significant political influence from the late 1970s onwards. They are, if you like, major components of neoliberalism.

By studying these intellectual traditions, it becomes possible to see how an entire moral and philosophical worldview has developed, which assumes that inequalities are both a fair and an exciting outcome of a capitalist process which is overseen by political authorities. In that respect, the state is a constant accomplice of rising inequality, although corporations, their managers and shareholders, were the obvious beneficiaries. Drawing on the work of Luc Boltanski, I suggest that we need to understand how competition, competitiveness and, ultimately, inequality are rendered justifiable and acceptable – otherwise their sustained presence in public and private life appears simply inexplicable.

And yet, this approach also helps us to understand what exactly has broken down over recent years, which I would argue is the following: At a key moment in the history of neoliberal thought, its advocates shifted from defending markets as competitive arenas amongst many, to viewing society-as-a-whole as one big competitive arena. Under the latter model, there is no distinction between arenas of politics, economics and society. To convert money into political power, or into legal muscle, or into media influence, or into educational advantage, is justifiable, within this more brutal, capitalist model of neoliberalism. The problem that we now know as the ‘1%’ is, as has been argued of America recently, a problem of oligarchy.

Underlying it is the problem that there are no longer any external, separate or higher principles to appeal to, through which oligarchs might be challenged. Legitimate powers need other powers through which their legitimacy can be tested; this is the basic principle on which the separation of executive, legislature and judiciary is based. The same thing holds true with respect to economic power, but this is what has been lost.

Regulators, accountants, tax collectors, lawyers, public institutions, have been drawn into the economic contest, and become available to buy. To use the sort of sporting metaphor much-loved by business leaders; it’s as if the top football team has bought not only the best coaches, physios and facilities, but also bought the referee and the journalists as well. The bodies responsible for judging economic competition have lost all authority, which leaves the dream of ‘meritocracy’ or a ‘level playing field’ (crucial ideals within the neoliberal imaginary) in tatters. Politically speaking, this is as much a failure of legitimation as it is a problem of spiralling material inequality.

The result is a condition that I term ‘contingent neoliberalism’, contingent in the sense that it no longer operates with any spirit of fairness or inclusiveness. The priority is simply to prop it up at all costs. If people are irrational, then nudge them. If banks don’t lend money, then inflate their balance sheets through artificial means. If a currency is no longer taken seriously, political leaders must repeatedly guarantee it as a sovereign priority. If people protest, buy a water canon. This is a system whose own conditions are constantly falling apart, and which governments must do constant repair work on.

The outrage with the ‘1%’ (and, more accurately, with the 0.1%), the sense that even the rich are scarcely benefiting, is to be welcomed. It is also overdue. For several years, we have operated with a cultural and moral worldview which finds value only in ‘winners’. Our cities must be ‘world-leading’ to matter. Universities must be ‘excellent’, or else they dwindle. This is a philosophy which condemns the majority of spaces, people and organizations to the status of ‘losers’. It also seems entirely unable to live up to its own meritocratic ideal any longer. The discovery that, if you cut a ‘winner’ enough slack, eventually they’ll try to close down the game once and for all, should throw our obsession with competitiveness into question. And then we can consider how else to find value in things, other than their being ‘better’ than something else.

#### Vote Neg to challenge the Westphalian frame---taken-for-granted nationalism is up for contestation and determines the scope of justice---the “who” of politics predetermines the “what” of policy---only shifting the grammar of argument can address the global nature of crisis.

Nancy Fraser 5. Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School. “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, NLR 36, November–December 2005.” New Left Review. https://newleftreview-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/issues/ii36/articles/nancy-fraser-reframing-justice-in-a-globalizing-world

Globalization is changing the way we argue about justice.footnote1 Not so long ago, in the heyday of social democracy, disputes about justice presumed what I shall call a ‘Keynesian-Westphalian frame’. Typically played out within modern territorial states, arguments about justice were assumed to concern relations among fellow citizens, to be subject to debate within national publics, and to contemplate redress by national states. This was true for each of two major families of justice claims—claims for socioeconomic redistribution and claims for legal or cultural recognition. At a time when the Bretton Woods system facilitated Keynesian economic steering at the national level, claims for redistribution usually focused on economic inequities within territorial states. Appealing to national public opinion for a fair share of the national pie, claimants sought intervention by national states in national economies. Likewise, in an era still gripped by a Westphalian political imaginary, which sharply distinguished ‘domestic’ from ‘international’ space, claims for recognition generally concerned internal status hierarchies. Appealing to the national conscience for an end to nationally institutionalized disrespect, claimants pressed national governments to outlaw discrimination and accommodate differences among citizens. In both cases, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame was taken for granted. Whether the matter concerned redistribution or recognition, class differentials or status hierarchies, it went without saying that the unit within which justice applied was the modern territorial state.footnote2

To be sure, there were always exceptions. Occasionally, famines and genocides galvanized public opinion across borders. And some cosmopolitans and anti-imperialists sought to promulgate globalist views.footnote3 But these were exceptions that proved the rule. Relegated to the sphere of ‘the international’, they were subsumed within a problematic that was focused primarily on matters of security, as opposed to justice. The effect was to reinforce, rather than to challenge, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame. That framing of disputes about justice generally prevailed by default from the end of the Second World War to the 1970s.

Although it went unnoticed at the time, this framework lent a distinctive shape to arguments about social justice. Taking for granted the modern territorial state as the appropriate unit, and its citizens as the pertinent subjects, such arguments turned on what precisely those citizens owed one another. In the eyes of some, it sufficed that citizens be formally equal before the law; for others, equality of opportunity was also required; for still others, justice demanded that all citizens gain access to the resources and respect they needed in order to be able to participate on a par with others, as full members of the political community. The argument focused, in other words, on exactly what should count as a just ordering of social relations within a society. Engrossed in disputing the ‘what’ of justice, the contestants apparently felt no necessity to dispute the ‘who’. With the Keynesian-Westphalian frame securely in place, it went without saying that the ‘who’ was the national citizenry.

Today, however, this framework is losing its aura of self-evidence. Thanks to heightened awareness of globalization, and to post-Cold War geopolitical instabilities, many observe that the social processes shaping their lives routinely overflow territorial borders. They note, for example, that decisions taken in one territorial state often have an impact on the lives of those outside it, as do the actions of transnational corporations, international currency speculators, and large institutional investors. Many also note the growing salience of supranational and international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, and of transnational public opinion, which flows with supreme disregard for borders through global mass media and cybertechnology. The result is a new sense of vulnerability to transnational forces. Faced with global warming, the spread of aids, international terrorism and superpower unilateralism, many believe that their chances for living good lives depend at least as much on processes that trespass the borders of territorial states as on those contained within them.

Under these conditions, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame no longer goes without saying. For many, it has ceased to be axiomatic that the modern territorial state is the appropriate unit for thinking about issues of justice, and that the citizens of such states are the pertinent subjects of reference. The effect is to destabilize the previous structure of political claims-making—and therefore to change the way we argue about social justice.

This is true for both major families of justice claims. In today’s world, claims for redistribution increasingly eschew the assumption of national economies. Faced with transnationalized production, the outsourcing of jobs, and the associated pressures of the ‘race to the bottom’, once nationally focused labour unions look increasingly for allies abroad. Inspired by the Zapatistas, meanwhile, impoverished peasants and indigenous peoples link their struggles against despotic local and national authorities to critiques of transnational corporate predation and global neoliberalism. Finally, wto protestors directly target the new governance structures of the global economy, which have vastly strengthened the ability of large corporations and investors to escape the regulatory and taxation powers of territorial states.

In the same way, movements struggling for recognition increasingly look beyond the territorial state. Under the umbrella slogan ‘women’s rights are human rights’, for example, feminists throughout the world are linking struggles against local patriarchal practices to campaigns to reform international law. Meanwhile, religious and ethnic minorities, who face discrimination within territorial states, are reconstituting themselves as diasporas and building transnational publics from which to mobilize international opinion. Finally, transnational coalitions of human-rights activists are seeking to build new cosmopolitan institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, which can punish state violations of human dignity.

In such cases, disputes about justice are exploding the Keynesian-Westphalian frame. No longer addressed exclusively to national states or debated exclusively by national publics, claimants no longer focus solely on relations among fellow citizens. Thus, the grammar of argument has altered. Whether the issue is distribution or recognition, disputes that used to focus exclusively on the question of what is owed as a matter of justice to community members now turn quickly into disputes about who should count as a member and which is the relevant community. Not just the ‘what’ but also the ‘who’ is up for grabs.

Today, in other words, arguments about justice assume a double guise. On the one hand, they concern first-order questions of substance, just as before. How much economic inequality does justice permit, how much redistribution is required, and according to which principle of distributive justice? What constitutes equal respect, which kinds of differences merit public recognition, and by which means? But above and beyond such first-order questions, arguments about justice today also concern second-order, meta-level questions. What is the proper frame within which to consider first-order questions of justice? Who are the relevant subjects entitled to a just distribution or reciprocal recognition in the given case? Thus, it is not only the substance of justice, but also the frame, which is in dispute. The result is a major challenge to our theories of social justice. Preoccupied largely with first-order issues of distribution and/or recognition, these theories have so far failed to develop conceptual resources for reflecting on the meta-issue of the frame. As things stand, therefore, it is by no means clear that they are capable of addressing the double character of problems of justice in a globalizing age.footnote4

In this essay, I shall propose a strategy for thinking about the problem of the frame. I shall argue, first, that theories of justice must become three-dimensional, incorporating the political dimension of representation alongside the economic dimension of distribution and the cultural dimension of recognition. I shall also argue that the political dimension of representation should itself be understood as encompassing three levels. The combined effect of these two arguments will be to make visible a third question, beyond those of the ‘what’ and the ‘who’, which I shall call the question of the ‘how’. That question, in turn, inaugurates a paradigm shift: what the Keynesian-Westphalian frame cast as the theory of social justice must now become a theory of post-Westphalian democratic justice.

Specificity of the political

Let me begin by explaining what I mean by justice in general and by its political dimension in particular. In my view, the most general meaning of justice is parity of participation. According to this radical-democratic interpretation of the principle of equal moral worth, justice requires social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life. Overcoming injustice means dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people from participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction. Previously, I have analysed two distinct kinds of obstacles to participatory parity, which correspond to two distinct species of injustice. On the one hand, people can be impeded from full participation by economic structures that deny them the resources they need in order to interact with others as peers; in that case they suffer from distributive injustice or maldistribution. On the other hand, people can also be prevented from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing; in that case they suffer from status inequality or misrecognition.footnote5 In the first case, the problem is the class structure of society, which corresponds to the economic dimension of justice. In the second case, the problem is the status order, which corresponds to its cultural dimension. In modern capitalist societies, the class structure and the status order do not neatly mirror each other, although they interact causally. Rather, each has some autonomy vis-à-vis the other. As a result, misrecognition cannot be reduced to a secondary effect of maldistribution, as some economistic theories of distributive justice appear to suppose. Nor, conversely, can maldistribution be reduced to an epiphenomenal expression of misrecognition, as some culturalist theories of recognition tend to assume. Thus, neither recognition theory nor distribution theory alone can provide an adequate understanding of justice for capitalist society. Only a two-dimensional theory, encompassing both distribution and recognition, can supply the necessary levels of social-theoretical complexity and moral-philosophical insight.footnote6

That, at least, is the view of justice I have defended in the past. And this two-dimensional understanding of justice still seems right to me as far as it goes. But I now believe that it does not go far enough. Distribution and recognition could appear to constitute the sole dimensions of justice only so long as the Keynesian-Westphalian frame was taken for granted. Once the question of the frame becomes subject to contestation, the effect is to make visible a third dimension of justice, which was neglected in my previous work—as well as in the work of many other philosophers.footnote7

The third dimension of justice is the political. Of course, distribution and recognition are themselves political in the sense of being contested and power-laden; and they have usually been seen as requiring adjudication by the state. But I mean political in a more specific, constitutive sense, which concerns the nature of the state’s jurisdiction and the decision rules by which it structures contestation. The political in this sense furnishes the stage on which struggles over distribution and recognition are played out. Establishing criteria of social belonging, and thus determining who counts as a member, the political dimension of justice specifies the reach of those other dimensions: it tells us who is included in, and who excluded from, the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition. Establishing decision rules, the political dimension likewise sets the procedures for staging and resolving contests in both the economic and the cultural dimensions: it tells us not only who can make claims for redistribution and recognition, but also how such claims are to be mooted and adjudicated.

Centred on issues of membership and procedure, the political dimension of justice is concerned chiefly with representation. At one level, which pertains to the boundary-setting aspect of the political, representation is a matter of social belonging. What is at issue here is inclusion in, or exclusion from, the community of those entitled to make justice claims on one another. At another level, which pertains to the decision-rule aspect, representation concerns the procedures that structure public processes of contestation. Here, what is at issue are the terms on which those included in the political community air their claims and adjudicate their disputes.footnote8 At both levels, the question can arise as to whether the relations of representation are just. One can ask: do the boundaries of the political community wrongly exclude some who are actually entitled to representation? Do the community’s decision rules accord equal voice in public deliberations and fair representation in public decision-making to all members? Such issues of representation are specifically political. Conceptually distinct from both economic and cultural questions, they cannot be reduced to the latter, although, as we shall see, they are inextricably interwoven with them.

To say that the political is a conceptually distinct dimension of justice, not reducible to the economic or the cultural, is also to say that it can give rise to a conceptually distinct species of injustice. Given the view of justice as participatory parity, this means that there can be distinctively political obstacles to parity, not reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, although (again) interwoven with them. Such obstacles arise from the political constitution of society, as opposed to the class structure or status order. Grounded in a specifically political mode of social ordering, they can only be adequately grasped through a theory that conceptualizes representation, along with distribution and recognition, as one of three fundamental dimensions of justice.

Three levels of misrepresentation

If representation is the defining issue of the political, then the characteristic political injustice is misrepresentation. Misrepresentation occurs when political boundaries and/or decision rules function to deny some people, wrongly, the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction—including, but not only, in political arenas. Far from being reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, misrepresentation can occur even in the absence of the latter injustices, although it is usually intertwined with them. At least two different levels of misrepresentation can be distinguished. Insofar as political decision rules wrongly deny some of the included the chance to participate fully, as peers, the injustice is what I call ordinary-political misrepresentation. Here, where the issue is intra-frame representation, we enter the familiar terrain of political science debates over the relative merits of alternative electoral systems. Do single-member-district, winner-take-all, first-past-the-post systems unjustly deny parity to numerical minorities? And if so, is proportional representation or cumulative voting the appropriate remedy? Likewise, do gender-blind rules, in conjunction with gender-based maldistribution and misrecognition, function to deny parity of political participation to women? And if so, are gender quotas an appropriate remedy? Such questions belong to the sphere of ordinary-political justice, which has usually been played out within the Keynesian-Westphalian frame.

Less obvious, perhaps, is a second level of misrepresentation, which concerns the boundary-setting aspect of the political. Here the injustice arises when the community’s boundaries are drawn in such a way as to wrongly exclude some people from the chance to participate at all in its authorized contests over justice. In such cases, misrepresentation takes a deeper form, which I shall call misframing. The deeper character of misframing is a function of the crucial importance of framing to every question of social justice. Far from being of marginal significance, frame-setting is among the most consequential of political decisions. Constituting both members and non-members in a single stroke, this decision effectively excludes the latter from the universe of those entitled to consideration within the community in matters of distribution, recognition, and ordinary-political representation. The result can be a serious injustice. When questions of justice are framed in a way that wrongly excludes some from consideration, the consequence is a special kind of meta-injustice, in which one is denied the chance to press first-order justice claims in a given political community. The injustice remains, moreover, even when those excluded from one political community are included as subjects of justice in another—as long as the effect of the political division is to put some relevant aspects of justice beyond their reach. Still more serious, of course, is the case in which one is excluded from membership in any political community. Akin to the loss of what Hannah Arendt called ‘the right to have rights’, that sort of misframing is a kind of ‘political death’.footnote9 Those who suffer it may become objects of charity or benevolence. But deprived of the possibility of authoring first-order claims, they become non-persons with respect to justice.

It is the misframing form of misrepresentation that globalization has recently begun to make visible. Earlier, in the heyday of the postwar welfare state, with the Keynesian-Westphalian frame securely in place, the principal concern in thinking about justice was distribution. Later, with the rise of the new social movements and multiculturalism, the centre of gravity shifted to recognition. In both cases, the modern territorial state was assumed by default. As a result, the political dimension of justice was relegated to the margins. Where it did emerge, it took the ordinary-political form of contests over the decision rules internal to the polity, whose boundaries were taken for granted. Thus, claims for gender quotas and multicultural rights sought to remove political obstacles to participatory parity for those who were already included in principle in the political community. Taking for granted the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, they did not call into question the assumption that the appropriate unit of justice was the territorial state.

Today, in contrast, globalization has put the question of the frame squarely on the political agenda. Increasingly subject to contestation, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is now considered by many to be a major vehicle of injustice, as it partitions political space in ways that block many who are poor and despised from challenging the forces that oppress them. Channelling their claims into the domestic political spaces of relatively powerless, if not wholly failed, states, this frame insulates offshore powers from critique and control.footnote10 Among those shielded from the reach of justice are more powerful predator states and transnational private powers, including foreign investors and creditors, international currency speculators, and transnational corporations. Also protected are the governance structures of the global economy, which set exploitative terms of interaction and then exempt them from democratic control. Finally, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is self-insulating; the architecture of the interstate system protects the very partitioning of political space that it institutionalizes, effectively excluding transnational democratic decision-making on issues of justice.

From this perspective, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is a powerful instrument of injustice, which gerrymanders political space at the expense of the poor and despised. For those persons who are denied the chance to press transnational first-order claims, struggles against maldistribution and misrecognition cannot proceed, let alone succeed, unless they are joined with struggles against misframing. It is not surprising, therefore, that some consider misframing the defining injustice of a globalizing age. Under these conditions, the political dimension of justice is hard to ignore. Insofar as globalization is politicizing the question of the frame, it is also making visible an aspect of the grammar of justice that was often neglected in the previous period. It is now apparent that no claim for justice can avoid presupposing some notion of representation, implicit or explicit, insofar as none can avoid assuming a frame. Thus, representation is always already inherent in all claims for redistribution and recognition. The political dimension is implicit in, indeed required by, the grammar of the concept of justice. Thus, no redistribution or recognition without representation.footnote11

In general, then, an adequate theory of justice for our time must be three-dimensional. Encompassing not only redistribution and recognition, but also representation, it must allow us to grasp the question of the frame as a question of justice. Incorporating the economic, cultural and political dimensions, it must enable us to identify injustices of misframing and to evaluate possible remedies. Above all, it must permit us to pose, and to answer, the key political question of our age: how can we integrate struggles against maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation within a post-Westphalian frame?

### Off

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#### Interp---the scope of competition law defines it goals---attempts to meet current goals by banning practice are implementation questions.

ESE No Date. Erasmus School of Economics (as per their website, “The Erasmus Center for Economic and Financial Governance is an international multidisciplinary network of leading researchers and societal stakeholders initiated by researchers from Erasmus School of Economics and Erasmus School of Law. ECEFG conducts interdisciplinary research (law, economics and political science) and contributes to current debates in public and in academia on issues relating to European and global economic and financial governance.”). "Competition Policy". <https://www.eur.nl/en/ese/affiliated/ecefg/research/competition-policy>

Competition Policy

Research in this field consists of two broad areas. The first area – Theory and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy – refers to fundamental and applied research into topics that are traditionally seen as the core of competition policy. The second area – Scope of Competition Law and Policy – refers to all research on the effect and desirability of including new considerations in competition law and policy in order to address the challenges of our time, such as the increasing power of big tech firms, or global warming.

Theory and Implementation of Competition Policy

This covers for instance collusion, abuse of dominance, mergers, market regulation and state aid. Some examples of research topics are:

* the practices firms can use to engage in collusion and its welfare consequences;
* the practices firms can use to abuse a dominant position and its welfare consequences;
* which practices can be considered proof of such activities;
* how to regulate access to a market;
* how to properly assess the effects of a particular practice or merger;
* the practices, by which the state and public authorities distort competition such as subisidies and tax measures
* the interpretation and application of EU and national competition law by Competition Authorities and Courts and the extent to which they achieve the goals of competition policy

Scope of Competition Policy

The effectiveness of European competition law and policy in combination with rapid technological changes have raised questions about its proper scope. Which policy objectives can and should be pursued by means of competition law and policy, and which should be delegated to other legal fields and policies? Some examples of specific research questions include:

* Can and should competition law be used to protect the privacy of consumers on the internet?
* Information gathered by firms can be used to increase their own profits. How does this affect consumers, and what does this depend on? Can and should competition law deal with market power derived from information gathering? For instance, should the big five tech giants be forced to divest activities?
* Should competition policy also include considerations of economic inequality or environmental effects?
* Can competition law remain effective if it is used for more than safeguarding fair competition?

#### Violation---the Aff doesn’t replace the consumer welfare standard.

Trevor Wagener 21. "The Curse of Tradeoffs: Neo-Brandeisians vs. Consumers". Disruptive Competition Project. 5-21-2021. https://www.project-disco.org/competition/052121-the-curse-of-tradeoffs-neo-brandeisian-antitrust-versus-consumers/

Neo-Brandeisians seek to replace the longstanding objective and principles-based framework of the consumer welfare standard in antitrust enforcement with an amorphous, process-based framework guided by an ethos one Neo-Brandeisian described as: “Big is bad. Just don’t let big firms merge. The end.” A movement dedicated to replacing a consumer welfare-maximizing approach with an assortment of competing goals has proven unable to offer a quantified, systematic cost-benefit analysis justifying such a radical change, instead relying upon anecdotal evidence and moving prose. The many goals of the Neo-Brandeisian approach are often rhetorically appealing, but the rhetoric hides a simple truth: When you target every variable, you effectively target none. Addressing a wide range of goals through antitrust policy requires de-emphasizing consumer welfare, creating fundamental tradeoffs expected to harm consumers relative to the status quo.

The willingness to sacrifice consumer welfare in order to achieve other ends is a defining characteristic of Neo-Brandeisian antitrust. This is illustrated by concrete Neo-Brandeisian critiques, which typically emphasize perceived harms to businesses rather than harms to consumers. For example, the Neo-Brandeisian activist group American Economic Liberties Project (AELP) published a pair of policy briefs on May 3 that criticize online service operators for a litany of purported inconveniences to businesses over a combined 22 pages, but struggle to quantify any harms to ordinary consumers and users. Those few purported harms to consumers that AELP raised are distinctly qualitative rather than quantitative, consistent with the broader reluctance of prominent Neo-Brandeisian thinkers to conduct a rigorous quantitative cost-benefit analysis of their antitrust policy prescriptions relative to the consumer welfare standard.

#### Vote Neg---limits and ground---only “change goals” creates key economy and legal DAs over what antitrust should consider---the Aff’s topic races to tiny exemptions and technical changes with no core ground.

## Case

### Supply Chains Adv---1NC

#### There is no collusion, and even if there is, it can’t be proven.

Soren Pico, 21. Reporter for shipping watch, “Authorities find no evidence of collusion between container carriers,” September 21, 2021. https://shippingwatch.com/carriers/Container/article13295061.ece#:~:text=ShippingWatch-,Authorities%20find%20no%20evidence%20of%20collusion%20between%20container%20carriers,the%20EU%2C%20according%20to%20media.&text=Instead%2C%20the%20increases%20have%20been%20fueled%20by%20market%20forces.

The overheated container market is driven solely by unprecedented demand and not collusion between carriers, conclude authorities in the US, China and the EU, according to media. No proof has been found in the investigations of possible market manipulation between container carriers or the three major alliances to push up pricing, concludes maritime authorities in the EU, the US and China, according to Daniel B. Maffei, Chair of US Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). In an interview with Lloyd’s List, Maffei explains that the maritime authorities have reached similar conclusions. The carriers, he says, have artificially reduced capacity to make pricing go up. Instead, the increases have been fueled by market forces.

#### Deglobalization inevitable via nation-state thinking.

Román Mendoza & Oleg Ruban, 21. Mendoza is a Senior Associate, Americas Regional Index Research. Oleg Ruban is Head of Analytics Applied Research for Asia Pacific. “Did Deglobalization Add to Inflation Woes?” December 13, 2021. https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/did-deglobalization-add-to/02910648011

Deglobalization has been on the rise, accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. If deglobalization persists, it may require a rethink of existing asset-allocation strategies and bring new opportunities for equity investors. Well-diversified global portfolios, quality and minimum-volatility strategies and innovation-oriented themes have benefited from such opportunities. Deglobalization could mean more inflation volatility and a worsening trade-off between growth and inflation. Value has historically outperformed in high-inflation periods; low volatility in moderate- and high-inflation ones. Investors are already well aware of how COVID-19 led to closed borders, economic shutdowns and trillions of dollars of fiscal and monetary stimulus. But there’s also been a longer-term shift at play: one toward deglobalization, in the form of rising nationalism, trade wars and geopolitical tensions. Now, investors may look to adapt as these forces collide and potentially forge rising global inflation.

#### Alt causes to deglobalization besides shipping---covid, pallet shortages, no truck drivers, labor shortage due to aging population.

Lauren Sytsma, 21. Global Edge blog writer. “Supply Chain Crisis Leading to Deglobalization.” November 11, 2021. https://globaledge.msu.edu/blog/post/57051/supply-chain-crisis-leading-to-deglobali

In today’s market, consumers are offered a variety of instantly available products from across the globe. The sourcing of production across nations and within borders has allowed this globalization to be efficacious – effective supply chain and logistics being the main component to this success. When COVID-19 appeared, the supply chain’s pre-existing fundamental issues were exacerbated; now, this crisis is **powering a retreat from globalization**, similar to the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Production tension and financial tension are being generated in companies due to the inaccessibility to essential logistics and the excessive premium pricing with which is involved. Clogged ports, wooden pallet shortages, scarcity of truck drivers, lack of accessibility to cargo containers, heightened shipping rates, and limited warehousing capacity are all obstacles in the supply chain sector. These bottlenecks are in “every link of the supply chain,” making the expected recovery time long. Labor shortages and power shortages are two catalysts of this evolving problematic distress. The labor shortages are being seen globally, as workers are voluntarily quitting their jobs at the same unfortunate timing of economies opening back up. Reasons for quitting include aging populations, retiring workers, border and immigration controls, and demands for flexible working arrangements along with better pay. Currently, Germany is undergoing a labor shortage of about 400,000 workers a year, despite nearly full employment.

#### Shipping alliances and megaships are key to trade---the plan undermines them.

Cameron Clarke, 20. Sales & Marketing Support Coordinator for Clear Freight. “The Benefits of an Ocean Alliance.” December 1, 2020. https://www.clearfreight.com/post/the-benefits-of-an-ocean-alliance

An ocean alliance, also known as a shipping alliance, is a collection of maritime freight characters that combine their resources to offer an enormous fleet with global coverage. The largest shipping carriers form today’s 3 ocean alliances. Participating in one of the three shipping alliances offer a number of benefits to both customers and carriers. In this article, we’ll discuss the benefits of ocean alliances. Reduce operational cost By pooling shipping resources, freight carriers can reduce overall operating costs. That’s because ocean alliances allow shipping companies to share their large fleets, coverage area and slots on their vessels. Shipping alliances also allow companies to purchase mega-ships, which allow for greater shipping capacity. Typically, many carriers would not be able to afford this expansive reach and capacity if not for the operational cost-benefit of an ocean alliance. Increase capabilities Customers benefit from shipping alliances because large carriers have more coverage. This translates to **increased shipping capabilities globally**, making it easier for customers to order products and have them delivered to their homes or businesses.

**Trade won’t solve war.**

Joel **Einstein, 17**. Master of Strategic Studies at Australian National University. “Economic Interdependence and Conflict – The Case of the US and China.” January 17, 2017. <http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/17/economic-interdependence-and-conflict-the-case-of-the-us-and-china/>

In 1913, Norman Angell declared that the use of military force was now economically futile as international finance and trade had become so interconnected that harming the enemy’s property would equate to harming your own.[1] A year later Europe’s economically interconnected states were embroiled in what would later become known as **the First World War.** Almost a century later Steven Pinker made a similar claim. Pinker argues, “Though the relationship between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff and we owe them too much money.”[2] His argument rests upon the liberal assumption that high levels of trade and investment between two states, in this case the US and China, will make war unlikely, if not impossible. It is this assumption that this essay seeks to evaluate. This essay is divided into three sections. The first briefly outlines the theory that economic interdependence results in a reduced likelihood of conflict, breaking the theory down into smaller components that can be examined. In the second section, this essay suggests **that** the premise ‘more **trade equals less conflict**’ is **simplistic**. It does not take into account **many of the variables** that can influence the strength of economic interdependence’s conflict reducing attributes. Within this section, the essay considers: the extent to which conflict cuts off trade, theories arguing that how and what a state trades matters, Copeland’s theory of trade expectations and the differences between status quo and revisionist states. The final section deals with the realist perspective, concentrating on arguments pertaining to the primacy of strategic interests and arguments that economic interdependence will increase the likelihood of conflict owing to a reduction of deterrence credibility. Each section will be related back to the US-China relationship with a view to assessing Pinker’s claim. The essay will conclude that economic interdependence does reduce the likelihood of conflict but is insufficient on its own to completely prevent it. To calculate the likelihood of conflict correctly one would need to factor in the nature of the economic interdependence alongside the strength of the strategic interests at stake. **Economic Interdependence and Conflict** The theory that increased economic interdependence reduces conflict rests on three observations: trade benefits states in a manner that decision-makers value; conflict will reduce or completely cut-off trade; and that decision-makers will take the previous two observations into account before choosing to go to war. Based on these observations, one should expect that the higher the benefit of trade, the higher the cost of a potential conflict. After a certain point, the value of trade may become so high that the state in question has become economically dependent on another. Proponents of this theory argue that if two states have reached this point of mutual dependence (interdependence), their decision-makers will value the continuation of trade relations higher than any potential gains to be made through war.[3] It is on this argument that Pinker rests his statement that the economic relationship between the US and China precludes war. One can see evidence of this when analysing US views on China as trade rises. A 2014 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey indicates that only a minority of Americans see China as a critical threat, compared to a majority in the mid-1990s. This number is even higher when analysing Americans who directly benefit from trade with China.[4] As compelling as this argument may be, high levels of economic interdependence have **not always resulted in peace**. The decades preceding WW1 saw an **unprecedented growth in international trade**, communication, and interconnectivity but needless to say, war broke out.[5] This instance alone is not enough to disprove Pinker’s logic. War may become very unlikely but began nonetheless.[6] Let us take two hypothetical scenarios, one in which the chances of war is 80% and the other in which trade has reduced the likelihood of war to 10%. Just knowing that war did indeed take place does not tell us which scenario was in play. Similarly, the fact that WW1 took place gives us no information about whether economic interdependence made war unlikely or not. In fact, evidence even exists to suggest that economic linkages prevented a war from breaking out during the sequence of crises that led up to WW1.[7] However, the fact that a war as detrimental as WW1 could break out despite a supposed reduction of the likelihood of conflict gives us an impetus to examine whether this reduction does take place. Additionally, if this is the case, what variables can weaken this pacifying effect? **Does Conflict Cut off Trade?** Economic **interdependence theory** makes the **assum**ption that conflict will reduce or cut-off trade. This assumption appears to be logical, as one would expect that the moment two states are officially adversaries, fear of relative gains would ensure that policy makers want to completely cut-off trade. **However**, there are **many historical examples** of **trade between warring states** carrying on during wartime, **includ**ing strategic goods that directly affect the ability of the enemy to carry out the war.[8] For example, in the **Anglo-Dutch Wars**, British insurance companies continued to insure enemy ships **and** paid to replace ships that were being destroyed by their own army.[9] Even during **WW2**, there are numerous examples of American firms continuing to trade strategic goods with Nazi Germany.[10] Barbieri and Levy argue that these examples and their own statistical analysis suggest that the outbreak of war does not radically reduce trade between enemies, and when it does, it often quickly returns to pre-war levels after the war has concluded.[11] In response to this result, Anderton and Carter conducted an interrupted time-series study on the effect war has on trade in which they analysed 14 **major power** wars and 13 **non-major power** wars. Seven of the non-major power wars negatively impacted trade (although only four of these reductions were significant), but in the major war category, all results bar **one** showed a reduction of trade during wartime and a quick return to pre-war levels at its conclusion.[12] Accompanying this contradictory finding one must take into account that even if war does not radically reduce trade, if a state believes that it does then potential opportunity cost would still figure in their calculations. Variables that Impact the Pacifying Effect of Economic Interdependence The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the pacifying effect of economic interdependence is not constant. It achieves this via a discussion of the effect of changes in a number of variables pertaining to how and what a state trades. Once it is established that changes in such variables may alter the effect of economic interdependence on the likelihood of conflict, Pinker’s statement (that the level of trade between the US and China makes conflict unlikely) can be considered to be an over-simplification. One variable is the relative levels of economic dependence. Some argue that asymmetry of trade can increase the chances of conflict if the trade is more important to one state than it is to the other; their resolve would not be reduced by the same degree. The less dependent state would be far more willing than its adversary to initiate a conflict.[13] An example is the possibility of the prevalent idea in China that ‘Japan needs China more than China needs Japan’ leading to China becoming more assertive in Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute.[14] It is important to recognize that all trade is asymmetric in one fashion or another. It is radical asymmetry that one has to fear, which at the moment does not appear to be the case in the China-Japan or US-China case. Another variable is the specifics of what is being traded. A study by Dorussen suggests that the pacifying effect of trade is less evident if the trade consists of raw materials and agriculture but stronger if the trade consists of manufactured goods. Even within the category of manufactured goods there are differences in effect. Mass consumer goods yield the strongest pacifying results whilst high-technology sectors such as electronics and highly capital-intensive sectors such as transport and metal industries tend to have a relatively weak effect.[15] If it is a sector with alternative trade avenues then embargos and boycotts as a result of conflict will have far less effect.[16] The rule is that the more inelastic the import demand, the higher the opportunity cost and the smaller the probability of conflict.[17] According to these studies, trade still generally reduces the likelihood of conflict however it is by no means homogeneous in its effects. Additionally, the opportunity costs are not the same for importers and exporters. Dorussen’s study suggests that increased trade in oil tends to make the exporters more hostile and the importers friendlier in relations to their foreign policy.[18] Taking this framework into account, in 2014 China’s top five exports to the US (computers, broadcasting equipment, telephones and office machine parts) all fell under the category of electronics,[19] whilst the US’s top five exports to China (air and/or spacecraft, soybeans, cars, integrated circuits and scrap copper) were all either high-capital intensive sectors or raw materials and agriculture.[20] According to Dorussen’s study, these exports should not yield the strongest possible conflict reducing results, which could impact the validity of Pinker’s statement. Copeland presents another variable, namely expectations of trade. Copeland argues that if a highly dependent state expects future trade to be high, decision makers will behave as many liberals predict and treat war as a less appealing option. However if there are low expectations of future trade, then a highly dependent state will attach a low or even negative value to continued peaceful relations and war would become more likely.[21] As an example, he points out that despite high levels of trade in 1914 German leaders believed that rival great powers would attempt to undermine this trade in the future, so a war to secure control over raw materials was in the interests of German long-term security.[22] Via this framework, if the US began to believe that in future years they would be less dependent on China’s economy, or if it became apparent that a US-China trade war was about to take place, there would be a sharp rise in the probability of conflict. The final variable this essay will discuss relates to the differences between status quo and revisionist states. Most empirical analyses of economic interdependence tend to group together states as different as the United States, Pakistan, Australia, Germany and China and assume that variations in their behaviour would be the same.[23] Papayoanou on the other hand, argues that when analysing the effects of economic interdependence it is useful to differentiate the effects on great power states and states with revisionist aspirations.[24] If a status quo power has strong economic ties with revisionist state there will be interest groups who advocate engagement and who believe that confrontational stances will threaten the political foundation of economic links. This will constrain the response of the status quo state.[25] One can see evidence of such an interest group in the US, a group Friedberg describes as the Shanghai coalition, who he argues advocate engagement with China at the expense of balancing.[26] A study by Fordham and Kleinberg backs up this argument as they find that US business elites who benefit from trade with China tend to see little benefit in limiting the growth of Chinese power.[27] A 21st Century revisionist power is far less likely to be a democracy, and therefore, interest groups will influence the leadership far less. This means an authoritarian revisionist power will be working under fewer constraints and will be able to take a more aggressive stance.[28] This appears to be the case in China where rather than having domestic constraints on taking an aggressive stance against Japan, one of their biggest trading partners, grassroots nationalism has made explicit cooperation a domestically risky option.[29] There are many indicators to suggest that China is a revisionist power willing to wage war. Lemke and Werner argue that an extraordinary growth of military expenditures’ reveals when a state is dissatisfied with the status quo.[30] Data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute certainly indicates that China qualifies as its military expenditure has nominally increased by 1270% between 1995 and 2015.[31] Additionally, the military modernization appears to be aimed at capabilities to contest US primacy in East Asia.[32] Much like German strategists recognized that Britain was operating under significant domestic constraints, China could realize the same of the US.[33] This is not to say that Chinese decision-makers would be cavalier about making a decision that would be to the detriment its economy. A crash in the Chinese economy due to the loss of exports to the US could potentially undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist party and endanger the regime. However, the view that China is a revisionist power indicates that good trade relations alone will not result in a low probability of conflict. Realist Arguments Pertaining to Dominance of Strategic Interests Having established that if the pacifying effect of trade does exist, it can rise or fall depending on changes in a series of variables this essay proceeds to deal with realist theories arguing that trade has a negligible or even negative effect on the likelihood of conflict. Buzan argues that noneconomic factors contribute far more to major phenomena than liberal theorists usually cite to support their theory.[34] There is evidence of the primacy of strategic interests in Masterson’s 2012 study on the relationship between China’s economic interdependence and political relations with its neighbours. The study concluded that as economic interdependence with neighbouring states increased the likelihood of conflict did indeed decrease, but that the impact was minimal when compared to the impact of relative power capabilities. In other words, political and military issues dominated interstate relations. Growth in power disparities were associated with decreases in dyadic political relations that were greater than the increase caused by economic interdependence.[35] If the pacifying effect of trade can rise and fall so can the provocative effect of strategic interests. It is important to distinguish between the existence of a strategic interest and a situation of unbearable strategic vulnerability. China and the US have many opposing strategic interests, but neither is in a strategically vulnerable position. For example, China shares many borders, but none present the same threat of invasion that Tsarist Russia did to Imperial Germany as none of the current maritime tensions between China, Japan, and the US equate to a matter of national survival.[36] This is crucial as some believe that for a crisis to escalate to a major war an actor who is isolated and believes that history is conspiring against them is needed. Only this actor would take an existential risk to try and offset their strategic vulnerability.[37] Imperial Germany fit this description, but neither China nor the US does. This is largely due to the geography of the region. The tension between the US, China and Japan are over maritime regions. Maritime issues still relate to national interests but, as Krause points out, “Land armies are still the only forces that can conquer and hold territory.”[38] Taking this into account one can argue that the benefits of US-China trade are, for each state, currently greater than the benefits of pursing strategic benefits via force, but this situation will only remain as long as the situation does not become one of unbearable strategic vulnerability. **Realist Arguments Pertaining to the Undermining of Deterrence** Having established that scenarios exist where **strategic interests** and vulnerabilities have a greater effect on the likelihood of war than **economic interdependence**, this essay will now evaluate arguments that economic interdependence can increase the likelihood of conflict through the undermining of deterrence. The argument proceeds as follows: if economic interdependence constrains the ability or willingness of a state to use its military, security is lowered as the state now has a weakened ability to engage in deterrence and defensive alliances. Deterrence relies on the ability of a state to make credible threats and defensive alliances rely on credible promises to protect one’s allies.[39] Credibility is defined as the product of the operational capability to follow through with a threat and the communication of resolve to use force.[40] What is at risk here is that if economic interconnectivity interferes with the communication of resolve to use force then states may end up with a way that neither side expected or wanted. Some argue that it was such a failure to communicate resolve that resulted in the beginning of WW1. Indeed, Jolly claims that: “The Austrians had believed that vigorous actions against Serbia and a promise of German support would deter Russia: the Russians had believed that a show of strength against Austria would both check the Austrians and deter Germany. In both cases, the bluff had been called and the three countries were faced with the military consequences of their actions.”[41] The risk in the US-China case would be that the interest groups described earlier would prevent the US from effectively communicating its resolve to use force if China were to cross a redline. The flaw in this argument lies in the fact that whilst interest groups might push back against public statements outlining redlines; the US has many less overt options available to it to communicate resolve. Modern technology and the forms of interconnectivity have resulted in many more lines of communication between China and the US than adversaries had access to in 1914. Private meetings, electronic communication and numerous other methods of communication have the capability to be candid without being visible to interest groups. It is for this reason that this essay discounts the theory that Sino-American economic interdependence results in a reduction of deterrence and therefore increases the likelihood of conflict.

#### No renewables---won’t happen, too small, failed tests, funneled money to petro capital.

Black 21 [Emma, Educational Background in continental philosophy and is a member of Socialist Alternative. Capitalism’s fake solutions to the climate crisis. 5-23-2021. https://redflag.org.au/article/capitalisms-fake-solutions-climate-crisis]

While the disappearance of the outright climate denialism of the Trump era might seem cause for celebration, the new trend for spruiking the magical power of technology to solve the climate crisis is cause for serious concern. When you look beyond the headline-grabbing announcements of increased long-term ambition, the Earth Day summit amounted to little more than another case of government greenwashing of the business as usual of fossil-fuelled capitalism.

Instead of detailing the changes to be made in the here and now to reduce emissions, Biden and other world leaders instead promoted faith in the capacity of science and technology to come to the rescue at an indeterminate point in the future.

Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison was among them. While the media highlighted the supposed gulf between a progressive, “green” Biden and the conservative, fossil-fuel-loving Morrison, they both promoted the same faith in the powers of technology. Like Biden, Morrison has vowed to invest tens of billions of dollars in developing carbon capture and storage technologies, “clean” hydrogen, “blue” carbon and “green” steel—among other colourful innovations.

In May’s federal budget, the Coalition allocated more than half a billion dollars to developing the first two of these technologies—$263.7 million for carbon capture and storage (CCS) and $275.5 million for “clean” hydrogen.

CCS mostly involves capturing C02 emissions at their source—in mines, power stations and so on—and pumping them deep underground (so the theory goes) to be permanently stored in appropriately porous and stable rock formations. But despite politicians and business leaders spruiking CCS as an easy fix for the climate crisis for decades, it has never been shown to work on anything near the scale required.

Australia already boasts the world’s largest, supposedly functional, CCS facility at Chevron’s Gorgon gas project in Western Australia. However, according to the Climate Council, “the Gorgon CCS trial has been a big, expensive failure ... capturing less than half the emissions needed to make CCS viable”. In what is only the latest in a series of problems since it became operational in 2019, Michael Mazengarb reported in Renew Economy earlier this year that pumping equipment required to clear water from the undersea formation into which the C02 is to be injected had become clogged with sand.

However, while CCS may be useless for addressing climate change, it remains an extremely useful political tool for the government—providing it with green cover while it continues to funnel money to Coalition supporters in the coal and gas industries. And of course, it’s also useful for those companies on the receiving end of the government’s “green” largesse.

Bernard Keane was right in his assessment of it as a scam in Crikey. “Fossil fuel interests”, he wrote in 2019, “sense the opportunity to extract some taxpayer funding from a government worried it might have to pretend it believes in climate change”. With this year’s budget, they hit the jackpot.

But if CCS is a scam, what about “clean” hydrogen? In his speech to the Earth Day summit, Morrison vowed to rival US innovation by investing billions in high-tech “hydrogen valleys”. “In the United States you have the Silicon Valley”, he said. “Here in Australia we are creating our own ‘Hydrogen Valleys’, where we will transform our transport industries, our mining and resource sectors, our manufacturing, our fuel and energy production.”

Hydrogen is potentially a clean energy source, but only if it’s produced using renewable energy. And to be produced at the scale required to transform the economy in the way Morrison is implying would require a lot of electricity.

In his recent contribution to the Quarterly Essay, Australia’s former chief scientist, Alan Finkel, calculates that to produce the equivalent volume of hydrogen to what Australia currently exports in liquefied natural gas would require “approximately 2,200 terawatt-hours” of electricity. This, Finkel notes, “is about eight times Australia’s total electricity generation in 2019”.

If Morrison genuinely believes the “hydrogen boom” he envisages will be based on production of renewable energy on that kind of scale, the government would have provided increased funding for renewables in the budget. None was forthcoming.

The reality is that Morrison sees the talk of “hydrogen valleys” as a way of greenwashing the same old “gas-fired recovery” he was promoting last year. The government doesn’t envisage producing hydrogen with electricity from renewables, but rather from gas. The focus on CCS gives the game away. The “hydrogen valleys” of the future will be criss-crossed with pipelines and peppered with gas-fired power stations with (we’re supposed to believe) the magic of CCS ensuring that the whole operation can nevertheless be run green and guilt-free.

“Clean” hydrogen then, just like CCS, turns out to be just another technological chimera designed to greenwash capitalism’s continuing addiction to fossil fuels.

What then of the other technological solutions being touted? Perhaps the most headline grabbing of them has been Biden’s proposed US$174 billion investment in the infrastructure for electric vehicles and their production. On the surface, again, this might sound like a good idea. Who wouldn’t want to live in a world in which we can all drive around in sleek, silent, powerful and “green” electric vehicles like Teslas?

Again, however, this is just another fake technological “fix” to the climate crisis that will help perpetuate the environmentally destructive status quo. A genuinely sustainable society won’t be built around the kind of car culture that exists today. What’s needed, among other things, is a massive investment in public transport and the transformation of cities to reduce the need for long commutes.

The promotion of electric vehicles as part of a technological “green” utopia is designed to forestall this kind of change, to protect as much as possible the car makers and other big business interests that profit from the status quo.

Elon Musk personifies this. In his authorised biography, Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future, Ashlee Vance revealed that Musk’s California “hyperloop” proposal was aimed at quashing plans for a high-speed rail link between Los Angeles and San Francisco. “Musk had dished out the Hyperloop proposal just to make the public and legislators rethink the high-speed train”, wrote Vance. “He didn’t intend to build the thing ... With any luck, the high-speed rail would be cancelled. Musk said as much to me during a series of emails and phone calls leading up to the announcement.”

For those who can afford it (a base-level Tesla will set you back an eye-watering $73,900 in Australia today), driving an electric car might make you feel like you’re doing something to help save the planet. This is an illusion.

Even if your car is charged from electricity produced by renewable energy, you also have to consider all the emissions produced in the construction and maintenance of the roads and freeways on which you drive. Then there’s the material of the car itself, and the lithium needed for the battery. Already, the skyrocketing demand is causing major environmental problems for major lithium producers like China, Chile and Bolivia. Tellingly, Musk has already devised the ultimate escape plan for himself—moving to Mars. This is not an option for most people.

The long list of fake technological fixes to the climate crisis is nothing more than a delaying tactic, designed to create the impression of change to ensure the profits bonanza of the fossil fuel economy can continue for as long as possible. Only a total transformation of society, in which technological production is rationally designed and democratically organised and controlled, can ensure that we are able, in Marx’s words, “to bequeath the Earth in an improved state to succeeding generations”.

#### \*Profitability thumps.

Kim Moody 21. Visiting scholar at the University of Westminster, 10/11/21. “Why it’s high time to move on from ‘just-in-time’ supply chains.” https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/oct/11/just-in-time-supply-chains-logistical-capitalism

A price shock on the global natural gas markets brings down several small energy providers, leaving customers without heating and facing rising fuel prices. A fire knocks out the huge cable sending electricity from France to the UK, threatening homes with darkness and increasing power bills. The container ship Ever Given, bound for Felixstowe from Malaysia, gets stuck in the Suez canal for six days, backing up shipping traffic at an estimated cost of £730m and delaying that electronic gadget you ordered from Amazon Prime.

What these incidents have in common is the speed at which a single event can disrupt the supply chains that crisscross the world . Almost every time you order something online, it is transported via a network of factories, rails, roads, ships, warehouses and delivery drivers that together form the global economy’s circulatory system. This tightly calibrated infrastructure is designed for perpetual motion. Once one link breaks or stalls, the impact on today’s just-in-time supply chains can be felt immediately.

Just-in-time was the idea of Taiichi Ohno, an engineer at Toyota in the 1950s, who was inspired by the work of Henry Ford. Ohno defined it as a way of eliminating “waste” – by which he meant stockpiles, extra workers and unused minutes – in the production and movement of goods. Instead of wasting time, labour and money by storing parts along the assembly line or warehousing goods (as manufacturers had done for decades), Ohno’s idea was that suppliers could instead deliver these just as they were needed. In turn this would increase profits, reducing the amount that businesses spent on maintaining inventories and paying for additional labour.

After its introduction to the west in the 1980s, the just-in-time model gradually moved out of the car plant and into every type of goods and service production. It forced its way down every supply chain until each supplier, big or small, was expected to deliver products promptly to the next buyer. This increased competition between companies to deliver goods quickly, which meant firms reduced their costs (usually the price of labour). Just-in-time delivery thus contributed to the growth of low-wage, often more precarious jobs, with workers recruited only when they would be needed. This constant squeezing of workers has fuelled our 24/7 work culture and the mental health problems that go with it, while attempts to cut the price of labour have added to the growth of economic inequality, regardless of who sits in government.

Delivering products at speed relies on infrastructure. From the 1980s onwards, motorways widened, ports deepened and extra runways were added here and there to keep up with the pace of change. Twenty-first century warehouses transformed from places of storage into vast distribution and fulfilment centres. But speed, as any Formula One driver will tell you, brings its own risks. Floods, power outages, closed roads, labour disputes and, of course, pandemics can all halt the system. Because just-in-time has eradicated stockpiles, an unforeseen crisis can lead to treacherous shortages. At the start of the pandemic, there were widespread shortages of PPE, gowns, masks and plastic gloves – all of which rely on just-in-time production, with few stockpiles kept as backup.

Now, our just-in-time world is becoming increasingly crisis prone. The schedules of container shipping have been unreliable since the pandemic began in early 2020. The rise of fuel prices has also led to reduced shipping speeds, known as “slow steaming”, to cut costs. The British International Freight Association, meanwhile, has warned about a “shortage of land transport” – in other words, dockers or warehouse workers have gone down with Covid and lorry drivers are in short supply owing to the pandemic and Brexit, as well as years of stagnant wages, long hours and lack of available training. The Road Haulage Association estimates the current shortage at 100,000 drivers in the UK. Too few drivers means clogged ports, stalled ships, empty shelves and higher prices.

Supply chain managers and logistics experts are aware of all the potential problems, and have been debating the trade-off between “risk” versus “resilience” – the latter being the ability to minimise or quickly recover from a disruption – for the past decade or more. Low just-in-time inventories increase the risks of shortages when a crisis bites. “Resilience”, however, means bigger stockpiles, more workers, multiple suppliers and higher costs. This creates a dilemma. Competition makes resilience itself risky for individual companies. Who wants to buy from the higher-priced laggard? Yet so long as profitability is the driving force, national efforts to turn inward or “take back control” – ironically, often in order to create an imagined resilience, as with Brexit – simply create more disruptions, broken supply chains and higher prices as businesses seek to recover losses. The regime of cheap consumer goods becomes more and more difficult to sustain.

There are even bigger implications for this regime of breakneck capitalism. All this global real-time motion is driven by fossil fuels that are driving climate breakdown. The increase in tsunamis, wildfires, floods and other extreme weather events is making supply chains and the necessities they deliver even more vulnerable. Those protesters sitting down in central London or out on the motorways are on to something. One way or another, if you deprive big business of the free use of its favourite deadly energy sources, you can slow things down to a human pace – and maybe even save the planet while you’re at it.

Decades of deregulation, privatisation and market worship have left society vulnerable to the unbidden force of “just-in-time” supply chains. No amount of government subsidies, lower taxes, job training and other shopworn policies will be enough to address the crises we face, from the pandemic to climate breakdown, which are causing supply chains to fail. Now is the time to think about not just how we make and consume things, but also how we move them.

### Naval Industries Adv---1NC

#### Heg is doomed---backlash and technology destroy the foundations of the US-led order.

Walter Russell Mead 21. James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and the Humanities at Bard College, the Global View columnist at The Wall Street Journal, and a Distinguished Fellow at the Hudson Institute. "The End of the Wilsonian Era". Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-12-08/end-wilsonian-era

This task was complicated by the Cold War, but “the free world” (as Americans then called the noncommunist countries) continued to develop along Wilsonian lines. Inevitable compromises, such as U.S. support for ruthless dictators and military rulers in many parts of the world, were seen as regrettable necessities imposed by the need to fight the much greater evil of Soviet communism. When the Berlin Wall fell, in 1989, it seemed that the opportunity for a Wilsonian world order had finally come. The former Soviet empire could be reconstructed along Wilsonian lines, and the West could embrace Wilsonian principles more consistently now that the Soviet threat had disappeared. Self-determination, the rule of law between and within countries, liberal economics, and the protection of human rights: the “new world order” that both the George H. W. Bush and the Clinton administrations worked to create was very much in the Wilsonian mold.

Today, however, the most important fact in world politics is that this noble effort has failed. The next stage in world history will not unfold along Wilsonian lines. The nations of the earth will continue to seek some kind of political order, because they must. And human rights activists and others will continue to work toward their goals. But the dream of a universal order, grounded in law, that secures peace between countries and democracy inside them will figure less and less in the work of world leaders.

To state this truth is not to welcome it. There are many advantages to a Wilsonian world order, even when that order is partial and incomplete. Many analysts, some associated with the presidential campaign of former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, think they can put Humpty Dumpty together again. One wishes them every success. But the centrifugal forces tearing at the Wilsonian order are so deeply rooted in the nature of the contemporary world that not even the end of the Trump era can revive the Wilsonian project in its most ambitious form. Although Wilsonian ideals will not disappear and there will be a continuing influence of Wilsonian thought on U.S. foreign policies, the halcyon days of the post–Cold War era, when American presidents organized their foreign policies around the principles of liberal internationalism, are unlikely to return anytime soon.

THE ORDER OF THINGS

Wilsonianism is only one version of a rules-based world order among many. The Westphalian system, which emerged in Europe after the Thirty Years’ War ended in 1648, and the Congress system, which arose in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century, were both rules-based and even law-based; some of the foundational ideas of international law date from those eras. And the Holy Roman Empire—a transnational collection of territories that stretched from France into modern-day Poland and from Hamburg to Milan—was an international system that foreshadowed the European Union, with highly complex rules governing everything from trade to sovereign inheritance among princely houses.

As for human rights, by the early twentieth century, the pre-Wilsonian European system had been moving for a century in the direction of putting egregious violations of human rights onto the international agenda. Then, as now, it was chiefly weak countries whose oppressive behavior attracted the most attention. The genocidal murder of Ottoman Christian minorities at the hands of Ottoman troops and irregular forces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries received substantially more attention than atrocities carried out around the same time by Russian forces against rebellious Muslim peoples in the Caucasus. No delegation of European powers came to Washington to discuss the treatment of Native Americans or to make representations concerning the status of African Americans. Nevertheless, the pre-Wilsonian European order had moved significantly in the direction of elevating human rights to the level of diplomacy.

Wilson, therefore, was not introducing the ideas of world order and human rights to a collection of previously anarchic states and unenlightened polities. Rather, his quest was to reform an existing international order whose defects had been conclusively demonstrated by the horrors of World War I. In the pre-Wilsonian order, established dynastic rulers were generally regarded as legitimate, and interventions such as the 1849 Russian invasion of Hungary, which restored Habsburg rule, were considered lawful. Except in the most glaring instances, states were more or less free to treat their citizens or subjects as they wished, and although governments were expected to observe the accepted principles of public international law, no supranational body was charged with the enforcement of these standards. The preservation of the balance of power was invoked as a goal to guide states; war, although regrettable, was seen as a legitimate element of the system. From Wilson’s standpoint, these were fatal flaws that made future conflagrations inevitable. To redress them, he sought to build an order in which states would accept enforceable legal restrictions on their behavior at home and their international conduct.

That never quite materialized, but until recent years, the U.S.-led postwar order resembled Wilson’s vision in important respects. And, it should be noted, that vision is not equally dead everywhere. Although Wilson was an American, his view of world order was first and foremost developed as a method for managing international politics in Europe, and it is in Europe where Wilson’s ideas have had their greatest success and where their prospects continue to look strongest. His ideas were treated with bitter and cynical contempt by most European statesmen when he first proposed them, but they later became the fundamental basis of the European order, enshrined in the laws and practices of the EU. Arguably, no ruler since Charlemagne has made as deep an impression on the European political order as the much-mocked Presbyterian from the Shenandoah Valley.

THE ARC OF HISTORY

Beyond Europe, the prospects for the Wilsonian order are bleak. The reasons behind its demise, however, are different from what many assume. Critics of the Wilsonian approach to foreign affairs often decry what they see as its idealism. In fact, as Wilson demonstrated during the negotiations over the Treaty of Versailles, he was perfectly capable of the most cynical realpolitik when it suited him. The real problem of Wilsonianism is not a naive faith in good intentions but a simplistic view of the historical process, especially when it comes to the impact of technological progress on human social order. Wilson’s problem was not that he was a prig but that he was a Whig.

Like early-twentieth-century progressives generally and many American intellectuals to this day, Wilson was a liberal determinist of the Anglo-Saxon school; he shared the optimism of what the scholar Herbert Butterfield called “the Whig historians,” the Victorian-era British thinkers who saw human history as a narrative of inexorable progress and betterment. Wilson believed that the so-called ordered liberty that characterized the Anglo-American countries had opened a path to permanent prosperity and peace. This belief represents a sort of Anglo-Saxon Hegelianism and holds that the mix of free markets, free government, and the rule of law that developed in the United Kingdom and the United States is inevitably transforming the rest of the world—and that as this process continues, the world will slowly and for the most part voluntarily converge on the values that made the Anglo-Saxon world as wealthy, attractive, and free as it has become.

Wilson was the devout son of a minister, deeply steeped in Calvinist teachings about predestination and the utter sovereignty of God, and he believed that the arc of progress was fated. The future would fulfill biblical prophecies of a coming millennium: a thousand-year reign of peace and prosperity before the final consummation of human existence, when a returning Christ would unite heaven and earth. (Today’s Wilsonians have given this determinism a secular twist: in their eyes, liberalism will rule the future and bring humanity to “the end of history” as a result of human nature rather than divine purpose.)

Wilson believed that the defeat of imperial Germany in World War I and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires meant that the hour of a universal League of Nations had finally arrived. In 1945, American leaders ranging from Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Wallace on the left to Wendell Willkie and Thomas Dewey on the right would interpret the fall of Germany and Japan in much the same way. In the early 1990s, leading U.S. foreign policymakers and commentators saw the fall of the Soviet Union through the same deterministic prism: as a signal that the time had come for a truly global and truly liberal world order. On all three occasions, Wilsonian order builders seemed to be in sight of their goal. But each time, like Ulysses, they were blown off course by contrary winds.

TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES

Today, those winds are gaining strength. Anyone hoping to reinvigorate the flagging Wilsonian project must contend with a number of obstacles. The most obvious is the return of ideology-fueled geopolitics. China, Russia, and a number of smaller powers aligned with them—Iran, for example—correctly see Wilsonian ideals as a deadly threat to their domestic arrangements. Earlier in the post–Cold War period, U.S. primacy was so thorough that those countries attempted to downplay or disguise their opposition to the prevailing pro-democracy consensus. Beginning in U.S. President Barack Obama’s second term, however, and continuing through the Trump era, they have become less inhibited. Seeing Wilsonianism as a cover for American and, to some degree, EU ambitions, Beijing and Moscow have grown increasingly bold about contesting Wilsonian ideas and initiatives inside international institutions such as the UN and on the ground in places from Syria to the South China Sea.

These powers’ opposition to the Wilsonian order is corrosive in several ways. It raises the risks and costs for Wilsonian powers to intervene in conflicts beyond their own borders. Consider, for example, how Iranian and Russian support for the Assad regime in Syria has helped prevent the United States and European countries from getting more directly involved in that country’s civil war. The presence of great powers in the anti-Wilsonian coalition also provides shelter and assistance to smaller powers that otherwise might not choose to resist the status quo. Finally, the membership of countries such as China and Russia in international institutions makes it more difficult for those institutions to operate in support of Wilsonian norms: take, for example, Chinese and Russian vetoes in the UN Security Council, the election of anti-Wilsonian representatives to various UN bodies, and the opposition by countries such as Hungary and Poland to EU measures intended to promote the rule of law.

Meanwhile, the torrent of technological innovation and change known as “the information revolution” creates obstacles for Wilsonian goals within countries and in the international system. The irony is that Wilsonians often believe that technological progress will make the world more governable and politics more rational—even if it also adds to the danger of war by making it so much more destructive. Wilson himself believed just that, as did the postwar order builders and the liberals who sought to extend the U.S.-led order after the Cold War. Each time, however, this faith in technological change was misplaced. As seen most recently with the rise of the Internet, although new technologies often contribute to the spread of liberal ideas and practices, they can also undermine democratic systems and aid authoritarian regimes.

Today, as new technologies disrupt entire industries, and as social media upends the news media and election campaigning, politics is becoming more turbulent and polarized in many countries. That makes the victory of populist and antiestablishment candidates from both the left and the right more likely in many places. It also makes it harder for national leaders to pursue the compromises that international cooperation inevitably requires and increases the chances that incoming governments will refuse to be bound by the acts of their predecessors.

The information revolution is destabilizing international life in other ways that make it harder for rules-based international institutions to cope. Take, for example, the issue of arms control, a central concern of Wilsonian foreign policy since World War I and one that grew even more important following the development of nuclear weapons. Wilsonians prioritize arms control not just because nuclear warfare could destroy the human race but also because, even if unused, nuclear weapons or their equivalent put the Wilsonian dream of a completely rules-based, law-bound international order out of reach. Weapons of mass destruction guarantee exactly the kind of state sovereignty that Wilsonians think is incompatible with humanity’s long-term security. One cannot easily stage a humanitarian intervention against a nuclear power.

The fight against proliferation has had its successes, and the spread of nuclear weapons has been delayed—but it has not stopped, and the fight is getting harder over time. In the 1940s, it took the world’s richest nation and a consortium of leading scientists to assemble the first nuclear weapon. Today, second- and third-rate scientific establishments in low-income countries can manage the feat. That does not mean that the fight against proliferation should be abandoned. It is merely a reminder that not all diseases have cures.

What is more, the technological progress that underlies the information revolution significantly exacerbates the problem of arms control. The development of cyberweapons and the potential of biological agents to inflict strategic damage on adversaries—graphically demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic—serve as warnings that new tools of warfare will be significantly more difficult to monitor or control than nuclear technology. Effective arms control in these fields may well not be possible. The science is changing too quickly, the research behind them is too hard to detect, and too many of the key technologies cannot be banned outright because they also have beneficial civilian applications.

In addition, economic incentives that did not exist in the Cold War are now pushing arms races in new fields. Nuclear weapons and long-range missile technology were extremely expensive and brought few benefits to the civilian economy. Biological and technological research, by contrast, are critical for any country or company that hopes to remain competitive in the twenty-first century. An uncontrollable, multipolar arms race across a range of cutting-edge technologies is on the horizon, and it will undercut hopes for a revived Wilsonian order.

IT’S NOT FOR EVERYBODY

One of the central assumptions behind the quest for a Wilsonian order is the belief that as countries develop, they become more similar to already developed countries and will eventually converge on the liberal capitalist model that shapes North America and western Europe. The Wilsonian project requires a high degree of convergence to succeed; the member states of a Wilsonian order must be democratic, and they must be willing and able to conduct their international relations within liberal multilateral institutions.

At least for the medium term, the belief in convergence can no longer be sustained. Today, China, India, Russia, and Turkey all seem less likely to converge on liberal democracy than they did in 1990. These countries and many others have developed economically and technologically not in order to become more like the West but rather to achieve a deeper independence from the West and to pursue civilizational and political goals of their own.

In truth, Wilsonianism is a particularly European solution to a particularly European set of problems. Since the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe has been divided into peer and near-peer competitors. War was the constant condition of Europe for much of its history, and Europe’s global dominance in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century can be attributed in no small part to the long contest for supremacy between France and the United Kingdom, which promoted developments in finance, state organization, industrial techniques, and the art of war that made European states fierce and ferocious competitors.

With the specter of great-power war constantly hanging over them, European states developed a more intricate system of diplomacy and international politics than did countries in other parts of the world. Well-developed international institutions and doctrines of legitimacy existed in Europe well before Wilson sailed across the Atlantic to pitch the League of Nations, which was in essence an upgraded version of preexisting European forms of international governance. Although it would take another devastating world war to ensure that Germany, as well as its Western neighbors, would adhere to the rules of a new system, Europe was already prepared for the establishment of a Wilsonian order.

But Europe’s experience has not been the global norm. Although China has been periodically invaded by nomads, and there were periods in its history when several independent Chinese states struggled for power, China has been a single entity for most of its history. The idea of a single legitimate state with no true international peers is as deeply embedded in the political culture of China as the idea of a multistate system grounded in mutual recognition is embedded in that of Europe. There have been clashes among Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans, but until the late nineteenth century, interstate conflict was rare.

In human history as a whole, enduring civilizational states seem more typical than the European pattern of rivalry among peer states. Early modern India was dominated by the Mughal Empire. Between the sixteenth century and the nineteenth century, the Ottoman and Persian Empires dominated what is now known as the Middle East. And the Incas and the Aztecs knew no true rivals in their regions. War seems universal or nearly so among human cultures, but the European pattern, in which an escalating cycle of war forced a mobilization and the development of technological, political, and bureaucratic resources to ensure the survival of the state, does not seem to have characterized international life in the rest of the world.

For states and peoples in much of the world, the problem of modern history that needed to be solved was not the recurrence of great-power conflict. The problem, instead, was figuring out how to drive European powers away, which involved a wrenching cultural and economic adjustment in order to harness natural and industrial resources. Europe’s internecine quarrels struck non-Europeans not as an existential civilizational challenge to be solved but as a welcome opportunity to achieve independence.

Postcolonial and non-Western states often joined international institutions as a way to recover and enhance their sovereignty, not to surrender it, and their chief interest in international law was to protect weak states from strong ones, not to limit the power of national leaders to consolidate their authority. Unlike their European counterparts, these states did not have formative political experiences of tyrannical regimes suppressing dissent and drafting helpless populations into the service of colonial conquest. Their experiences, instead, involved a humiliating consciousness of the inability of local authorities and elites to protect their subjects and citizens from the arrogant actions and decrees of foreign powers. After colonialism formally ended and nascent countries began to assert control over their new territories, the classic problems of governance in the postcolonial world remained weak states and compromised sovereignty.

Even within Europe, differences in historical experiences help explain varying levels of commitment to Wilsonian ideals. Countries such as France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands came to the EU understanding that they could meet their basic national goals only by pooling their sovereignty. For many former Warsaw Pact members, however, the motive for joining Western clubs such as the EU and NATO was to regain their lost sovereignty. They did not share the feelings of guilt and remorse over the colonial past—and, in Germany, over the Holocaust—that led many in western Europe to embrace the idea of a new approach to international affairs, and they felt no qualms about taking full advantage of the privileges of EU and NATO membership without feeling in any way bound by those organizations’ stated tenets, which many regarded as hypocritical boilerplate.

EXPERT TEXPERT

The recent rise of populist movements across the West has revealed another danger to the Wilsonian project. If the United States could elect Donald Trump as president in 2016, what might it do in the future? What might the electorates in other important countries do? And if the Wilsonian order has become so controversial in the West, what are its prospects in the rest of the world?

Wilson lived in an era when democratic governance faced problems that many feared were insurmountable. The Industrial Revolution had divided American society, creating unprecedented levels of inequality. Titanic corporations and trusts had acquired immense political power and were quite selfishly exploiting that power to resist all challenges to their economic interests. At that time, the richest man in the United States, John D. Rockefeller, had a fortune greater than the annual budget of the federal government. By contrast, in 2020, the wealthiest American, Jeff Bezos, had a net worth equal to about three percent of budgeted federal expenditures.

Yet from the standpoint of Wilson and his fellow progressives, the solution to these problems could not be simply to vest power in the voters. At the time, most Americans still had an eighth-grade education or less, and a wave of migration from Europe had filled the country’s burgeoning cities with millions of voters who could not speak English, were often illiterate, and routinely voted for corrupt urban machine politicians.

The progressives’ answer to this problem was to support the creation of an apolitical expert class of managers and administrators. The progressives sought to build an administrative state that would curb the excessive power of the rich and redress the moral and political deficiencies of the poor. (Prohibition was an important part of Wilson’s electoral program, and during World War I and afterward, he moved aggressively to arrest and in some cases deport socialists and other radicals.) Through measures such as improved education, strict limits on immigration, and eugenic birth-control policies, the progressives hoped to create better-educated and more responsible voters who would reliably support the technocratic state.

A century later, elements of this progressive thinking remain critical to Wilsonian governance in the United States and elsewhere, but public support is less readily forthcoming than in the past. The Internet and social media have undermined respect for all forms of expertise. Ordinary citizens today are significantly better educated and feel less need to rely on expert guidance. And events including the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 2008 financial crisis, and the inept government responses during the 2020 pandemic have seriously reduced confidence in experts and technocrats, whom many people have come to see as forming a nefarious “deep state.”

International institutions face an even greater crisis of confidence. Voters skeptical of the value of technocratic rule by fellow citizens are even more skeptical of foreign technocrats with suspiciously cosmopolitan views. Just as the inhabitants of European colonial territories preferred home rule (even when badly administered) to rule by colonial civil servants (even when competent), many people in the West and in the postcolonial world are likely to reject even the best-intentioned plans of global institutions.

Meanwhile, in developed countries, problems such as the loss of manufacturing jobs, the stagnation or decline of wages, persistent poverty among minority groups, and the opioid epidemic have resisted technocratic solutions. And when it comes to international challenges such as climate change and mass migration, there is little evidence that the cumbersome institutions of global governance and the quarrelsome countries that run them will produce the kind of cheap, elegant solutions that could inspire public trust.

WHAT IT MEANS FOR BIDEN

For all these reasons, the movement away from the Wilsonian order is likely to continue, and world politics will increasingly be carried out along non-Wilsonian and in some cases even anti-Wilsonian lines. Institutions such as NATO, the UN, and the World Trade Organization may well survive (bureaucratic tenacity should never be discounted), but they will be less able and perhaps less willing to fulfill even their original purposes, much less take on new challenges. Meanwhile, the international order will increasingly be shaped by states that are on diverging paths. This does not mean an inevitable future of civilizational clashes, but it does mean that global institutions will have to accommodate a much wider range of views and values than they have in the past.

There is hope that many of the gains of the Wilsonian order can be preserved and perhaps in a few areas even extended. But fixating on past glories will not help develop the ideas and policies needed in an increasingly dangerous time. Non-Wilsonian orders have existed both in Europe and in other parts of the world in the past, and the nations of the world will likely need to draw on these examples as they seek to cobble together some kind of framework for stability and, if possible, peace under contemporary conditions.

For U.S. policymakers, the developing crisis of the Wilsonian order worldwide presents vexing problems that are likely to preoccupy presidential administrations for decades to come. One problem is that many career officials and powerful voices in Congress, civil society organizations, and the press deeply believe not only that a Wilsonian foreign policy is a good and useful thing for the United States but also that it is the only path to peace and security and even to the survival of civilization and humanity. They will continue to fight for their cause, conducting trench warfare inside the bureaucracy and employing congressional oversight powers and steady leaks to sympathetic press outlets to keep the flame alive.

Those factions will be hemmed in by the fact that any internationalist coalition in American foreign policy must rely to a significant degree on Wilsonian voters. But a generation of overreach and poor political judgment has significantly reduced the credibility of Wilsonian ideas among the American electorate. Neither President George W. Bush’s nation-building disaster in Iraq nor Obama’s humanitarian-intervention fiasco in Libya struck most Americans as successful, and there is little public enthusiasm for democracy building abroad.

#### No military laundry list impact---military empirically hypes threats

Zenko 13 Micah Zenko is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations [February 26, 2013, “Most. Dangerous. World. Ever.” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/26/most\_dangerous\_world\_ever?wp\_login\_redirect=0]

In fact, the military is actually pretty good at developing worst-case contingency response plans for any number of foreseeable or crazy crises, using the operations -- or "3" -- planning staffs at combatant commands and in the Joint Staff. But the Pentagon's budgetary and programmatic managers did not plan in advance of sequestration, and now they find themselves scrambling to finish the job. In September, Defense Department comptroller Robert Hale said, "We will wait as long as we can to begin this process." Last week, he defended the lack of planning: "If we'd done this six months ago, we would have caused the degradation in productivity and morale that we're seeing now among our civilians." History will judge whether or not the Pentagon gambled correctly, if the already once-delayed sequestration is triggered as scheduled this Friday.

Instead of planning, Pentagon officials seemed to all reach for their thesauri after the Budget Control Act was passed in August 2011. Civilian and military officials have used a range of colorful terms to decry the joint-White House-Congress manufactured crisis of sequestration: "doomsday mechanism," "fiscal castration," "peanut butter," "stupid," "gun to their heads," "nuts," "irrational," "an indiscriminate formula," "worst possible outcome," "legislative madness," "devastating," "shameful," "reckless," and "absolutely disastrous." During what was supposed to be his final overseas trip -- before Senate Republicans delayed Chuck Hagel's confirmation process -- Panetta's staff appropriately gifted him a plastic meat axe, his favorite metaphor for graphically describing how sequestration would be applied across defense budget.

Besides applying these metaphors while simultaneously defending the necessity and relevance of their service or agency, national security officials have also seized the opportunity to paint the world as increasingly dangerous, unstable, and unpredictable. This casual threat inflation -- unquestioned by congressional members and the vast majority of punditry and media outlets -- has serious consequences for America's future foreign policy agenda. Consider these comments from over the past two weeks:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Martin Dempsey informed the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC), "I will personally attest to the fact that [the world is] more dangerous than it has ever been." The next day, he warned the HASC: "There is no foreseeable peace dividend. The security environment is more dangerous and more uncertain." Similarly, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno professed to the SASC, "The global environment is the most uncertain I've seen in my thirty-six years of service." Director of National Intelligence James Clapper also concluded in an interview: "In almost 50 years in intelligence, I don't remember when we've had a more diverse array of threats and crisis situations around the world to deal with."

I will not repeat Gen. Dempsey's questionable threat calculus again in this column. However, it is worth noting that Dempsey has claimed for over a year: "We are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime." Now, Dempsey argues that we are not merely living in the most dangerous moment since his birth in 1952, but since the earth was formed 4.54 billion years ago.

Also appearing before the HASC, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Amos predicted: "The world we live in right now is very dangerous, and it's going to be that way for the next two decades." Referring to the relatively responsive capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Units, Amos added: "I'm not trying to scare everybody, but you have to have a hedge force...to buy time for our national leaders." Given the U.S. military's terrible track record of predicting future conflicts, we should be skeptical of Amos's contention of being able to accurately forecast the global security environment through 2029.

#### Their frame of Russia produces error replication.

**Crosston ’15** (Matthew, Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University, “America vs. Russia: Bringing a Knife to a Gun Fight”, THE CASPIAN PROJECT: A WEEKLY EDITION FROM THE MODERN DIPLOMACY no. 7, pgs. 5-8, [SG])

In South Ossetia, Russia was outraged once more when it was accused of ‘invading’ another country when it felt it was justifiably responding strongly to unrest and instability threatening its own North Ossetia (which resulted in Russian peacekeepers being killed according to the UN) and sending an appropriate force message to Georgia to stop exacerbating the situation between North and South. In Crimea/Eastern Ukraine, Russia is bluntly pursuing its own foreign policy interests during a time of political turmoil in a region that was once its own (Crimea was given to Ukraine in the 1950s with an air of diplomatic indifference as the expected eternal nature of the Soviet Union made the ‘gift’ irrelevant – ie, Moscow would always control it from afar), while listening to the West say it is trying to ultimately occupy all of Ukraine and possibly beyond. In each case, when you look back over numerous media, academic, and diplomatic sources, the word ‘imperialism’ factors prominently: Russia’s motivations in each case were not based on national security interests, but were instead founded on its inevitable need to regain an old Soviet‘ imperialistic’ nature. This Cold War residue even made the categorization and scope of the conflicts themselves a source of political discord: in the West, Chechnya often became ‘Southern Russia,’ South Ossetia became ‘Georgia,’ and Crimea has now become ‘Ukraine.’ In other words, time and again Russia preferred keeping situations more case-specific and minimalized, while the United States (in Russia’s opinion at least) effectively re-characterized the situations so that they seemed more far reaching and tyrannical in terms of danger and concern. No doubt even more galling to Russia has been the need to answer such criticism while the United States has pursued decidedly more aggressive maneuvers on a global scale without interference and relatively minor criticism. Russia did not interfere when campaigns were launched in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia did not interfere with maneuvers in Libya and Yemen. What Russia bristles at is when America characterizes its own maneuvers as somehow being something ‘above’ basic foreign policy priorities and national security objectives while everything the Russian Federation does in much the same light is declared ‘neo-imperialist’ or breaking international law. Make note: this is not any lame or manic anti American diatribe. Russia is not anti-American. Russia is simply first and foremost pro-Russia, just as it expects and assumes America to be first and foremost pro-America. And here is the tricky part: on this issue, in the eyes of most of the world when speaking privately, Russia is right. America is the only country that indefatigably explains its positions as being about something more than just purely American interests. But the U.S. needs to understand that this sermon is being delivered from a pulpit more and more often to an EMPTY congregation: no one except America believes this diplomatic propaganda. Surveying allies and adversaries alike reveals nothing but dismissive smirks about the idea that American global maneuvers are based on higher moral principles rather than on what best positions American national interests. Again, remember the subtlety: such dismissiveness is not anger about America trying to leverage its power for maximum output. It is rather irritation at how often America tries to judge and prevent other states from doing the exact same thing on the regional and/or global stage. Other countries might not like how Russia expresses its power but they accept those maneuvers, for better or worse, as the way the geopolitical game still works on the modern global stage of differentiated power capacity. As long as the United States continues to delude itself on this basic fundamental aspect of global affairs - envisioning itself as the great preserver of international principles while never supposedly acting opportunistically or self-servingly - then it will continue to blow a mighty wind on situations like Crimea while accomplishing nothing. Indeed, Russians have complained about the essence of this American diplomatic grandstanding for decades, in earnest since 9/11 when they believed America would be joining them in the global fight against radical Islamic extremism only to be inexplicably (to them) rebuffed. America has long held pride in the fact that it can and does project its global power independently when it wants to. It has never, however, responded positively whenever any other nation tries to do the same, whether it is Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, or Russia. And for those who think it is alright to ‘constrain’ such nations, keep in mind that France, Germany, Israel, and India have all complained at times of the same thing. There is nothing wrong with trying to ‘manage your power brand’ so that it comes across as something more noble and more righteous than pure nationalist desire. When the United States seems to actually come across as complaining about other countries not buying in and wanting the same right to enact its political will just like America, then it underserves its own true global power by seeming a bit petulant and unsubtle. And doing that, unfortunately, is why Russia has been so successful in maintaining geopolitical sympathizers outside of Western Europe when it comes to American posturing. It makes the U.S. look like it is trying to bring a knife to a foreign policy gunfight.

#### Middle East impact is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Studying the Middle East is the new war of biopolitical war of preemption.

**Morrissey 11** John MORRISSEY, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland, 11 [“Liberal Lawfare and Biopolitics: US Juridical Warfare in the War on Terror,” Geopolitics, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2011, p. 280-305, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

Foucault’s envisioning of a more governmentalised and securitized modernity, framed by a ubiquitous architecture of security, speaks on various levels to the contemporary US military’s efforts in the war on terror, but I want to mention three specifically, which I draw upon through the course of the paper. First, in the long war in the Middle East and Central Asia, the US military actively seeks to legally facilitate both the ‘circulation’ and ‘conduct’ of a target population: its own troops. This may not be commonly recognized in biopolitical critiques of the war on terror but, as will be seen later, the Judge Advocate General Corps has long been proactive in a ‘juridical’ form of warfare, or lawfare, that sees US troops as ‘technical-biopolitical’ objects of management whose ‘operational capabilities’ on the ground must be legally enabled. Second, as I have explored elsewhere, the US military’s ‘grand strategy of security’ in the war on terror – which includes a broad spectrum of tactics and technologies of security, including juridical techniques – has been relentlessly justified by a power/knowledge assemblage in Washington that has successfully scripted a neoliberal political economy argument for its global forward presence.19 Securitizing economic volatility and threat and regulating a neoliberal world order for the good of the global economy are powerful discursive touchstones registered perennially on multiple forums in Washington – from the Pentagon to the war colleges, from IR and Strategic Studies policy institutes to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees – and the endgame is the legitimisation of the military’s geopolitical and biopolitical technologies of power overseas.20 Finally, Foucault’s conceptualisation of a ‘society of security’ is marked by an urge to ‘govern by contingency’, to ‘anticipate the aleatory’, to ‘allow for the evental’.21 It is a ‘security society’ in which the very language of security is promissory, therapeutic and appealing to liberal improvement. The lawfare of the contemporary US military is precisely orientated to plan for the ‘evental’, to anticipate a series of future events in its various ‘security zones’ – what the Pentagon terms ‘Areas of Responsibility’ or ‘AORs’ (see Figure 1).22 These AORs equate, in effect, to what Foucault calls “spaces of security”, comprising “a series of possible events” that must be securitized by inserting both “the temporal” and “the uncertain”.23 And it is through preemptive juridical securitization ‘beyond the battlefield’ that the US military anticipates and enables the necessary biopolitical modalities of power and management on the ground for any future interventionary action.

AORs AND THE ‘MILIEU’ OF SECURITY

For CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, and the other five US regional commanders across the globe, the ‘population’ of primary concern in their respective AORs is the US military personnel deployed therein. For Petraeus and his fellow commanders, US ground troops present perhaps less a collection of “juridical-political” subjects and more what Foucault calls “technical-political” objects of “management and government”.25 In effect, they are tasked with governing “spaces of security” in which “a series of uncertain elements” can unfold in what Foucault terms the “milieu”.26 What is at stake in the ‘milieu’ is “the problem of circulation and causality”, which must be anticipated and planned for in terms of “a series of possible events” that need to “be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework”.27 And the “technical problem” posed by the eighteenth-century town planners Foucault has in mind is precisely the same technical problem of space, population and regulation that US military strategists and Judge Advocate General Corps (JAG) personnel have in the twenty-first century.

For US military JAGs, their endeavours to legally securitize the AORs of their regional commanders are ultimately orientated to “fabricate, organize, and plan a milieu” even before ground troops are deployed (as in the case of the first action in the war on terror, which I return to later: the negotiation by CENTCOM JAGs of a Status of Forces Agreement with Uzbekistan in early October 2001).28 JAGs play a key role in legally conditioning the battlefield, in regulating the circulation of troops, in optimising their operational capacities, and in sanctioning the privilege to kill. The JAG’s milieu is a “field of intervention”, in other words, in which they are seeking to “affect, precisely, a population”.29 To this end, securing the aleatory or the uncertain is key. As Michael Dillon argues, central to the securing of populations are the “sciences of the aleatory or the contingent” in which the “government of population” is achieved by the sciences of “statistics and probability”.30 As he points out elsewhere, you “cannot secure anything unless you know what it is”, and therefore securitization demands that “people, territory, and things are transformed into epistemic objects”.31 And in planning the milieu of US ground forces overseas, JAGs translate regional AORs into legally enabled grids upon which US military operations take place. This is part of the production of what Matt Hannah terms “mappable landscapes of expectation”;32 and to this end, the aleatory is anticipated by planning for the ‘evental’ in the promissory language of securitization.

The ontology of the ‘event’ has recently garnered wide academic engagement. Randy Martin, for example, has underlined the eventual discursive underpinnings of US military strategy in the war on terror; highlighting how the risk of future events results in ‘preemption’ being the tactic of their securitization.33 Naomi Klein has laid bare the powerful event-based logic of ‘disaster capitalism’;34 while others have pointed out how an ascendant ‘logic of premediation’, in which the future is already anticipated and “mediated”, is a marked feature of the “post-9/11 cultural landscape”.35 But it was Foucault who first cited the import of the ‘evental’ in the realm of biopolitics. He points to the “anti-scarcity system” of seventeenth-century Europe as an early exemplar of a new ‘evental’ biopolitics in which “an event that could take place” is prevented before it “becomes a reality”.36 To this end, the figure of ‘population’ becomes both an ‘object’, “on which and towards which mechanisms are directed in order to have a particular effect on it”, but also a ‘subject’, “called upon to conduct itself in such and such a fashion”.37 Echoing Foucault, David Nally usefully argues that the emergence of the “era of bio-power” was facilitated by “the ability of ‘government’ to seize, manage and control individual bodies and whole populations”.38 And this is part of Michael Dillon’s argument about the “very operational heart of the security dispositif of the biopolitics of security”, which seeks to ‘strategize’, ‘secure’, ‘regulate’ and ‘manipulate’ the “circulation of species life”.39 For the US military, it is exactly the circulation and regulation of life that is central to its tactics of lawfare to juridically secure the necessary legal geographies and biopolitics of its overseas ground presence.

US FORWARD PRESENCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR: THE ENDURING IMPORT OF ‘LAND POWER’

In considering the US military's legal tactics to empower its specifically ‘biopolitical project of security’ overseas, it is important to first sketch out the recent historical geographical evolution of the contemporary ‘milieu’ of US ground forces abroad – or what some refer to as the American ‘leasehold empire’. 40 In doing so, I want to especially underline the evolving import of ‘land power’ – defined by ‘land access’, not territorial control – increasingly identified by military strategists in Washington from the early 1980s, which in turn behoved US military JAGs to foreground the legal terrain of any planned for ground presence. They were tasked with forecasting the evental, forestalling the uncertain; preconfiguring, in other words, the biopolitical modalities of US operations on the ground. And this expressly biopolitical project of securitization works in tandem, of course, with a broader geopolitical and geoeconomic project of securitization. It is the biopolitical enabling of land power.

#### Studies of Korea war are flawed and racist.

**Kim 10** Suzy Kim, Associate Professor of Korean History Critical Asian Studies Volume 42, Issue 3, 2010. Review Essay (Dis)Orienting North Korea http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14672715.2010.507397

Since the publication in 1978 of Orientalism, Edward Said's seminal work and the form of postcolonial theory it spawned have been powerful tools in criticizing the way the West essentializes and orientalizes the non-West. This critique notwithstanding, places like **North Korea continue to be refracted through the Orientalist lens in the West today**. The image reflected by the Western mirror is a decidedly distorted one. Of course, all mirrors distort to some degree, but the bigger problem is that the Orientalist mirror is often the only one used or even acknowledged to exist. **The prime effect is the perennial creation of an Other and the consequence is occlusion rather than clarity**. The difficult task is to encompass multiple angles to allow for a diversity of perspectives that combined may provide a fuller picture. Without mincing words, this review aims to demonstrate that Demick's book and Ryang's edited volume go a long way in contributing to this task while Myers's and Hassig and Oh's do not.

As Charles K. Armstrong notes in Ryang's volume, political theorist Carl Schmitt pinpoints the mechanism of Othering in conflicts between nations. Indeed, an “enemy” is both normal and necessary for the **creation and maintenance of a sovereign state**, according to Schmitt. The inevitable consequence is that as one's own actions are justified by appeals to universal principles of humanity, **the enemy is turned into “an outlaw of humanity”** (53). Shifting the perspective away from this production of the enemy, Ryang begins her volume by asking, “Do concerns about North Korea become legitimate **only when they are posited as national security questions? Do we only need to know ‘nuclear North Korea,’** and not ‘cultural North Korea,’ ‘social North Korea,’ or ‘ethnic North Korea’?” (2). Going beyond the “securitization” discourse on North Korea, Ryang's volume as a whole attempts to understand North Korea from multiple angles as attested to by the array of contributing scholars that hail from the varied disciplines of history, anthropology, sociology, literature, and film studies.

Coincidentally, Ryang begins the Introduction by **deconstructing the discourse presented in North Korea** through the Looking Glass (2000), an earlier work by Oh and Hassig, as a way of illustrating how much of the so-called **scholarship on North Korea confounds** (in both senses of the term, to mystify and defeat) **a proper analysis and understanding of North Korea**. She berates the uncritical use of terms such as totalitarianism in describing North Korea as theoretically empty and superficial. By contrast, she is careful to place the evolving discourse on North Korea within the larger political context to explain the extent to which 9/11 and George Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, in which he labeled North Korea a part of the “axis of evil,” shaped subsequent depictions of North Korea. Certainly, **the demonization and character attacks against Kim Jong Il as a dictator prone to mood swings and a bad temper**, subject to an appetite for cognac and gourmet foods **while his country suffers from famine**, may be true to varying degrees but these **contribute little to any real understanding of North Korea let alone what the responsibilities of the international community should be**. Such conflations of personal failures with structural failures are a trademark of conservative politics that **refuses to acknowledge larger structural forces at work**.

#### Studying African instability is the new war of full spectral dominance. Enframing is a benign act so neocolonialism can continue

Campbell and Murrey 14 – International peace and justice scholar, Professor of African American studies at Syracuse University; PhD, Oxford Professor (Horace and Amber, “Culture-centric pre-emptive counterinsurgency and US African Command: assessing the role of US social sciences in US military engagements in Africa,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 35, Issue 8, October 3, 2014, pp. 1457-1475, accessed online through Taylor and Francis)

The debate on the criminality of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in the wider international community presents an alternative intellectual framework through which to understand the past efforts of the US national security establishment – the network of US military branches, defence contractors, politicians, think-tanks, arms manufacturers and other elements referred to as the ‘armaments industry’ – to mobilise social science knowledge for the advancement of military goals. Despite large quantities of information from multiple sources that expose hundreds of unreported incidents of civilian casualties, large-scale detentions of prisoners without trial in cia ‘black sites’ (secret prisons) and ‘black ops’ Special Forces target assassinations by the US military establishment, there has been no retreat from the intellectual and ideological starting points that influenced the decisions to go to war against the peoples of Iraq.[1](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0001) From leaked State Department cables it is apparent US government officials knew that international laws were violated throughout the US mission in Iraq.[2](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0002) The illegality of the war has been compounded by the adventurist and masculinist frameworks that inform the military project, which have resulted in hubristic errors that have been criticised by military specialists.[3](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0003) Despite the failures of militarised social science projects in Vietnam, Iraq and the colonial antecedents, the national security establishment continues to implement a revised brand of culture-centric counterinsurgency worldwide, including in Africa.

A main point of departure for the operational role of the USA Africa Command (US Africom or Africom, which is responsible for US military operations and military relations with all African nations excluding Egypt since its establishment in October of 2008) has been the push for increased social science research on the continent of Africa at its Intelligence and Knowledge Development Social Science Research Center (ssrc) located in Stuttgart, Germany. An Africom Congressional Research Report explains that command personnel ‘conduct civilian–military operations throughout East Africa as part of an effort to “win hearts and minds” [such as] digging wells and building and repairing schools, hospitals, and roads’.[4](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0004) Colonel Dean Bland, the former head of Africom’s Intelligence and Knowledge Development ssrc, in an interview with John Vandiver for an online article in Stars and Stripes, insisted that expanding cultural and socio-political knowledge is essential for the strategic military goals of Africom. He explained: ‘Examining the relationship between geography and environment, culture and politics, and how these factors can come together to create [potential] instability is a new approach to intelligence-gathering’.[5](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0005) In the midst of the quagmire in Iraq there were divisions within the US military establishment concerning approaches to intelligence gathering and the future of irregular warfare (or counterinsurgency, coin). It was in this context that David Petraeus worked with a team of likeminded counterinsurgency strategists at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KA to write the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual.[6](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0006) The Manual reiterated the urgency of cultural intelligence gathering identified by Colonel Bland: ‘Every action, including use of force, must be wrapped in a bodyguard of information’.[7](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0007) Counterinsurgency strategy and tactics are informed by culturally rich data (including psychology, religion, tradition, language and history) obtained by social science researchers through social network analysis, surveys, interviews and ethnography.

Social science research is conducted by Socio-Cultural Advisory Teams (scrats) to ‘expand…the knowledge base’, ie information on African culture, politics, religion, sexuality and economy, for Africom strategic movements on the continent.[8](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0008) The multi-pronged approaches of the command include (1) moves to increase the securitisation of the continent by bolstering African national military capabilities through military aid, military-to-military training and the creation of logistics networks; (2) highly publicised US-led military–humanitarian projects as symbols of American goodwill; and (3) an intensification of socio-cultural knowledge acquisition for US military purposes.[9](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0009) Each of these directives draws heavily from preventative counterinsurgency doctrine developed by colonial powers to suppress anti-colonial resistance.[10](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0010) The intensity of Africom missions in Africa is not likely to decrease in the near future: the USA has roughly 5000 troops stationed across the continent;[11](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0011) according to General David M Rodriguez, the current Commander of Africom, in 2013 the Command carried out ‘55 operations, 10 exercises and 481 security cooperation activities’.[12](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0012) In early May 2014 US President Barack Obama reached a 10-year security agreement for the continuation of the US military base, Camp Lemonnier (which houses special forces and a launching point for drones), with Djiboutian President Ismali Omar Guelleh.

Of course, 5000 troops on a continent of 1.1 billion people is a drop in the bucket.[13](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0013) In the current political and economic context the US government cannot risk stationing more US personnel abroad. The catastrophic experiences of the US military in Somalia in 1993, alongside popular American discontent with US imperialistic counterinsurgency occupations (most recently Iraq and Afghanistan) would produce a political backlash at home, making such a military endeavour unfeasible. Indeed, the USA does not deploy massive US military personnel in Africa because it is actively supporting African militaries in the controlling, occupying and killing of Africans. By arming and training African militaries – with the go-ahead of African presidents – the USA seeks to avoid criticisms of neo-imperialism, racism and colonial intervention. At the same time the domestic recruitment of non-white and non-US-born military personnel is integral to the securitisation machine by helping to obscure the racialised violence of US military missions across the globe. Within this framework the US security establishment seeks expertise from social scientists to advance US interests without having to maintain sizable (and politically costly) contingencies on the ground.

The current thrust of the Africom mission to obtain cultural data on African people is part of the ‘Phase Zero’ of ‘full-spectrum dominance’. The 2000 Department of Defense (dod) Joint Vision 2020 called for ‘full-spectrum dominance’: the domination of surface land, sub-surface sea, air, space, the electromagnetic spectrum and information systems. With total socio-cultural and political knowledge of the potential enemy before s/he becomes an enemy, potential future instabilities are suppressed before they begin. However, the constant search for risk, insecurity and harbours of terrorism becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. At the same time the discourse of instability has become a tool employed by unpopular and dictatorial leaders to gain access to US military-to-military aid, which fuels the continued militarisation of the continent.[14](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0014) The most recent example of this counterinsurgency discourse-sharing is Chad’s President Idriss Deby’s declaration at a news conference in Paris on 17 May 2014 that, ‘there is determination [between the governments of Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin and France] to tackle this situation head on…to launch a war, a total war on Boko Haram’.[15](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0015)

The participation of US social science researchers in military knowledge acquisition projects further entangles the US-based university and social science disciplines within the maintenance of an economic system founded upon imperial domination and sustained through force. Discipline-specific engagements with the various roles of academics within military activities have been differentially conducted, including in the literature on anthropologists within the Army’s Human Terrain Systems;[16](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0016)the discussions on military-funded geographical research and the mapping of indigenous communities, specifically the military-funded Bowman Expedition;[17](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0017) and in critiques of the presence and expertise of US psychologists in the torture chambers of Iraq and Afghanistan.[18](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0018) There has been sustained debate within factions of US anthropology, as illustrated by the efforts within the Association of Concerned Anthropologists and a special committee of the American Anthropological Association (aaa), ceaussic, to engage with the ethical concerns around the involvement of anthropologists in Human Terrain Systems.[19](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0019) On the other hand, the Association of American Geographers (aag) has responded with a ‘studied indifference’ that indicates a deeper inability to have critical conversations about the military–geography nexus.[20](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0020) The American Psychological Association (aps) – according to Stephen Soldz, Brad Olson, Steven Reisner, Jean Maria Arrigo and Bryant Welch of the Coalition for an Ethical Psychology – has responded with ‘strategic helplessness’ to disclosures of participation of psychologists in ‘enhanced interrogation’ techniques.[21](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0021) To date cross-discipline engagements with the role of US social science researchers in US military projects post-9/11 have remained limited, with Piya Chatterjee and Sunaina Maira’s 2014 edited volume, The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent a refreshing exception.[22](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0022) As researchers remain focused on the role of their particular discipline in US military projects, we risk losing sight of the larger systemic reach of the US military into US social science projects in general.

#### Alt causes & Plan doesn’t solve

1ac Greenwood & Miletello 21 (Jeremy Greenwood and Emily Miletello, Federal Executive Fellow - The Brookings Institution, Coast Guard Fellow - U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, THE Brookings Institute, “To expand the Navy isn’t enough. We need a bigger commercial fleet.”, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/11/04/to-expand-the-navy-isnt-enough-we-need-a-bigger-commercial-fleet/>, November 4, 2021)

With the United States drawing down in the Middle East and starting to realize the long-awaited “pivot to the Pacific,” **Chinese naval expansion and the troubling practices of Chinese distant-water fishing fleets have risen to the top of the list of global and national security concerns plaguing our top strategists. And while much has been written on Chinese military ambitions at sea, we seem to have forgotten Beijing’s commercial maritime activity, which has also increased dramatically, in terms of both shipbuilding and investments in port infrastructure around the globe.** **At the same time, the number of U.S. vessels engaged in global commerce has never been smaller. In the words of a senior official responsible for America’s sealift capability, this is no less than a “screaming national security vulnerability.”** America’s commercial fleet is languishing In the midst of negotiations surrounding one of the largest infrastructure spending bills in decades, there has been almost no serious discussion about the need to enhance our commercial sealift capabilities or to increase American shipbuilding capacity. Instead, America’s maritime infrastructure continues to be overlooked and our commercial fleet continues to fall behind those of our maritime competitors. **We have been prolific in building U.S. Navy warships, but have failed to invest even modestly in the civilian maritime industries that will support our warfighting capabilities.** Jeremy Greenwood Jeremy Greenwood The United States is an inherently maritime nation. Yet, U.S. flagged vessels make up only 0.4% of the world’s vessels (yes, that’s 0.4%, not 4%). As of July 2021, that’s about 180 ships out of a global fleet of more than 43,000. If you’ve ever sailed on a cruise ship, you likely were on a vessel registered in the Bahamas, Panama, or Liberia. **If you’ve ever looked out at any of America’s largest ports, you probably only saw vessels flying the flag of Panama, Marshall Islands, Hong Kong (which maintains a separate registry for now), or more than ever – China. Why many American ships don’t fly U.S. flags “Open registries” — a concept unique to global shipping — allow any ship owner to register its vessel in a nation with which it has practically no ties, to take advantage of low taxes, less regulation, and cheap labor. In the high-stakes and competitive world of global shipping, seeking out a cheaper flag state — often referred to as a “ flag of convenience” — can save a company millions. Starting with the first wave of globalization after World War II, “flags of convenience” quickly became a standard business practice in the shipping industry, removing almost any incentive to build and operate an American ship outside of the small market of those required to conduct domestic trade (the “Jones Act” fleet, which must, with limited exception, be U.S. crewed, owned, and registered). A consequence of this shift is that our nation lost much of its industrial capability to build, maintain and repair large ocean-going vessels, and with it, the large-scale training and education of U.S. Merchant Mariners.** The role of U.S. commercial ships in national security **Even with the world’s most dominant Navy, access to a U.S. flagged commercial fleet is critical to our national security. In a 1989 National Security Directive on Sealift (“sealift” is the use of cargo ships for military transport), the White House outlined the importance of maintaining a U.S.-flagged fleet, calling it “essential both to executing this country’s forward defense strategy and to maintaining a wartime economy” and necessary to build surge capacity to “ensure that sufficient military and civil maritime resources will be available to meet defense deployment and essential economic requirements in support of our national security strategy.” Related Books** Yet today, **the agency in charge of managing our nation’s maritime sealift capability, the Maritime Administration (or MARAD), is woefully underfunded and managing an aging fleet of vessels that may not be up to the job of moving and sustaining our Armed Forces in an increasingly competitive Asia-Pacific theater of operations**. Let’s remember that any conflict in the Pacific will not be sustained by the Navy alone. Our land forces rely on military and civilian sealift capability to fight abroad, and it is not clear that we could sustain a land force in the Pacific with our current sealift capability. Recognizing the defense imperative of sealift capabilities, the combatant command responsible for coordinating the military’s overseas transportation requirements recently announced that buying foreign vessels and re-flagging them under the U.S. flag is its top priority. But while buying used foreign ships from allies is a good start, it is not a solution or a long-term strategy. **It’s clear we need a more permanent investment in our maritime infrastructure**. In congressional testimony last year, then MARAD Administrator Rear Adm. Mark Buzby (ret.) noted that in the 1990s there were seven large shipyards in the United States building commercial vessels. Since then, three of the yards have closed. Of the remaining four, only one builds commercial vessels and the others do only repairs and maintenance. China’s rising maritime power Meanwhile, China is rapidly expanding its maritime reach through both naval and commercial enterprises. The size and growth of the Chinese navy, coast guard, and long-distance fishing fleets (including the so-called “ maritime militia”) has been well documented. However, Chinese investment in civilian shipbuilding and in strategic port and maritime infrastructure around the world is less well known. **China builds over 40% of large ocean-going vessels manufactured globally each year** ( over 1,000 per year, compared to approximately 10 per year in the U.S.). Not only that, but Beijing also registers a significant number of these vessels under the Chinese flag ( 4,569 as of January 1, 2020). As of 2021, **China maintains an ownership stake in at least 30 of the 50 largest container ports in the world, and has been taking advantage of pandemic-related economic challenges to establish footholds in some of the hardest hit economies, like Panama, whose economy shrunk by about 18% in 2020. Considering that the U.S. is the primary user and beneficiary of the Panama Canal, (over 60% of goods transiting the canal are destined for U.S. ports) increased Chinese control over port infrastructure surrounding the canal could constitute a serious threat to our supply chain.** This economic investment comes with strings attached. Not coincidentally, after signing a memorandum of agreement with the Panama Canal Authority in 2017, Panama dropped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. In short, China seems to have learned a lesson from American naval strategist Admiral Alfred Mahan that America seems to have forgotten: “[C]ontrol of the sea, by maritime commerce and naval supremacy, means predominant world influence.” Why the lack of U.S. commercial ships presents a security risk **With the withdrawal from Afghanistan complete, the long-awaited pivot to the Pacific might actually be taking shape. The AUKUS submarine agreement most recently highlighted the critical state of the maritime theater of operations in maintaining a “ free and open Indo-Pacific.” However, we can’t be so naïve as to think that a military buildup alone will win in this new era of strategic competition. Increasing shipbuilding capability and investing in the American commercial fleet would not only mitigate threats to our supply chain, but would also serve as an important hedge to China’s increasingly pervasive and aggressive maritime ambitions. As it stands now, our reliance on foreign vessels for critical trade is a national security risk both in terms of our inability to engage in sustained conflict abroad should that become necessary, but also in terms of supply chain vulnerabilities that will continue to plague us at home. We need not, and of course cannot, end globalization to protect our supply chain. But we can drastically increase the number of U.S. flagged merchant vessels sailing the world’s oceans and strengthen our domestic shipbuilding base to preserve our freedom of action in times of crisis. Without the ability to move and sustain our forces by sea wherever and whenever needed — a major deterrent against aggression — the U.S. (and its allies) will lose the capacity to ensure regional stability and peace. This maritime nation should not outsource its maritime needs. Continuing to do so requires that we rely on flag states that are increasingly vulnerable to the influence of foreign adversaries, most notably China. We must invest in our Merchant Marine and shipbuilding capability now, and undertake meaningful legislative efforts to make the U.S., at the very least, a less inconvenient flag state.**

#### Cruise ships are an alt-cause.

Freya Higgins-Desbiolles 19. Senior lecturer teaching and researching tourism management at the University of South Australia. “The dark side of the 'mega' cruise ships that have revolutionised travel,” June 4, 2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-05/the-problem-with-cruise-ships/11174110>. Accessed 12/18/21.

From classical sites such as Venice, Dubrovnik and Barcelona, to the hot new attractions of Iceland, Komodo National Park of Indonesia and even Antarctica, the cruise tourism industry is in the spotlight. Cruise ships have been getting a bad rap well before the MSC Opera was captured crashing into Venice's San Basilio dock on Sunday. The costs of cruise tourism are apparent in the case of Venice. In fact, cruise ship access to Venice has roused local anger and there were already plans underway to move them away from the central canals. Their hulking presence overwhelms the beautiful medieval city as they arrive to disgorge thousands of passengers for short day visits. The cruise ship model of tourism brings Venice a good deal of negative impacts in terms of crowding and pressure on fragile infrastructure. It also brings few positive economic impact as such visitors actually spend little money in the local economy. Venice risks its Unesco World Heritage listing if it continues to allow huge cruise ships to pass Piazza San Marco and dwarf its romantic charm. Both the cruise lines and the tourists will not be thrilled with the proposal to dock the cruise ships further away and to bus the excursionists to the main sites. Regardless, we are talking about a sector with stellar growth rates. Why cruising is popular In 2017, 25.8 million people globally went on a cruise. Demand has grown by 20.5 per cent over the past five years, making it one of the fastest growing forms of mass tourism. Cruise tourism caters for all incomes from the expensive, luxury end of the market to low-income wage-earners who save up for such a holiday. Cruising has specific attractions as a tourism experience. For tourists who are less experienced or less adventuresome, cruise ships offer a safe and known environment, with the majority of the holiday onboard and only brief shore excursions in a limited number of ports. The variety of experiences, entertainment and activities means the cruise ship itself is becoming the attraction. Contemporary cruise ships are featuring adrenaline adventures, including go kart racing and water parks. Some cruise itineraries make it possible for tourists to see amazing marine environments that are best seen this way, including Antarctica, the fjords of Norway and the Caribbean Islands. Do destinations benefit? But the cruise tourism sector has received extensive criticism for their negative impacts on destinations. The cruise ship industry is dominated by large multinational corporations, such as Royal Caribbean, Carnival, Norwegian and MSC Cruise Lines. These powerful companies are able to dictate terms of access to ports and their all-inclusive model means that too little tourist spending reaches the ports that receive them. There is a tendency to build ever-larger cruise ships and this is exacerbating problems. In 2016, Harmony of the Seas was launched in Southampton at 16 stories high and able to host 6,780 passengers and 2,100 crew. One marine expert stated: "These ships burn as much fuel as whole towns. They use a lot more power than container ships and even when they burn low sulphur fuel, it's 100 times worse than road diesel." Cruise ship visitation also brings negative socio-cultural impacts despite the brief duration of shore visits. The most pressing issue is the way cruise visitors add to already crowded tourist sites, such as the old city of Dubrovnik and Piazza Marco Square in Venice. Local residents are angered by such overcrowding and may even be pushed out at peak times and in peak seasons. Transport facilities can be overwhelmed and make an urban work commute difficult. What about the crew, and the environment? Then there is the issue of low wages, long hours, precarity and exploitation of cruise ship labour that does little to commend cruise lines as good corporate citizens. Many developing countries, such as the Philippines, provide the labour force to these cruise ships and rely on the remittance funds these workers send back. All the while having their own ports negatively impacted as ports of call to these very same cruise lines. However, the weak regulatory environment seems set to change. Welcome to a holiday of the future But they stand accused of "emissions dodging" rather than paying for more expensive cleaner fuels. Such responses to regulatory changes do little to foster goodwill.

#### No brink to this impact – container ships have been getting bigger for decades

Ricardo J. Sanchez, 21. Sanchez is a PhD in Economics. He is an internationally recognized expert in infrastructure and maritime economics. Also Daniel E. Perrotti, and Alejandra Gomez Paz Fort. "Looking into the future ten years later: big full containerships and their arrival to south American ports." *Journal of Shipping and Trade* 6.1 (2021): 1-20.

Since 2006, when the Emma Maersk broke into the world of shipping, the growth in containership size has remained a continuous trend. For the last 14 years, since 2006, the enlargement of full container ships size has remained a continuous trend since Emma Maersk broke into the world of shipping. This process - that also affected north-south trades - has crucial implications in the shipping business, particularly in the planning of ports and its services and related activities. This paper analyses the global increase in vessel size and forecasts larger vessels’ arrival to South American coasts. The paper analyses evidence since 2006 to understand the factors behind the trend for bigger ships (fleets between 18,000 and 24,000 TEU) and introduce a validated methodology for the prediction of the size of container ships. Experts presented a consensus vision in which factors associated with infrastructure, economics, technology, and the environment play a crucial role in driving the trend. Next, the paper presents a methodology for forecasting the size of containerships and applies it to Latin America’s trade. The models include two alternative thresholds for the dependent variables (1310 ft LOA and 18,000 TEU of nominal capacity) that are controlled by cascading effect (i.e., the size gap between Latin America and the world’s main trade routes), and the economic activity at the destination countries (represented by port activity). Finally, the conclusions highlight the forecast’s call to take action on infrastructure planning and investments, analyzing issues such as “economies of scale,” concentration, or entry barriers. Overall, the paper warns about the importance of efficient medium-term planning in the port industry to maximize its economic impact.

#### No 1ac card says US shipping industry is more important to “overall heg” than US military spending, the US economy, the Defense Industrial Base, climate leadership, etc.

#### \*US Navy readiness completely eroded now

Justin Holloran Witwicki, 19. Master of Arts in Government. "The United States Navy as a Hollow Force-An Assessment of Naval Readiness from 2010 to 2017." Johns Hopkins University, 2020. https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/62333/WITWICKI-THESIS-2019.pdf?sequence=1

Conclusions and Recommendations

Evaluation of Readiness Indicators

**From 2010 through 2017, the military readiness of the United States Navy eroded to such an extent that defense analysts and government officials publicly questioned whether it had become a hollow force. Scholars in future years will, and should, find the answer to that question to be “yes**.” The research presented in the preceding pages demonstrated that no fewer than six factors detracted from the military readiness of the United States Navy from 2010 to 2017. Three additional elements were rejected as readiness challenges. Seven indicators of force hollowness were proposed by the Center for Naval Analyses in a 1996 study of post-Vietnam War naval readiness and subsequently reexamined by the Congressional Research Service in 2012. Of those seven, this thesis accepted five as applicable to the U.S. Navy during the 2010-2017 scope of inquiry. Recognizing that “there is no guarantee that the next hollow force will look like the last one,”400 this study then presented evidence that two further indicators – excessive operational tempo and the effects of global climate change – must be added to any holistic examination of naval readiness during this period. In the case of the former, operational tempo directly damaged naval readiness from 2010 to 2017 and resulted in the loss of 17 lives – as many as were lost in the attack on the USS Cole. In the case of the latter, while it is among the Navy’s most severe future readiness challenges, climate change did not sufficiently impact naval capabilities to warrant acceptance as an indicator of unreadiness during the early- and mid-2010s.

#### \*Heg is already in decline

Hans-Georg Betz, 21. “Uncertain Times in a World Without American Hegemony.” November 3, 2021. https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north\_america/hans-georg-betz-international-order-great-powers-american-hegemony-china-news-12512/

The failure of the G20 to arrive at a meaningful position on climate change ahead of COP26 is proof that the US is no longer a global leader. The international order is in deep trouble, and not only since the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not how things were supposed to turn out. The collapse of the “evil empire,” the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU were supposed to bring about a new era of stability and prosperity, the latter epitomized most prominently by China’s embrace of the market. Liberalism was supposed to reign supreme. In the grand battle of ideas, Marx had lost out, Hegel had won — or so his American acolyte, Francis Fukuyama, claimed. Fukuyama proclaimed that the “end of history” was at hand, and the cognoscenti and would-be cognoscenti on both sides of the Atlantic enthusiastically applauded. Three decades later, the world is in disarray. The attacks of September 11 were a drastic reminder that not everybody was sold on Fukuyama’s utopia. The financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers and, with it, the house of cards built on a derivatives market that had spun out of control exposed the irrationality of rational behavior — taking more and more risks simply because everybody else did so. Finally, COVID-19 has demonstrated how quickly the beautiful world of ever-expanding consumer choices, sustained by cheap labor in remote parts of the world, can grind to a screeching halt. Benign Hegemon It is too early to tell whether or not global turbulences have reached a point of no return. The prospects are not great, and that has a lot to do with the United States. There is a strong sense that America’s hegemonic position, which it assumed after World War II, is on the wane and, with it, the country’s “commitment to promoting a liberal international order.” Or, perhaps, the United States suffers from a severe case of “leadership fatigue” and no longer wants to play the role of the “benign hegemon.” The notion of the benign hegemon is derived from hegemonic stability theory, popular among some experts in international relations. The theory posits that order and stability in world affairs crucially depend on a Great Power capable of sustaining them and willing to do so. As Stephen Kobrin, of the Wharton School, has recently put it, “A stable, open economy requires a hegemon, a dominant power who can provide some of the necessary public goods, absorb costs, and order the system.” Although this pertains particularly to international economic relations, it can be applied to other areas, such as international security. Order and stability require, among other things, that the hegemonic power formulate and underwrite the rules that define and govern the interactions between states in the international system. This was the case in the second half of the 19th century when Great Britain assumed this role, providing and guaranteeing global public goods such as free trade, capital mobility and the British pound, backed up by the gold standard, as the global reserve currency. The system came to an end with World War I. The conflict left Britain weakened and largely unable to reassume its prewar role. The interwar period was characterized by turmoil and crises, paving the way for the rise of autocratic regimes, committed to establishing a new order on the ruins of the old one. They accomplished the latter, but the new order was not theirs to create. The new hegemonic power that emerged from the war was not Hitler’s Germany but the United States, which filled the void left by an exhausted Great Britain.

#### \*Trump did the aff

J. Michael Cavanaugh & Christopher "Chris" DeLacy, 18. J. Michael Cavanaugh co-chairs Holland & Knight's Energy Team. His practice includes representation of clients in project development transactions also a faculty member at American University. Christopher DeLacy is the leader of the Political Law Group and a member of the Public Policy & Regulation team at Holland & Knight. “Congress Amends the U.S. Shipping Act, Broadening FMC Regulatory Authority.” December 5 2018. <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f7eb4790-b512-46b6-bf98-62b441f20ff9>

The Federal Maritime Commission Authorization Act of 2017 was signed into law by President Donald Trump on Dec. 4, 2018, marking the first **substantive revision to the U.S. Shipping Act**, 46 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. (the Shipping Act) since 1998 and providing several of the most significant changes to the Shipping Act since 1984. The substantive changes to the Shipping Act primarily **address antitrust issues** **related to recent consolidation in the maritime industry and the emergence of ocean carrier alliances**. The amended Shipping Act signals an important development for the maritime industry in the U.S. It is aimed at preserving competition in U.S. trades and assuring future capital investment in maritime and transportation infrastructure, the vital link in supply chains across the U.S. and the world. President Donald Trump, with bipartisan support, signed into law the Federal Maritime Commission Authorization Act of 2017 (the Act) on Dec. 4, 2018, as part of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (S. 140). The Act represents the first substantive revision to the U.S. Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq. (the Shipping Act) since 1998, and includes several of the most significant changes to the Shipping Act since 1984. The principal changes to the Shipping Act primarily address antitrust issues related to recent consolidation in the maritime industry and the emergence of ocean carrier alliances. These changes are expected to help protect marine terminal service providers as well as other U.S. marine equipment and services providers, and to preserve investment in domestic shore-side maritime infrastructure. History of the Shipping Act Enacted in 1916, the Shipping Act confers authority upon the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) to regulate maritime commerce in the U.S. The Shipping Act regulates common carriers (both non-vessel and vessel operating) and marine terminal operators (MTOs) and affords limited antitrust protections to filed agreements among regulated parties. In 1984, the Shipping Act was revised to eliminate a longstanding requirement for affirmative FMC approval of agreements and the requirement for carriers to file tariffs with the FMC. Pursuant to the 1984 amendment, parties may file agreements with the FMC, which become effective 45 days after filing unless, in the interim, the agency obtains injunctive relief in court to block the agreement. Carriers now publish tariffs, rather than filing them with the FMC. The last amendment to the Shipping Act occurred in 1998 as the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, following a five-year study of the effect of the Shipping Act on maritime trade and commerce. The 1998 amendment allowed carriers and shippers to enter confidential rate agreements providing discounted rates in exchange for cargo volume commitments. In 2005, the FMC issued a regulatory ruling extending authority to non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs) to enter such confidential rate agreements with shippers. After the 1998 amendment, the maritime industry experienced significant and widespread consolidation. In addition to carrier mergers and acquisitions concentrating the bulk of containership capacity in U.S. trades to fewer than a dozen large carriers, the formation of vessel carrier alliances caused further substantial consolidation. Currently, there are three major carrier alliances representing 80 percent of all container trade. Within the alliances, there has been further consolidation, e.g., the creation of Ocean Network Express (ONE) by the merger of Japanese carriers. In 2017, Congress began serious efforts to review and amend the Shipping Act to address these changes to the maritime industry, all of which have affected U.S. infrastructure investment. The legislative efforts represent the first step toward bolstering the U.S. maritime industry. Significant Revisions to the Shipping Act The newly enacted Federal Maritime Commission Authorization Act of 2017 **amends key sections of the Shipping Act**, particularly in the areas of 1) **competition regulation and remedies for violations of the Shipping Act's antitrust provisions,** 2) ocean transportation intermediary (OTI) licensure requirements and 3) adjustments to filing requirements. Each of these topics is discussed in further detail below: 1. Regulation of Competition in Ocean Carriage The Act amends multiple sections in the Shipping Act with the design of **prohibiting anti-competitive behavior** that would have a material adverse effect on U.S.-based maritime infrastructure and marine services and equipment providers. Section 703 requires the FMC to conduct "an analysis of the impacts on competition for the purchase of certain covered services by alliances of ocean common carriers" on an annual basis. This statutory mandate is intended to **promote active FMC oversight** of the ocean carrier alliances to ensure that U.S.-based infrastructure interests are not unfairly disadvantaged. Section 704 focuses upon alliances' impact on "certain covered services ... with respect to a vessel": (A) the berthing or bunkering of the vessel; (B) the loading or unloading of cargo to or from the vessel to or from a point on a wharf or terminal; (C) the positioning, removal, or replacement of buoys related to the movement of the vessel; and The definition of "certain covered services" is noteworthy given that it generally covers those services that ocean carrier alliance members procure at U.S. marine terminals. Section 709 utilizes this term in prohibiting ocean carriers from negotiating for "certain covered services" with MTOs in violation of antitrust laws or in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Shipping Act. The Act prohibits ocean carriers from engaging in excessively anti-competitive strategies when collectively negotiating with terminal service providers. This provision is designed to protect MTOs by avoiding a situation where MTOs and other service providers are forced to negotiate with the carriers acting collectively with such a concentration of bargaining power that rates are pressured to unsustainable levels, which may impair future investment in U.S. maritime terminal and port infrastructure. **The Act provides specific tools and remedies to the FMC and courts to enforce the provisions precluding anticompetitive behavior of regulated entities**. Section 710 grants the FMC authority to seek injunctive relief against actions of regulated entities that "substantially lessen competition in the purchasing of certain covered services." Section 710 expands the scope of factors the FMC must consider when seeking injunctive relief to include the aggregate effect of agreements on competition, rather than reviewing the agreements' isolated impacts. In addition, Section 709 preserves the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) authority to prosecute anticompetitive behavior that violates the U.S. antitrust laws. This section confirms that DOJ has a role in the enforcement process. Section 708 further amends the Shipping Act to **restrict anticompetitive actions** of common carriers. This section specifically prohibits a common carrier from "continu[ing] to participate simultaneously in a rate discussion agreement and an agreement to share vessels, in the same trade" if the continued participation would likely produce an unreasonable reduction in service or increase in transportation cost. Finally, the Act requires the U.S. Comptroller General to conduct a study of recent bankruptcies of ocean carriers. This provision flows from the recent bankruptcy of Hanjin Shipping, which saddled MTOs, shippers and suppliers with significant losses ranging from non-payment to lengthy delivery delays and loss or seizure of cargo. The purpose of this amendment to the Shipping Act is aimed at mitigating and understanding bankruptcy risks in the era of carrier alliances through a detailed review of these bankruptcies and their potential effect in the era of substantial carrier capacity concentrations and alliance activities.

### Maritime Cybersecurity Adv---1NC

#### COVID makes supply chains and infrastructure unsustainable.

Jay Blumler and Stephen Coleman 21. Jay Blumler is Emeritus Professor of Public Communication at the University of Leeds and Emeritus Professor of Journalism at the University of Maryland. Stephen Coleman (corresponding author) is Professor of Political Communication at the University of Leeds. “After the Crisis, A “New Normal” for Democratic Citizenship?” Javnost - The Public, 28:1, 3-19, DOI: 10.1080/13183222.2021.1883884

The lesson we draw from these studies is that crises do not generate changes in norms and practices deterministically through some sort of metaphysical shock wave. Normative and practical changes are consequences of altered perceptions of meaning. Crises throw social meaning into disarray, fracturing seemingly settled accounts of who “we” are; whose social contributions are most important; how to speak about causes and effects; feasible scales of social coordination; what can and cannot be tolerated; and how to demonstrate accountability. In crises, contestations of meaning become more explicit. Claims that certain perspectives are beyond the pale have less clout. Ideas that had an incipient, but marginal presence in pre-crisis thinking might begin to be taken seriously. A mixture of nervous conjecture and confident extemporisation inflect the public conversation, undermining abiding certainties.

Faced with a historically exceptional combination of global pandemic and economic depression, some citizens and politicians reach for a new language of civic reflection. This is because any hope of tackling the unprecedented debt pressures, market failures, infrastructural collapse, population immobility, intensifying inequalities and collective trauma generated by the crisis will not only call for imaginative, coordinated and massively resourced policy responses, but a new way of talking about policy that is not weighed down by obsolete categories. In short, much depends upon whether people can find a common frame of reflection that will enable them to think, speak and act upon what binds them together as well as what divides them.

Politics arises when people disagree, and now that there are more and bigger problems than ever to disagree about it is vitally important to find ways of arguing that do not exacerbate uncertainty or intolerance. In any political disagreement there are two matters at stake: firstly, the nature of the dispute; secondly, the competing options for action. The second cannot be realised unless there is some clarity surrounding the first. The political theorist, William Connolly (1993, 2) suggests that the distinction between these tasks can be compared to the conventionally agreed meanings set out for juries before they deliberate on a legal case:

The jury examines the evidence and reaches a verdict but prior to its deliberations, the judge, acting as the official interpreter of the law, charges the jury with a set of responsibilities, establishes what can be considered as evidence, and specifies what constitutes a punishable offense … In charging the jury and in regulating the presentation of evidence to it, the judge, we might say, specifies the terms within which the jury considers evidence and reaches a verdict.

Of course, democratic public debate does not take place in a courtroom in which the rules of discourse can be laid down by an authoritative judge. The contestability of the terms of political discourse by the people themselves is a fundamental precondition of democracy. People must not only be able to have their say, but to determine what they are talking about; what matters and what things mean. This entails a capacity to argue about the very norms that underpin policy decisions and to communicate across differences, acknowledging normative disagreements as necessary features of political communication. It is to these matters of normative contestation that we refer when we suggest that “the new normal” depends upon finding a refreshed language of democratic citizenship. What form might this discursive reconfiguration take? How might it be incorporated into an emerging vernacular of civic discourse?

Re-Thinking the Space, Mediation and Contestation of Citizenship

Citizenship involves the performance of norms and practices through which people are bound to strangers within communities of co-existence. The traditional liberal conception of citizenship sees it as a relationship between individuals and the state entailing the exercise of duties and rights. Citizenship in this sense is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a polity. Anyone who possesses this status is equal, having all the rights and duties that come with legally sanctioned legitimacy. No universal principle determines what those rights and duties shall be, but over time societies tend to create images of the ideal citizen and direct individuals to aspire to them (Marshall 1964).

In contrast to this legalistic notion of citizenship, there is a broader, less state-bound characterisation which sees it as comprising a repertoire of practices that people inherit and devise in order to co-exist interdependently with others. In this broader sense, to act as a citizen is to engage in public situations of various kinds with people one might not know and who might not share one’s interests, tastes, values, or even language. Sometimes civic interactions will involve relations with governments, authorities, or employers. At other times they will relate to quotidian ways of living amongst neighbours and strangers. Performances of citizenship are both framed institutionally, conforming to conventional notions of political and civic participation (voting, joining parties and campaigns, following the news) and improvised from below, often transcending or resisting established civic scripts. Through such extemporised forms of social practice, citizens create what Arendt (1958, 198) refers to as “spaces of appearance”: “the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men (sic) exist not merely like other living or inanimate things, but make their appearance explicitly.”

The crisis induced by the pandemic raises fundamental questions about how citizens are to “make their appearance explicitly.” Most of the decisions and regulations responding to the crisis have been framed by political elites and legitimised by appeals to expert wisdom. Public involvement in shaping or making such decisions has been extremely limited, raising questions about the role of democratic publics in responding to critical issues that affect them. Moves to democratise crisis response are bound to consider fundamental questions about who constitutes “the public” (given the need to respond to social challenges that transcend political borders); how civic discourse is mediated (given the need to generate global narratives, conversations and concerted actions in the face of common threats) and how political differences can be both recognised and negotiated (given the urgent need for pluralistic publics to work through complex problems). It is to these questions that we now turn.

Constituting the Public Domain

The global pandemic has brought into sharp focus the spatial framing of political problems within national boundaries. Since the middle of the seventeenth century, politics has been conceived as “taking place” within national units characterised by territorial borders, sovereign authority, civically attached populations and bounded economic interests. The emergence of nation-states as a natural scale of political action and analysis is the defining feature of the Westphalian order in which to govern is to protect and enhance national state interests; to be a citizen is to belong to a nation state, thereby bound by specific geo-political responsibilities and rights; and to speak of democracy in an empirically meaningful sense is to refer to a mode of legitimacy operating at the nation-state level. The Westphalian view of political place established a firm distinction between domestic and foreign domains; inside and outside; the scope of national control and extraneous precariousness.

The robustness of these conceptual categories of inter-national social order have been called into question by the speed and density of global economic and cultural interconnections that have become increasingly manifest since the late twentieth century. The conception of the globally dominant capitalist market as a “world system” was elaborated in the mid-1970s by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 390) who urged social scientists to abandon the reification of the nation-state as the primary unit of politico-economic analysis. He argued that capitalism could only operate as a world economy “with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems.” In short, states might be distinguished by cultural characteristics and domestic political projects, but they cannot escape their enmeshment in a global system of interdependent economic relations. Some theorists have celebrated globalisation as a modernising force, while others have warned against its homogenising flattening of cultures. Rejecting the simplistic notion of globalisation as “a single society and culture occupying the planet” (Waters 1995), more nuanced theorists have observed that the contemporary world is characterised by a marked tension between the specificity of place and the overriding dynamics of a global system. The latter frequently overrides the particularities of national statehood, economy and culture, while state actors do what they can to assert their independence. It makes sense to think of there being “multiple, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory globalisms” (Tsing 2000, 342), with states reshaping their territorial claims “on to both sub- and supra-national geographical scales” (Brenner 1999, 65). Such framing and reframing of political space depend as much upon symbolic mediation as upon the rules, treaties and logics of transnational institutions. In short, globalisation entails an ongoing struggle to tell people where and to what they belong.

The Covid-19 health crisis is a primary example of this battle to frame a global event. Most people acknowledge that the pandemic is truly global, albeit disparately pernicious in different parts of the world, and at different times. In relation to the urgent need for global coordination to find a vaccine, the insular ambitions of nations or regions seem manifestly petty and irrelevant. However, that has not stopped nationalist leaders from playing blame games in which they ascribe the origin of the virus to nefarious foreign states, or from making boastful claims that their public health strategy is “world-beating” rather than simply functional. Rarely has the disconnect between bombastic national rhetoric and empirical global reality seemed more conspicuous.

Given that the most pressing and intractable contemporary challenges can only be addressed through global coordination, the challenge of finding effective ways of communicating and acting beyond national silos seems more urgent than ever. From the spread of viruses to regulation of the environment, and from the direction of migration flows to the looming catastrophe of climate change, nation-states appear to be Canute-like before the irresistible waves of globalism. Left to themselves, nations squabble about who should take responsibility, constantly deferring meaningful action

until others have made a move.

The inescapably global nature of the pandemic has shown the futility and risk of such an approach, casting doubt upon the pursuit of national solutions and pointing towards the urgency of appeals to transnational public agency. Faced with globally diffuse problems of viral contagion, climate change and market instability, the civic case for stretching the use and meaning of the term “we, the public” becomes compelling. This important shift in collective self-consciousness entails the adoption of what Nancy Fraser (2007, 21) refers to as “the all-affected principle”:

Today, … the idea that citizenship can serve as a proxy for affectedness is no longer plausible. Under current conditions, one’s conditions of living do not depend wholly on the internal constitution of the political community of which one is a citizen. Although the latter remains undeniably relevant, its effects are mediated by other structures, both extra and non-territorial, whose impact is at least as significant … In general, globalization is driving a widening wedge between affectedness and political membership. As those two notions increasingly diverge, the effect is to reveal the former as an inadequate surrogate for the latter.

It follows from Fraser’s analysis that “what turns a collection of people into fellow members of a public is not shared citizenship, but their co-imbrication in a common set of structures and/or institutions that affect their lives” (ibid, 22). The logic of the all-affected principle rejects the notion that only national publics can confer democratic legitimacy, as the latter depends upon registering the voices of all those who are potentially affected by a problem, notwithstanding their national labels. This amounts to a post-Westphalian conception of citizenship in which, rather than being fragmented by artificial political divisions, the public is characterised by its common vulnerabilities, experiences and capacities. Members of post-Westphalian publics will continue to disagree with one another, of course, but the public sphere within which such political disagreement takes place will correspond to the dimensions of the issues at stake.

To be clear, it is only through the emergence of a cosmopolitan public domain in which solidarities are rooted in common affectedness rather than national-legal identities that global challenges such as the pandemic and economic depression, as well as climate change and other environmental threats, can be tackled democratically. This does not amount to a utopian call for citizens to adopt an abstractly cosmopolitan stance. Already competing with discourses of nationalism and populism in contemporary societies are many millions of voices across the world who view social problems from the perspective of a universal humanity sharing a common home. Such people are more inclined “to take risks by virtue of encountering the ‘other’” and to possess “some ability to reflect upon and judge aesthetically between different natures, places and societies” (Szerszynskiand and Urry 2002, 470). By understanding that “[g]lobalisation has brought large swathes of the world’s population closer together” in overlapping communities of fate (Held 2003, 478), many contemporary campaigners for social justice frame their arguments in terms of a language of cosmopolitan sensibility. These include movements opposing the structural inequalities of transnational economic power (such as Occupy Wall Street), ecological depredation (the School Strike for Climate Change), institutional sexism (MeToo) and racism (Black Lives Matter). The effectiveness of these campaigns in bringing injustices to global attention does not entail abandoning national institutions and populations as if they no longer matter, but framing messages to affected citizens within a cosmopolitan context that celebrates openness to global heterogeneity, pluralism and nuance.

As the pandemic highlights the limitations of the Westphalian conception of “normal” by forcing people from across the world to face up to their interdependence, both in terms of the transnational porosity of contagion and the resources needed to contain it, it calls attention to the aptness of a “new normal” in which shared social problems are addressed on a new scale. This adjustment of scale calls into being new conceptions of the public, defined increasingly in terms of shared affectedness.

Given that the most urgent crisis facing the world in the aftermath of the pandemic will be the threat of global catastrophe caused by climate change, the world is increasingly dependent upon the practical effectiveness of calls to action that are couched in a language of citizenship that transcends state borders and prioritises shared affectedness. The challenge of co-ordinating moral and political responses with a view to enhancing the public’s global agency is now a prerequisite for even modest success of efforts to save the planet from systemically wrought depredation. Could the public that has begun to develop a consciousness of its collective global vulnerability during the pandemic act upon such awareness beyond the current crisis?

#### Aff can’t solve cyberattacks—plan can’t make companies improve their infrastructure—Emory reads blue

1ac Merk et al. 18. Olaf Merk leads the work on ports and shipping at the International Transport Forum (ITF) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As such, he directs policy-relevant studies on maritime transport and the ports sector. Olaf Merk is the author of more than fifty OECD publications including “The Impact of MegaShips” and “The Competitiveness of Global Port-Cities”.), Lucie Kirstein (Scientific Advisor at National Academy of Science and Engineering) and Filip Salamitov (Policy analyst for the IFT), 2018, "The Impact of Alliances in Container Shipping", International Transport Forum, https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/impact-alliances-container-shipping.pdf

Consumers can be expected to want resilient maritime transport chains, so that the delivery of their goods will not be disrupted. Various indicators highlighted above, such as schedule reliability, delays, increased transit times related to less direct port connections, seem to suggest that containerised maritime transport chains could indeed run more smoothly. In addition, global alliances pose risks for system resilience, due to the limited possibilities for risk diversification, and to the extent that they have contributed to vertical integration between carriers and terminal operators. Risk diversification by shippers is rendered complicated by alliances. The nightmare of shippers (and shoppers) is to lose cargo or not get cargo at its destination before a crucial time, e.g. Christmas. In order to mitigate risks, shippers have traditionally spread their cargo over different carriers. The dominance of alliances means that containers from different carriers can end up on the same ship. In doing so, alliances have reduced the possibilities for risk diversification. Most shippers now take this into account and use back-up options from carriers that are not in the same alliance, but the choice wears thin. The lack of supply chain visibility is not helping efforts to diversify risk. An example of the limited visibility is the lack of transparency on what alliance services are and their characteristics. Almost none of the carriers indicate clearly if their services are operated by the carriers themselves, either as sole operator, through a vessel sharing agreement with competitors, or if the service is a slot charter operated entirely by their competitors. Shippers have in most cases no way to know who will move their cargo and it is often not clear which of the alliance members are operating an underlying service. Moreover, carriers rarely use the same service names across alliances, vessel sharing agreements and slot charter services, making cross-carrier comparisons difficult for shippers, possibly on purpose. The exception is THE Alliance where alliance members all use common service names. Finally, there is no standard for the information provided, e.g. different definitions and codes for ports and terminals, different calculations for transit times etc. (SeaIntel, 2018; 364). Due to this limited visibility, shippers are frustrated in their efforts to design diversification in their supply chains. In addition to alliances, vertical integration risks also reduce system resilience. Integration of shipping, terminal handling and hinterland transport could mean that whole transport chains are in the hand of just a few players, creating huge leverage for cyber-attacks, especially if parts of the chain are digitally connected. This became painfully evident during the NotPetya attack that hit Maersk ships and terminals (Box 7). Vertical integration could be considered to be related to the emergence of alliances. As service differentiation for the sea-leg is difficult in alliances – as the product is basically the same – one of the few remaining possibilities for individual carriers to differentiate is via vertical integration. Box 7. Cyber security and risks associated to vertical integration On 27 June 2017, a major cyber-attack began hitting firms mainly in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The attack is suspected to have started when hackers compromised the update server of Ukrainian tax accounting software company M.E.Doc so that it would distribute a malware referred to as “NotPetya” throughout its network. The malware further propagated itself notably via an exploit using a vulnerable Microsoft Windows network protocol. After analysis of the encryption routine of the malware, experts from Kaspersky came to the conclusion that the attack, although appearing as a ransomware attack, did not allow victims to recover their data even after paying the ransom, and the aim was therefore suspected to be directed at major disruption instead of financial gain for hackers (Ivanov and Mamedov, 2017). The carrier Maersk was presumably contaminated by this malware via software used by one of its offices in Ukraine. Maersk was forced to shut down many of its operating systems to stop the attack from spreading. The company was unable to process new orders and cranes were operated manually at some of its 76 container ports. The disruption caused major delays and led to rerouting of several vessels to ports not, or less, affected (Odell et al./FT, 2017). At least 17 terminals operated by APMT got infected by Maersk’s central IT infrastructure (Reuters, 2017). A number of terminals were unable to identify which shipment belonged to whom and therefore needed to clear cargo manually. The largest Indian port JNPT operated by Maersk’s APMT was forced to shut down and the terminal Maasvlakte II in Rotterdam stopped operations completely for a full week, which led to a highly congested service level. According to Maersk’s annual report for 2017, the attack mainly impacted Maersk Line, APM Terminals and Damco. The effect on profitability was estimated to be around USD 250-300 million, with the vast majority of the impact related to Maersk Line in the third quarter (Maersk, 2018). Maersk estimated a 20% drop in volume and lost out on carrying 70 000 40-foot containers within the two weeks of the attack. Besides lost revenue, the attack also involved high costs of rebuilding its IT infrastructure. At the moment of the cyber-attack, Maersk did not own any cyber risk insurance. The company reported that 4 000 new servers, 45 000 new PCs, and 2 500 applications had to be reinstalled (Chirgwin/The Register, 2018). Actual impacts on Maersk’s performance could be higher than reported and probably stretch beyond the second half of 2017 (Porter/Lloyd’s List, 2017a). In April 2018, analysts speculated that the attack could have cost Maersk group over USD 500 million in expenses and lost profit. Others situate the cost between USD 400-500 million because the effect from the attack continued in the fourth quarter of 2017 and led Maersk to make investments in new infrastructure and insurances. Furthermore, the cyber-attack could have had an extended impact on market shares until the first quarter of 2018 (Beck/ShippingWatch, 2018). Although for most affected terminals it took a few days before they could resume operations completely, shippers were affected by delays of up to two months, because Maersk reportedly had difficulties in allocating new slots and tracking and assigning correct data to containers. The impact was widely felt by interviewed shippers and Lloyd’s List reported a similar observation that nearly two months after the attack, Maersk was still dealing with containers in transit at the time of the attack (Porter/Lloyd’s List, 2017b). One of the interviewed shippers reports having received additional demurrage invoices due to complications and delays caused by the cyber-attack, which suggests the carrier might have tried to shift part of the costs of the attack to their consumers. Maersk’s global coverage, as well as strong horizontal and vertical integration in the sector further facilitated the knock-on effect of the cyber-attack. Companies who are reliant upon common IT infrastructure will logically suffer business interruption simultaneously when that infrastructure is compromised. Since supply chains are highly interconnected and even more so with increasing automation and digitalisation, this can result in an insecure operating environment even for those firms that make cyber security a priority. However, there is not only interdependence in IT infrastructure, but also in the utilisation of common assets. According to SeaIntel analysis, 20 other carriers transported containers on-board Maersk vessels around the time of the cyber-attack (SeaIntel, 2017; 319). MSC was the most affected with 23 vessel sharing agreements and four slot-charters, followed by Safmarine and Hamburg Süd. The most affected outside the 2M alliance and Maersk ownership was CMA CGM, with six vessel sharing agreements and four slot charter agreements with Maersk. The shipping sector is the backbone of international trade and ports are a vital part of every country’s infrastructure. Any major disruptions in supply chains can therefore have impacts on the overall economy. The scale of the cyber-attack and the many interconnections that exist vertically and horizontally in this industry could transform the collateral and rather accidental damage on a firm that was presumably not directly targeted, into a systemic risk for global trade.

#### 1AC Klare’s argument is that the US retaliates to a cyberattack---supply chains don’t affect the initial attack or the US’s response, so the plan doesn’t solve.

#### Grid’s resilient AND no cascades.

Larson 18 [Selena, Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst at Dragos, Inc., “Threats to Electric Grid are Real; Widespread Blackouts are Not”, 8/6/2018, https://dragos.com/blog/industry-news/threats-to-electric-grid-are-real-widespread-blackouts-are-not/]

The US electric grid is not about to go down. Though it’s understandable if someone believed that. Over the last few weeks, numerous media reports suggest state-backed hackers have infiltrated the US electric grid and are capable of manipulating the flow of electricity on a grand scale and cause chaos. Threats against industrial sectors including electric utilities, oil and gas, and manufacturing are growing, and it’s reasonable for people to be concerned. But to say hackers have invaded the US electric grid and are prepared to cause blackouts is false. The initial reporting stemmed from a public Department of Homeland Security (DHS) presentation in July on Russian hacking activity targeting US electric utilities. This presentation contained previously-reported information on a group known as Dragonfly by Symantec and which Dragos associates to activity labeled DYMALLOY and ALLANITE. These groups focus on information gathering from industrial control system (ICS) networks and have not demonstrated disruptive or damaging capabilities. While some news reports cite 2015 and 2016 blackouts in Ukraine as evidence of hackers’ disruptive capabilities, DYMALLOY nor ALLANITE were involved in those incidents and it is inaccurate to suggest the DHS’s public presentation and those destructive behaviors are linked. Adversaries have not placed “cyber implants” into the electric grid to cause blackouts; but they are infiltrating business networks – and in some cases, ICS networks – in an effort to steal information and intelligence to potentially gain access to operational systems. Overall, the activity is concerning and represents the prerequisites towards a potential future disruptive event – but evidence to date does not support the claim that such an attack is imminent. The US electric grid is resilient and segmented, and although it makes an interesting plot to an action movie, one or two strains of malware targeting operational networks would not cause widespread blackouts. A destructive incident at one site would require highly-tailored tools and operations and would not effectively scale. Essentially, localized impacts are possible, and asset owners and operators should work to defend their networks from intrusions such as those described by DHS. But scaling up from isolated events to widespread impacts is highly unlikely.

#### Cyberattacks on shipping firms don’t escalate to great power conflict – 2019-present prove.

1ac Sadek 21. Nicole Sadek. Reporter who has covered policy, politics and community for Bloomberg Government, The Arizona Republic, Georgia Public Broadcasting, and the Atlanta Journal Constitution), 6-29-2021, "Shipping Companies Confront Cyber Crooks as Economies Reopen", Bloomberg Government, https://about.bgov.com/news/shipping-companies-confront-cyber-crooks-as-economies-reopen/ Accessed: 2/14/22.

Shipping companies are part of critical infrastructure that’s fallen prey to cyberattacks in recent years, which most recently included the world’s largest meatpacker JBS SA and the southeastern Colonial Pipeline Co. Supply bottlenecks can drive consumer prices higher. Pandemic Shocks, Costs Go Far Beyond Empty Shelves: Supply Lines Rise in Attacks Ransomware attacks on shipping firms tripled between 2019 and 2020, cybersecurity company BlueVoyant reports. The world’s four largest shipping companies—Maersk, Mediterranean Shipping Company, CMA CGM, and COSCO—were all infected by ransomware in the last four years. Ransomware attacks encrypt victims’ files, preventing them from accessing sensitive information until they pay the hacker. Hackers can gain entry through malicious email attachments, old passwords, or other phishing techniques. “A lot of people are asking, ‘Why all of a sudden are all these critical infrastructure companies being attacked?” Austin Berglas, global head of professional services for BlueVoyant, said in an interview. “These groups are all financially motivated, and they’re just looking to target now organizations that they know they’re going to get the biggest payday from.” Illustrating the need to ensure shipping companies are operating adequately, the Ever Given, a quarter-mile container ship, got stuck in the Suez Canal for almost a week, disrupting traffic and resulting in a loss of almost $10 million per day.

#### No cyber impact.

Lewis 20, PhD, a senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. (James Andrew, 8-17-2020, "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe", *CSIS*, https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe)

A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack. To qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With ~~man-made~~ actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge. It is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. No one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days. As electric production is digitized, vulnerability increases, but many electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority. Similarly, at water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult. In any case, it would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted. More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are: Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals. There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.) No one has ever died from a cyberattack

#### No 1ac evidence that respiratory diseases (their internal link evidence) cause extinction.

**Adaptation and resilience prevent bio-d impacts.**

R. Alexander **Pyron, 17**. Robert F. Griggs Associate Professor of Biology at the George Washington University. “We don’t need to save endangered species. Extinction is part of evolution.” The Washington Post. November 22. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/we-dont-need-to-save-endangered-species-extinction-is-part-of-evolution/2017/11/21/57fc5658-cdb4-11e7-a1a3-0d1e45a6de3d_story.html?utm_term=.f0978c93ca1e>

But the impulse to conserve for conservation’s sake has taken on an unthinking, unsupported, unnecessary urgency. Extinction is the engine of evolution, the mechanism by which natural selection prunes the poorly adapted and allows the hardiest to flourish. Species constantly go extinct, and every species that is alive today will one day follow suit. There is no such thing as an “endangered species,” except for all species. The only reason we should conserve biodiversity is for ourselves, to create a stable future for human beings. Yes, we have altered the environment and, in doing so, hurt other species. This seems artificial because we, unlike other life forms, use sentience and agriculture and industry. But we are a part of the biosphere just like every other creature, and our actions are just as volitional, their consequences just as natural. Conserving a species we have helped to kill off, but on which we are not directly dependent, serves to discharge our own guilt, but little else. Climate scientists worry about how we’ve altered our planet, and they have good reasons for apprehension: Will we be able to feed ourselves? Will our water supplies dry up? Will our homes wash away? But unlike those concerns, extinction does not carry moral significance, even when we have caused it. And unless we somehow destroy every living cell on Earth, the sixth extinction will be followed by a recovery, and later a seventh extinction, and so on. Yet we are obsessed with reviving the status quo ante. The Paris Accords aim to hold the temperature to under two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels, even though the temperature has been at least eight degrees Celsius warmer within the past 65 million years. Twenty-one thousand years ago, Boston was under an ice sheet a kilometer thick. We are near all-time lows for temperature and sea level; whatever effort we make to maintain the current climate will eventually be overrun by the inexorable forces of space and geology. Our concern, in other words, should not be protecting the animal kingdom, which will be **just fine**. Within a few million years of the asteroid that killed the dinosaurs, the post-apocalyptic void had been filled by an explosion of diversity — modern mammals, birds and amphibians of all shapes and sizes. This is how evolution proceeds: through extinction. The inevitability of death is the only constant in life, and 99.9 percent of all species that have ever lived, as many as 50 billion, have already gone extinct. In 50 million years, Europe will collide with Africa and form a new supercontinent, destroying species (think of birds, fish and anything vulnerable to invasive life forms from another landmass) by irrevocably altering their habitats. Extinctions of individual species, entire lineages and even complete ecosystems are common occurrences in the history of life. The world is no better or worse for the absence of saber-toothed tigers and dodo birds and our Neanderthal cousins, who died off as Homo sapiens evolved. (According to some studies, it’s **not even clear** that **biod**iversity is suffering. The authors of another recent **N**ational **A**cademy of **S**ciences paper point out that **species richness** has shown **no net decline** among plants over 100 years across 16,000 sites examined around the world.) Conserving biodiversity should not be an end in itself; diversity can even be **hazardous** to human health

marked

. Infectious diseases are most prevalent and virulent in the most diverse tropical areas. Nobody donates to campaigns to save HIV, Ebola, malaria, dengue and yellow fever, but these are key components of microbial biodiversity, as unique as pandas, elephants and orangutans, all of which are ostensibly endangered thanks to human interference. Humans should feel less shame about molding their environment to suit their survival needs. When beavers make a dam, they cause the local extinction of numerous riverine species that cannot survive in the new lake. But that new lake supports a set of species that is just as diverse. **Studies** have shown that when humans introduce invasive plant species, native diversity sometimes suffers, but productivity — the **cycling of nutrients** through the ecosystem — frequently increases. Invasives can **bring other benefits**, too: Plants such as the Phragmites reed have been shown to **perform better at reducing coastal erosion** and **storing carbon** than native vegetation in some areas, like the Chesapeake. And if biodiversity is the goal of extinction fearmongers, how do they regard South Florida, where about 140 new reptile species accidentally introduced by the wildlife trade are now breeding successfully? No extinctions of native species have been recorded, and, at least anecdotally, most natives are still thriving. The ones that are endangered, such as gopher tortoises and indigo snakes , are threatened mostly by habitat destruction. Even if all the native reptiles in the Everglades, about 50, went extinct, the region would still be gaining 90 new species — a biodiversity bounty. If they can adapt and flourish there, then evolution is promoting their success. If they outcompete the natives, extinction is doing its job. There is no return to a pre-human Eden; the goals of species conservation have to be aligned with the acceptance that large numbers of animals will go extinct. Thirty to 40 percent of species may be threatened with extinction in the near future, and their loss may be inevitable. But both the planet and humanity can probably **survive or even thrive in a world with fewer species**. We don’t depend on polar bears for our survival, and **even if their eradication has a domino effect** that eventually affects us, we will **find a way to adapt**. The species that we rely on for food and shelter are a **tiny proportion** of total **biod**iversity, and most humans live in — and rely on — areas of only moderate biodiversity, not the Amazon or the Congo Basin.

## 2NC

### Cosmo K---2NC

#### Judging the aff’s constitutive political community is a reality creating principle.

Gerard Delanty 14. University of Sussex, UK “The prospects of cosmopolitanism and the possibility of global justice.” Journal of Sociology 2014, Vol. 50(2) 213–228 https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/plurispace/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/DELANTY\_Prospects-Cosmopolitanism.pdf

The notion that global justice is both a challenge and a possibility is a relatively new idea.1 Notions of justice have traditionally been confined to territorially limited political communities, generally nation-states, and global justice seen as a secondary or derivative matter. It was not very long ago that all questions of justice were thought to pertain to nationally defined political communities. This was certainly the assumption that Rawls made in A Theory of Justice in 1971, and which set the terms of debate for more than four decades. In the past two decades there has been a steady increase in what may be called discourses of global justice – including theoretical conceptualizations – and political practices that reflect notions of global justice. It would appear that global justice has become part of the Zeitgeist or the political imaginary of critical publics in contemporary societies as they address a range of global challenges.

To create new or possible worlds it is first of all necessary to be able to imagine them. The fact that we are unsure of what exactly constitutes global justice, but nonetheless speak of it, suggests that it is a reality of a certain kind. One might say it is a reality creating idea. The reality of global justice can now be declared to be a constitutive feature of political community. It is a way of judging the world and a way of thinking about the world, as well as a way of examining the world that challenges the exclusivity of national borders as determining the boundaries of justice. Global justice has a normative, a cognitive and an epistemological dimension: it offers principles against which injustice can be measured, it offers a language to speak about human interconnectedness, and it is a topic on which knowledge can be acquired through social research. The concern with global justice is central to the idea of cosmopolitanism, though not the only aspect of cosmopolitanism. In this article I am largely concerned with the political dimension of cosmopolitanism, which I see as the context in which to discuss global justice. The aim of the article is to explore the considerations that are at stake in assessing the prospects of cosmopolitanism today as a political project. I argue that there is scope for fruitful dialogue between sociology and political science around this question, which asks how a normative idea becomes an empirical phenomenon. In the first section I discuss the notion of global justice before outlining a theoretical approach to the analysis of cosmopolitanism. The third section of the article moves on to look at the conditions of the possibility of cosmopolitanism, before finally considering the prospects of cosmopolitanism.

#### Debates over cosmopolitanism shape subjectivity---their model re-instantiates meta-norms that teach debaters to recreate the nation-state’s violence through social practices.

Gerard Delanty 14. Professor of Sociology and Social Political Thought (School of Law, Politics and Sociology) @ University of Sussex, UK “The prospects of cosmopolitanism and the possibility of global justice.” Journal of Sociology 2014, Vol. 50(2) 213–228 https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/plurispace/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/DELANTY\_Prospects-Cosmopolitanism.pdf

It is in the first instance a condition of openness to the world in the sense of the broadening of the moral and political horizon of societies. It entails a view of societies as connected rather than separated. Cosmopolitanism is made possible by the fact that individuals, groups, publics, societies have a capacity for learning in dealing with problems and, in particular, learning from each other. In this sense, then, cosmopolitanism is not a matter of diversity or mobility, but a process of learning. Dialogue is a key feature of cosmopolitanism since dialogue opens up the possibility of incorporating the perspective of others into one’s own view of the world. It can thus be associated with a communicative view of modernity. Rather than being an affirmative condition, it is transformative and is produced by social struggles rather than being primarily elite driven or entirely institutional. In this sense, cosmopolitanism can be related to popular and vernacular traditions rather than exclusively to the projects of elites (see Holton, 2009). From an epistemological perspective, cosmopolitanism involves the production of essentially critical knowledge, such as the identification of transformative potentials within the present.

Finally, cosmopolitanism is related to subject formation: it is constitutive of the self as much as it is of social and political processes. This is reflected in the von Humboldtian – in this case Wilhelm von Humboldt’s – understanding of cosmopolitanism as a particular kind of consciousness that is best exemplified in education. In the acquisition of knowledge, the self undergoes a transformation, for Bildung is a form of self-formation and occurs through the encounter of the individual with the world. Bildung is a means of encountering the universal, as reflected in the category of the world, and is the aim of education.

These features of cosmopolitanism challenge the received view of normative ideas, such as global justice as transcending political community or as simply utopian. The conception of cosmopolitanism I am putting forward is that it is constitutive of modernity and part of the make-up of political community. This is why cosmopolitanism is not a zero sum condition – either present or absent – as its critics often argue and its defenders mistakenly argue in its support. It is present to varying degrees in contemporary societies.

In order to assess the prospects of cosmopolitanism it is therefore necessary to determine the extent to which cosmopolitan phenomena are present in the cultural model of societies and in their modes of social organization and institutions. By the cultural model, I mean the social imaginary of societies, that is the dominant forms of collective identity or self-understanding. The cultural model of all modern societies involves the amplification and metamorphosis of transcultural ideas such as liberty, justice, freedom, autonomy, rights, which of course are variously interpreted and are not always fully institutionalized. But the existence of such ideas (essentially meta-norms), means that societies have the cognitive means of reaching beyond themselves. For this reason, there is generally a tension in modern societies between the cultural model and institutions. Related to these levels of analysis is the dimension of subject formation, the cosmopolitan self. It is possible that any one time in the history of a society there is a tension between subject formation, the cultural model of society, and social institutions. It is for this reason that cosmopolitanism can be seen as a critical theory of society (see Delanty, 2009): it shares with the critical heritage the concern with possibilities within the present or the immanent transcendence of society.

I am emphasizing, then, the formative dimensions of cosmopolitanism, which in other words is a structure forming itself out of both the self and society. It entails a subject (the cosmopolitan subject), a discourse in which ideas, knowledge, modes of cognition are produced, and social practices. Viewed in such terms, cosmopolitanism is a process as opposed to a fixed condition. It is marked by conflict, contradictions, negotiation. The implications of this view are that evidence of cosmopolitanism must be found not in an end state – a cosmopolitan society or state as opposed to a non-cosmopolitan one – but in the process by which it emerges. It is the task of sociology to determine whether and how this process is occurring.

#### 4. Misrepresentation---predetermining the “who” and “how” of policymaking blocks democratic arenas. Our public sphere of argument over the Westphalian frames is an act of justice through assertion of rights.

Nancy Fraser 05. Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School. “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, NLR 36, November–December 2005.” New Left Review. https://newleftreview-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/issues/ii36/articles/nancy-fraser-reframing-justice-in-a-globalizing-world

But the claims of transformative politics go further still. Above and beyond their other demands, these movements are also claiming a say in a post-Westphalian process of frame-setting. Rejecting the standard view, which deems frame-setting the prerogative of states and transnational elites, they are effectively aiming to democratize the process by which the frameworks of justice are drawn and revised. Asserting their right to participate in constituting the ‘who’ of justice, they are simultaneously transforming the ‘how’—by which I mean the accepted procedures for determining the ‘who’. At their most reflective and ambitious, accordingly, transformative movements are demanding the creation of new democratic arenas for entertaining arguments about the frame. In some cases, moreover, they are creating such arenas themselves. In the World Social Forum, for example, some practitioners of transformative politics have fashioned a transnational public sphere where they can participate on a par with others in airing and resolving disputes about the frame. In this way, they are prefiguring the possibility of new institutions of post-Westphalian democratic justice.footnote16

The democratizing dimension of transformative politics points to a third level of political injustice, above and beyond the two already discussed. Previously, I distinguished first-order injustices of ordinary-political misrepresentation from second-order injustices of misframing. Now, however, we can discern a third-order species of political injustice, which corresponds to the question of the ‘how’. Exemplified by undemocratic processes of frame-setting, this injustice consists in the failure to institutionalize parity of participation at the meta-political level, in deliberations and decisions concerning the ‘who’. Because what is at stake here is the process by which first-order political space is constituted, I shall call this injustice meta-political misrepresentation. Meta-political misrepresentation arises when states and transnational elites monopolize the activity of frame-setting, denying voice to those who may be harmed in the process, and blocking creation of democratic arenas where the latter’s claims can be vetted and redressed. The effect is to exclude the overwhelming majority of people from participation in the meta-discourses that determine the authoritative division of political space. Lacking any institutional arenas for such participation, and submitted to an undemocratic approach to the ‘how’, the majority is denied the chance to engage on terms of parity in decision-making about the ‘who’.

#### 2. Misrepresentation makes consequentialism impossible---nation-states discount background injustice.

András Miklós 09. Harvard University. “Nationalist Criticisms of Cosmopolitan Justice”. Public Reason 1 (1): 105-124.

In their general form, instrumental justifications of national partiality are unlikely to succeed, for the following general reason. As we saw, they purport to justify the claim that, whatever people’s interests consist in, we should give priority to our fellow-nationals’ interests over those of others. However, as Charles Beitz argues against what he calls the consequentialist justification of the priority to compatriots view, it is implausible that such justifications can establish this general thesis since they would have to rely on implausible empirical assumptions (1983, 593). That is, they would have to presuppose a fair background distribution of resources against which states’ taking care of the interests of their citizens might be justified. Given the hugely unequal current international distribution of resources and the tendency of free-market mechanisms to generate injustice without appropriate institutions maintaining background justice, more of international redistribution could bring about a better state of affairs from an impartial point of view. Now, Goodin recognizes that special responsibilities can be assigned to agents only against the background of a fair initial distribution of resources (1988, 685). It is very implausible to suppose that a setup where the Mozambiquean and the Swiss state are each exclusively responsible for the well-being of their own citizens produces the best overall state of affairs from an impartial point of view. However, an arrangement where each state would be allocated an equal initial per capita share of the earth’s resources, and then left free to do whatever it can to perform its special responsibility for its citizens, would still be unjust if states are not self-sufficient. Liberals share the view that the operation of free markets tends to generate injustice unless it takes place against the background of just institutions correcting for unfavorable distributive effects. Thus, even in the domestic case, partiality in special relationships is regarded as permissible only if there are background institutions that implement the impartial requirements of justice. Individuals have a duty to create and uphold such institutions that maintain the conditions of impartiality, against the background of which communal projects and personal commitments can take place. Analogously, if such just global institutions are in place that maintain a fair background distribution and correct for unjust distributive effects of market transactions, there may indeed be legitimate forms of giving priority to fellow-nationals. However, this idea is different from what the priority thesis in its general form purports to establish, as it is silent about just background institutions.

#### Walt is wrong and outdated---Nationalism is not inevitable---it’s a question of the frame we use to approach politics. Socio-cognitive shifts are possible.

Gerard Delanty 14. University of Sussex, UK “The prospects of cosmopolitanism and the possibility of global justice.” Journal of Sociology 2014, Vol. 50(2) 213–228 https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/plurispace/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/DELANTY\_Prospects-Cosmopolitanism.pdf

Evidence of major change can never be easily found in the short term. Criticisms of cosmopolitanism that invoke the obvious presence of counter-cosmopolitan trends – which presumably presuppose cosmopolitan currents – are too short-sighted in focusing on a short time span or on reactive events. The Axial Age breakthrough itself took several centuries – 800 to 200 bc – to produce the first universalistic visions, which laid the foundations for the emergence of cosmopolitanism, and the tumultuous history of democracy is itself a reminder of the need to take a longer view on major social and political transformation. Thus the fact that there is much evidence of global injustice does not mean that global justice is absent from the self-understanding of contemporary critical publics or that it has no consequences. The thesis of this article is that the most compelling evidence resides less in manifest institutional change – despite considerable gains, as discussed in the preceding section – than in socio-cognitive shifts in learning competences. Thus the structuring impact that global justice has had on the political imagination in recent times is essentially more of a cognitive than a normative development in redefining the self-understanding of political community.

#### Epistemic shifts are key---the future is defined by global crisis.

Sumiti Kataria and Hongmei Qu 21. School of Philosophy and Sociology, Jilin University. "The Coronavirus Pandemic: The Growing Relevance of Moral Cosmopolitan Justice?". SpringerLink. 10-23-2021. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40647-021-00334-6

The metaphysical modus operandi of cosmopolitanism demands an epistemological shift towards a hybrid account of moral responsibility, establishing reconciliation between national identity and global individualism. To reformulate the discourse on welfare and social progress, it is inevitable that we cogitate on the desire to move beyond the politics of populism, economic growth and profit-making approach of neo-liberalism emphasising on downsizing and disinvestment, purporting the reinterpretation of realist assertion international relations focusing on the conduct of inter-state conflict to the reflection on growing dependence and existing global inequality.

The adoption of HIF plan of action as an alternate model of arbitrary pricing mechanism of intellectual property rights can be a virtuous point of departure in furthering the accessibility and affordability level of the marginalised section to the health facilities, but at the same time, the focus should be on building a mechanism that also recognises the social and political impediments and emphasise on setting the global norms and operational guidelines to eliminate the structural barriers.

The multidimensional approach to cosmopolitanism attempts to construct a realm of fair distribution of duties and responsibilities that acknowledge the relevance of subsistence rights and the necessity of the global community to cooperate for creating an environment of social cohesion, providing the equal share of entitlements to the least-developed countries.

Conclusion

The essay tries to illuminate the strong interplay between the health catastrophe and its detrimental effects on the existing structural inequalities in the least-developed countries. Coronavirus revealed the hollowness of the pursuit of neo-liberal policy discourse. The conditions of human life were radically altered. The national government and international institutions failed miserably to ensure health faculties for the poor. The so-called civil society organisations, enchanting the slogan for strengthening the citizen entitlements to social and economic rights, kept staring at the plight of migrant labourers, and none took effective measures for the protection of the labouring class from hunger and starvation. We might overcome the coronavirus pandemic, but it is just a glimpse of the broader chains of crises waiting for us in the future. The global Pandemic has unravelled the dilemmas embedded in the premise of social theory. The correspondence of the development of diagnostic mechanism as a public policy formulation is much more complicated than outlining the diagnostic strategy in medical science based on scientific experimentation and following a cut-and-dried predetermined methodology. The societal problems are wicked and complex in nature. It requires not only the positivist problem-solving approach but also the capability to anticipate the casual chain of unseen future repercussions. Furthermore, consideration is needed to reconcile the pluralistic cultural values along with the reconstruction of unequal social and economic structure to restore the public faith in policy discourse (Rittel and Webber 1973).

#### Inability to conceptualize violence determines impact calculous---overcorrect for the intelligibility gap.

Tamara Trownsell et al. 19. Tamara Trownsell, Associate Professor of IR @ Universidad San Francisco de Quito, Ecuador. AND Amaya Querejazu, Associate Professor of IR and Latin American Studies at Universidad de Antioquia, Colombia. AND Giorgio Shani, Chair of the Department of Politics and IR @ International Christian University. AND Navnita Chadha Behera, Visiting Fulbright Fellow at George Washington University and Professor of IR @ the University of Delhi. AND Jarrad Reddekop, Associate Fellow at the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society @ the University of Victoria. AND Arlene Tickner, professor of IR @ the Universidad del Rosario, Colombia. “Recrafting International Relations through Relationality.” <https://www.e-ir.info/2019/01/08/recrafting-international-relations-through-relationality/>

How we relate to others should be a central concern of the field of International Relations. However, independent political communities—states—and their interrelations have historically been the focus of the discipline of International Relations (IR), thus limiting the forms of interaction that potentially constitute the field.[1] Postpositivist accounts have repeatedly indicated the disjuncture between the conceptual constructs that IR scholars use to make sense of the world historically and the way people practice their lives, which in the end is the substance of global politics. Many critical projects including Global IR have challenged the research produced through atomistic understandings of the world, and attempts have been made to integrate other ways of knowing into the discipline (Acharya 2014, Jackson and Nexon 1999, Tickner and Wæver 2009). While the ‘critical turn’ has made IR a more plural discipline by opening space for examining different types of relations, they have still been founded on modern, western ‘ontological’ assumptions about existence that have undercut their ability to reap the full benefits of other more robustly relational ways of existing (Blaney and Tickner 2017, Shani 2008, Trownsell 2013). Because the kind of plurality practised has not effectively dealt with distinctly relational ways of living and forms of knowing in their own terms, the call that we are making here is not just about adding other perspectives to the IR cauldron. We are aspiring for a deep plurality, in which IR scholars learn to effectively engage with difference at the ontological, methodological and practical levels.

Since the issue at hand is about ontological-cosmological commitments, we proffer our particular understandings of these terms. By ontology, we mean those basic assumptions about the nature of existence that are operative within any given tradition of living and thinking. In this sense ontology is closely linked to the cosmological in that they both reflect how we conceptualize our relationship with the cosmos and our place in it (Shani 2017). They are distinct in that cosmology refers more to origin stories and to cultural, spiritual and religious practices while ontology expresses the assumptions about the primordial condition of existence that provides the underlying logic of cosmological accounts and as such of all the other cultural fruits that emerge from them. Here we focus on ontology, because it helps draw attention to and provincialize many of the fundamental assumptions made in the dominant IR tradition, many of which have become invisible or merely commonsensical by being consonant with prevalent shared meaning systems and through longstanding and conventional use.

The general inability both in the field and discipline of international relations to recognize when and how one and others are engaging existence from very distinct ontological points of departure has had a serious impact in terms of both politics and knowledge production. Promoted through globally replicated institutions including academia, media, churches, etc., conceptualizing and practicing existence based on separation has become so naturalized that other more relational forms of being have been silenced and excluded. Conflict over what counts as real arises since those applying the predominant assumptions cannot even fathom that these other ways of being can be possible, legitimate or valid. As such living in one’s own or a group’s terms becomes a struggle when they are not aligned with the more predominant logic.

Several consequences of being blind to these relational ways of living and being manifest themselves politically. First these life expressions are often “othered” and “minimized” by treating them as myths (Law 2015), legends, superstitions, or stories about how people communicate with other beings. Denigration also becomes evident when examining public policies that do not even articulate, let alone protect, these relational ways of life. Among humans, groups abound that have not been deemed worthy of civil rights protections in the process of statebuilding for not engaging the world in sufficiently “civilized” manners (Sawyer 2004). Others have been the targets of state-led violence through national forced sterilization or “population control” initiatives (Carpio 2004, Pegoraro 2015). Beyond the human, these excluded groups have clamored to protect other beings that do not translate easily into traditional legal frameworks. For example, while indigenous groups were able to get the rights of nature officially acknowledged in Ecuador’s 2008 constitution, an effective implementation of these rights has yet to be seen. Efforts to maintain a healthy relationship with the beings of land, water, air, plants and animals often come into direct conflict with “national interests,” international treaties, foreign direct investment and forms of international cooperation, as can be clearly seen in last year’s indigenous struggles at Standing Rock in the United States. In the end, the ontological nature of these clashes has been clearly echoed in the zapatistas’ claims to a world of many worlds when stating, “We are another resistance, we are another reality.”[2]

In addition to the important political implications in the field of international relations, the discipline itself has yet to consider seriously relational ways of knowing and being. Because the problematics typical of IR and the tools generated to deal with them have been identified and named through the same predominant set of existential assumptions, the conceptual capacity of the discipline to grasp and respond to these ways of knowing is limited. In fact the predominant understanding of ontology within the discipline of IR has been referred to as “scientific ontology” (Patomäki and Wight 2000, Jackson 2011). Here scholars fight over what exists in the world without a prior discussion as to how it is ontologically that we arrive at a place where we insist on the existential autonomy of categories in the first place. This means that we keep studying these cosmologies through ontologically incommensurate filters (not based on similar existential assumptions) thinking that in this way we will still be able to understand them and then use the knowledge generated through reduced filters to find effective strategies for engagement. Yet our ontological parochialism still translates into epistemic violence by not being able to hear, understand, engage their world in their own ontological terms. Simultaneously we continue to generate a skewed picture of the kinds of knowing and being practiced in distinct parts of the world and subsequently of world politics. Consequently the resulting “intelligibility gap” still reinforces certain ways of being and knowing in the world as more legitimate or acceptable than others, thus reinforcing the source of cosmological insecurity for those falling outside these parameters.

#### 6. Nationalism causes war and genocide.

Virginia Matteo 20. Bachelor's degree in Spanish and English Literature. “Why Nationalism Is Dangerous.” https://soapboxie.com/social-issues/Why-Nationalism-Is-Dangerous

A Rise of Nationalism

In theory, we all should know what pursuing extreme national interests and a xenophobic agenda can lead to. . . the horrors of the two world wars are not buried in the distant past. But do we really? Perhaps those wars have become fossilized stories we can’t really relate to anymore?

An increase in the support of nationalist parties across Europe and the phenomenon of Donald Trump in the U.S. seem to indicate just that; how quickly we can forget. Populist politicians deliberately play upon the refugee crisis and the fear of terrorism to revive nationalist sentiments. In this nationalist rhetoric, the refugee and the migrant become the figures upon which all our fears materialize; the scapegoats. Nationalists want you to thing if we could get rid of migrants, society would be purged and all problems resolved. Terrorism would fade into oblivion, the working class would live in bliss, and the prices of houses would fall.

Except none of it would really happen. Picking a victim and blaming them for all that’s wrong, as understandable from a psychological point of view as it may be, will lead to nothing but violence and creating even more problems. Nationalists think they have a simple cure for all social ailments, but in fact they terribly misdiagnosed the patient. Theirs is the kind of thinking that led people to believe that if they sacrifice enough victims, the gods will show mercy and send them the long-awaited rain.

Of course nationalism doesn’t boil down to blaming migrants for every evil. It’s a complex phenomenon with many faces across the world and throughout history. But it is still possible to identify some common features that may be dangerous.

Pitting One Nation Against Another

In post imperial Britain the notions of “nation” and “race” were played upon by the Conservative party in an attempt to revive political language at a time when the UK had lost their sway over a significant portion of the world. The scheme of restoring past glory and a sense of value to the nation was carried out by defining the British nation against a surge of immigrants that were coming to the country, especially black settlers. The proper British way of life was seen in opposition to alien, threatening, dangerous ways of life. In short, the creation of a white homogenous British nation that overlooked differences such as class, gender, regional identities, was only possible by saying what this nation wasn’t (it wasn’t black, it wasn’t criminal, it wasn’t dangerous).

Scholars of nationalism agree that achieving a consensus about national identity requires identifying an Other inside or outside the national borders, that is somehow inferior to the nation itself. The exclusion and derogation of other cultures inside a state can lead to a series of social problem such as legitimization of abuse, alienation, in extreme cases violence. It is also problematic because it is only natural that the abused and alienated victim will look for an alternative identity, finding consolation in their own version of nationalism. Two hostile communities (parts of them, at least) that despise each other’s cultures and are unable to communicate is no good news. Especially if one community significantly outnumbers the other.

National Will: Where Does It Reside?

In nationalist rhetoric whatever the people do, or wish, or rather what politicians say that the people wish, is inherently good by virtue of it being the “will of the people”. The consequence of the nation being held the highest good is a dangerous lack of self-criticism and a very dubious sense of morality. The national interest can be used to justify just about anything.

Another problem is that the national will is highly malleable to different political agendas. It should not be understood as a pure expression of the nation, as some nationalists seem to understand it, but rather as a political tool for pursuing particular political goals. Many politicians claim the right to speak on behalf of the nation, but how do they identify the national will? Where does it reside? How is it created? How is it measured? Does a politician just “feel” it? Is it unanimous?

A politician brandishing the national will is giving themselves essentially carte blanche to do anything they claim is in the national interest and shows that they are unwilling to compromise on anything that could in their opinion harm the nation. Putting ideology over pragmatism certainly is not the best entry into dialogue on an international level; it can cause misunderstanding and the nation’s isolation.

Nation-Building Is Repressive

According to some models, nation-building requires in agrarian societies a landed elite to subjugate the peasantry. The emergence of a nation is frequently preceded by gory peasant revolts, especially in colonial and post-colonial contexts in the Middle East and South Asia, where the predominant economic model is agrarian capitalism. Nationalist violence isn’t always directed outward; it is also used against the same people it supposedly cherishes. This is one of the many paradoxes of nationalism; it glorifies the nation, the people, but at the same time it crashes those of its own people that dare to disagree. Nationalism’s dream of unity is impossible to achieve without a degree of violence and coercion (conscripting armies is one example of state repression). Nationalism pretends to represent the totality of the nation, but on close inspection it is obvious that it constantly struggles to hold the nation together and there are other identities that challenge it.

The Threats of Civil War and Genocide

In multi-ethnic and multi-religious states (many of such states were erected by colonial powers in the Middle East), if different groups disagree about what should be the basis of national consciousness, there always exists the danger of civil war. History provides too many sad examples of struggles over hegemony that resulted in utter human tragedy. Genocides on Iraqi Shi’is and Kurds by the Ba’thist regime in Iraq, the massacres of Shi’is and Tajiks by the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Bosnian civil war, the civil war in Tajikistan and the Ayodhya and Bombay massacres of Muslims in India. As Juan R. I. Cole and Deniz Kandiyoti sum it up these events should: “stand as reminders of how the post-colonial national imagination can turn, just as had some European nationalisms, toward dark fantasies of ethnic hegemony and even homogenization.”

#### they’ve answered the wrong K and our alt isn’t “world government”---Realism concedes anti-hegemonic blocks want to democratize decision making and that shared, meta-institutions are possible. Any structuralist reading of realism can’t explain democracy.

Daniele Archibugi 04. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK and Italian National Research Council, Italy European Journal of International Relations Copyright 2004. “Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review”. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Daniele-Archibugi-2/publication/240701697\_Cosmopolitan\_Democracy\_and\_Its\_Critics\_A\_Review/links/5cc861b5299bf120978b3022/Cosmopolitan-Democracy-and-Its-Critics-A-Review.pdf

Realist Critics

The disenchanted Realists remind us that the world’s mechanisms are very different from how cosmopolitan democracy’s dreamers imagine them to be. They argue that the principal elements regulating international relations are, ultimately, force and interest. Thus, every effort to tame international politics through institutions and public participation is pure utopia (Zolo, 1997; Hawthorn, 2000; Chandler, 2003). I do not disagree with attributing importance to force and interest, but it is excessive not only to consider them as the sole force moving politics, but also as being immutable. Even from a Realist perspective it would be wrong to think that the interests of all actors involved in international politics are opposed to democratic management of the decision-making process. A more accurate picture is that of opposing interests in tension with each other. Thus at the moment, there is on the one side the influence exerted over the decision-making process by a few centres of power (a few governments, military groups, large enterprises); and on the other side the demands of wider interest groups to increase their role at the decision-making table. Whether peripheral states, global movements or national industries, these latter groups are not necessarily pure at heart. They follow an agenda which is de facto anti-hegemonic because their own interests happen to be opposed to those of centralized power. To support these interests is not a matter of theory, but rather of political choice.

Some Realists, however, reject not just the feasibility of the cosmopolitan project but also its desirability. These critiques are often confused; doubtless because a risk is perceived that the cosmopolitan project could, in the frame of contemporary political reality, be used in other directions. It is certainly relevant that Zolo, in order to construct his critique of cosmopolitan democracy, must continuously force the position taken by his antagonists. In Cosmopolis, he often criticizes the prospect of a global government, but none of the authors he cites — Bobbio, Falk, Habermas, Held — ever argued in its defence (on the other hand, the inevitability of world government is discussed in Wendt, 2003). These scholars limited their support to an increase in the rule of law and integration within global politics; they never argued in favour of the global concentration of coercive power. Cosmopolitan democracy is not to be identified with the project of a global government — which is necessarily reliant upon the concentration of forces in one sole institution — on the contrary, it is a project that invokes voluntary and revocable alliances between governmental and meta-governmental institutions, where the availability of coercive power, in ultima ratio, is shared between players and subjected to juridical control.

It would be useful to carry out an experiment to verify how often a Realist’s critique of cosmopolitan democracy could also apply to state democracy. If the Realist approach were to be applied coherently, democracy could not exist as a political system. Despite all of its imperfections, democracy does exist, and this has been made possible due, in part, to the thinkers and movements — all visionary! — who have supported and fought for its cause far before it could ever become possible.

#### Demands create feasibility---they shift meta-politics.

Nancy Fraser 05. Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School. “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, NLR 36, November–December 2005.” New Left Review. https://newleftreview-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/issues/ii36/articles/nancy-fraser-reframing-justice-in-a-globalizing-world

Today, however, monological theories of social justice are becoming increasingly implausible. As we have seen, globalization cannot help but problematize the question of the ‘how’, as it politicizes the question of the ‘who’. The process goes something like this: as the circle of those claiming a say in frame-setting expands, decisions about the ‘who’ are increasingly viewed as political matters, which should be handled democratically, rather than as technical matters, which can be left to experts and elites. The effect is to shift the burden of argument, requiring defenders of expert privilege to make their case. No longer able to hold themselves above the fray, they are necessarily embroiled in disputes about the ‘how’. As a result, they must contend with demands for meta-political democratization.

An analogous shift is currently making itself felt in normative philosophy. Just as some activists are seeking to transfer elite frame-setting prerogatives to democratic publics, so some theorists of justice are proposing to rethink the classic division of labour between theorist and demos. No longer content to ascertain the requirements of justice in a monological fashion, these theorists are looking increasingly to dialogical approaches, which treat important aspects of justice as matters for collective decision-making, to be determined by the citizens themselves, through democratic deliberation. For them, accordingly, the grammar of the theory of justice is being transformed. What could once be called the ‘theory of social justice’ now appears as the ‘theory of democratic justice’.footnote17

In its current form, however, the theory of democratic justice remains incomplete. To complete the shift from a monological to dialogical theory requires a further step, beyond those contemplated by most proponents of the dialogical turn.footnote18 Henceforth, democratic processes of determination must be applied not only to the ‘what’ of justice, but also to the ‘who’ and the ‘how’. In that case, by adopting a democratic approach to the ‘how’, the theory of justice assumes a guise appropriate to a globalizing world. Dialogical at every level, meta-political as well as ordinary-political, it becomes a theory of post-Westphalian democratic justice.

### Advantage 1---2NC

**Extend 1NC 3---Alt causes to the supply chain crisis---covid, warehouse space, and trucker shortage. That’s Sytsma AND…**

Peter S. **Goodman, 22**. U.S. economics journalist and author. Goodman has worked for The Washington Post and The Huffington Post, was the editor of the International Business Times, and is currently the European economics correspondent for The New York Times. "A Normal Supply Chain? It’s ‘Unlikely’ in 2022," 2-1-2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/01/business/supply-chain-disruption.html>. accessed on 2-11-2022.

The breadth and persistence of supply chain troubles in part result from how the coronavirus pandemic has accelerated trends that have been unfolding for decades, especially the growth of e-commerce. Whereas major brands traditionally ship goods from factories around the world to central warehouses that supply retail outlets, e-commerce demands a far more complicated endeavor: Retailers must deliver individual orders to homes and businesses. As warehouses have been swamped by goods, major retailers have added capacity at a breakneck pace. Amazon spent more than $164 million to construct new warehouse space last year, while Lowe’s, the home improvement retailer, spent more than $17 million, according to Reonomy, a commercial real estate data provider. Warehouses are stuffed to the rafters in the places with the most demand — those near the largest metropolitan areas. As of late last year, warehouses in the Inland Empire region of Southern California had vacancy rates of less than 1 percent, according to CBRE Group, a commercial real estate services and investment company. Those in northern New Jersey had vacancy rates of only 2.4 percent. “The basic physics of land scarcity matters quite a bit,” said Chris Caton, managing director of global strategy and analytics at Prologis, a real estate investment trust focused on warehouses. “If you look at Southern California, you look at the greater New York-New Jersey area, there’s just no more land in the most sought-after locations.” The tightness in warehouses helps explain why American ports remain seized by dysfunction, especially the busiest one, the complex of terminals at Los Angeles and Long Beach. With limited room to stash goods offloaded from inbound vessels, containers have piled up on docks uncollected. That has prompted port overseers to force ships to float offshore for days and even weeks before they can unload. Over the last three months, container ships unloading goods have remained at American ports for seven days on average, an increase of 4 percent compared with all of 2021 and 21 percent higher than at the start of the pandemic, according to FourKites, a supply chain consultancy based in Chicago. As ports work through the backlog, they are contending with structural problems — aging and overtaxed infrastructure, a shortage of chassis used to haul containers with trucks, and not enough drivers, even as trucking companies increase pay. Shipping companies are hobbled by outmoded technology that has limited their ability to anticipate and plan around problems. “Those systemic problems in the supply chains, this has been building for years,” said Steve Dowse, senior vice president and general manager for international solutions at FourKites. “The pandemic has really just highlighted the fragility of our supply chains.” Even as companies confront the supply chain upheaval, the costs and complexity of solving their troubles may dissuade executives from taking effective action. How the Supply Chain Crisis Unfolded The pandemic sparked the problem. The highly intricate and interconnected global supply chain is in upheaval. Much of the crisis can be traced to the outbreak of Covid-19, which triggered an economic slowdown, mass layoffs and a halt to production. Here’s what happened next: A reduction in shipping. With fewer goods being made and fewer people with paychecks to spend at the start of the pandemic, manufacturers and shipping companies assumed that demand would drop sharply. But that proved to be a mistake, as demand for some items would surge. Demand for protective gear spiked. In early 2020, the entire planet suddenly needed surgical masks and gowns. Most of these goods were made in China. As Chinese factories ramped up production, cargo vessels began delivering gear around the globe. Then, a shipping container shortage. Shipping containers piled up in many parts of the world after they were emptied. The result was a shortage of containers in the one country that needed them the most: China, where factories would begin pumping out goods in record volumes Demand for durable goods increased. The pandemic shifted Americans’ spending from eating out and attending events to office furniture, electronics and kitchen appliances – mostly purchased online. The spending was also encouraged by government stimulus programs. Strained supply chains. Factory goods swiftly overwhelmed U.S. ports. Swelling orders further outstripped the availability of shipping containers, and the cost of shipping a container from Shanghai to Los Angeles skyrocketed tenfold. Labor shortages. Businesses across the economy, meanwhile, struggled to hire workers, including the truck drivers needed to haul cargo to warehouses. Even as employers resorted to lifting wages, labor shortages persisted, worsening the scarcity of goods.

#### Alt causes to deglobalization - Chinese power shortages

Lauren Sytsma, 21. Global Edge blog writer. “Supply Chain Crisis Leading to Deglobalization.” November 11, 2021. https://globaledge.msu.edu/blog/post/57051/supply-chain-crisis-leading-to-deglobali

As China is a major manufacturer for companies worldwide, its power shortages have wreaked havoc on the global supply chain. The intense demand with low supply has forced many factories to limit production to two or three days a week, or in some cases, cease production entirely. Both shortages have caused a decrease in supply, while the demand is only growing with the reopening of economies. Global value chains, where a product must cross at least two borders, made up 37% of world trade in 1970. This percent rose to 52% in 2008 and has plateaued around that percent ever since. The amount of dependence and integration with other economies has allowed for this disruption to cause a ripple effect on other economies, forcing companies to reevaluate the structure of their sourcing and manufacturing. The deglobalization that may ensue is possible to bring about higher costs to consumers and a paucity of diverse products.

#### A – Won’t happen – short term focus on competitive advantage ensure no efficiency or innovation. That’s 1NC Black AND…

Allinson et al ‘21 [Jamie Allinson is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Edinburgh University and author of The Age of Counter-revolution. China Miéville is the author of a number of highly acclaimed and prize-winning novels including October: The History of the Russian Revolution. Richard Seymour is the author of numerous works of non-fiction, His writing appears in the New York Times, London Review of Books, Guardian, Prospect, Jacobin. Rosie Warren is an Editor at Verso and the Editor-in-Chief of Salvage. All are writing for the Salvage Collective. “The Tragedy of the Worker: Toward the Proletarocene.” Chapter 1: M-C-M’ and the Death Cult. July 2021. Verso EBook. ISBN: 9781839762963 //shree]

As Andreas Malm has fiercely and beautifully argued, capitalism did not settle for fossil fuels as a solution to energy scarcity. The common assumption that fossil energy is an intrinsically valuable energy resource worth competing over, and fighting wars for is, as geographer Matthew Huber argues, an example of fetishism. At the onset of steam power, water was abundant, and, even with its fixed costs, cheaper to use than coal. The hydraulic mammoths powered by water wheels required far less human labour to convert to energy, and were more energy-efficient. Even today, only a third of the energy in coal is actually converted in the industrial processes dedicated thereto: the only thing that is efficiently produced is carbon dioxide. On such basis, the striving for competitive advantage by capitalists seeking maximum market control ‘should’ have favoured renewable energy.

Capital, however, preferred the spatio-temporal profile of stocks due to the internal politics of competitive accumulation. Water use necessitated communal administration, with its perilously collectivist implications. Coal, and later oil, could be transported to urban centres, where workers were acculturated to the work-time of capitalist industry, and hoarded by individual enterprises. This allowed individual units of capital to compete more effectively with one another, secured the political authority of capital and incorporated workers into atomised systems of reproduction, from transport to heating.

Thus, locked in by the short-termist imperatives of competitive accumulation, fossil capital assumed a politically privileged position within an emerging world capitalist ecology. It monopolised the supply of energy for dead labour, albeit in a highly inefficient way.

#### B – Can’t reverse capital’s heavy metal use or nuclear waste – extinction

Allinson et al ‘21 [Jamie Allinson is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Edinburgh University and author of The Age of Counter-revolution. China Miéville is the author of a number of highly acclaimed and prize-winning novels including October: The History of the Russian Revolution. Richard Seymour is the author of numerous works of non-fiction, His writing appears in the New York Times, London Review of Books, Guardian, Prospect, Jacobin. Rosie Warren is an Editor at Verso and the Editor-in-Chief of Salvage. All are writing for the Salvage Collective. “The Tragedy of the Worker: Toward the Proletarocene.” Chapter 1: M-C-M’ and the Death Cult. July 2021. Verso EBook. ISBN: 9781839762963 //shree]

Fossil capital is but one modality of the death cult, albeit a paragon. The ‘externalities’ of capital – climate chaos, biosphere destruction, resource depletion, topsoil erosion, ocean acidification, mass extinction, the accumulation of chemical, heavy metal, biological and nuclear wastes – extend far beyond the specific catastrophe of a carbonised atmosphere. Capitalism is a comprehensive system of work-energetics. The food industry, which powers waged labour, and is key to the shifting value of labour-power itself, is as central to the deterioration of the biosphere as is fossil-fuelled transit. Nonetheless, the continuing decision for fossil fuels as a solution to the energy demands of capitalist production, for all the growing denial of climate-change denial among the antivulgarian ruling class, for all their concerned mouth music, is an exemplary case of the capitalist imperative of competitive accumulation at work.

#### Your evidence disagrees and says that we don’t have capacity or supply. Emory reads Green.

Short and Mancini ’21 (Mike Short and James Mancini, Mike Short serves as C.H. Robinson’s President of Global Forwarding. Jim Mancini, Vice President of North American Surface Transportation, oversees the services and technology for our renewable energy customers, “Overcoming the 5 Supply Chain Barriers that Threaten the Growth of Renewable Energy”, <https://www.chrobinson.com/blog/overcoming-the-5-supply-chain-barriers-that-threaten-the-growth-of-renewable-energy/>, June 28, 2021)

Renewables are expected to account for 90% of new power generation globally through 2022. But the world’s demand for clean energy is running up against some hard realities in the global supply chain and one of the most erratic transportation markets in history. Here are the five key project logistics challenges we’re seeing in renewable energy and how to overcome them. Tighter budgets for renewable energy projects The cost of wind and solar energy has been declining relative to fossil fuels for years, making it more attractive to more investors. That’s good news for climate change, but some new factors could throw that trend off track. The shortage of semiconductors plaguing the auto industry has become a problem for the renewables sector as well, because semiconductors are needed to convert wind and solar into electricity. Scarcity of steel is driving up prices for wind turbines and the mounting systems that point solar panels toward the sun. Polysilicon, an essential building block for solar panels, is the world’s second most abundant element but the cost has recently quadrupled. Rising material costs and historically high freight rates can eat into the profitability of your renewable energy project. That makes it even more important to avoid unexpected costs in your project logistics. The supply chain for wind and solar farms is vast and complex, starting in precious-metal mines and culminating in some of the most remote places on Earth. To make sure you come in on budget, choose a project logistics provider that has deep and specific industry knowledge. When you’re renting a crane for $100,000 a day, you can’t afford for the wind turbines to be three days late. Every county those will travel through requires a permit, which is typically granted for just a few days. If you miss that window, those permits must be renewed in every county. Meanwhile, you’re paying the installation crew to wait. These projects have too many moving parts and variables to try to piece it together yourself, and it exposes you to too much financial risk to count on the disparate processes of multiple vendors. An experienced provider can deliver end-to-end project logistics. That includes making sure manufacturers upstream of your project can reliably get raw materials. That includes anticipating every possible contingency to mitigate disruptions in shipping. That includes technology to track every piece of equipment’s path to the installation site. Renewable energy logistics has been a specialty of C.H. Robinson’s for more than a decade. That expertise helps you avoid the unexpected costs that can easily erase your project’s profit margin. Unpredictability in shipping The majority of solar equipment manufacturers are in China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia. Four companies dominate more than half the manufacturing of wind turbines, with most production in Asia. Five years ago, the movement of containerized goods out of Asia was high volume, low cost and consistent. For breakbulk cargo, you could call to book space on a vessel for next week. That world—where you could plan week-to-week—is gone. Now, ship capacity is scarce and exponentially more expensive because of the contraction of shipping lines and a global container shortage. Port congestion is making it hard to know when incoming ships will be able to berth. It’s gotten to the point where schedule reliability has dropped from about 80% at this time last year to 5%. New disruptions can make it even more challenging to get everything for your renewable energy project where it needs to be when it needs to be. Congestion at China’s Port of Yantian is a case in point, creating massive backlogs of shipments to North America, Latin America, Europe, and Oceania that could take months to clear.

## 1NR

### Advantage 2---1NR

#### US Navy readiness completely eroded now

Justin Holloran Witwicki, 19. Master of Arts in Government. "The United States Navy as a Hollow Force-An Assessment of Naval Readiness from 2010 to 2017." Johns Hopkins University, 2020. https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/62333/WITWICKI-THESIS-2019.pdf?sequence=1

Conclusions and Recommendations

Evaluation of Readiness Indicators

**From 2010 through 2017, the military readiness of the United States Navy eroded to such an extent that defense analysts and government officials publicly questioned whether it had become a hollow force. Scholars in future years will, and should, find the answer to that question to be “yes**.” The research presented in the preceding pages demonstrated that no fewer than six factors detracted from the military readiness of the United States Navy from 2010 to 2017. Three additional elements were rejected as readiness challenges. Seven indicators of force hollowness were proposed by the Center for Naval Analyses in a 1996 study of post-Vietnam War naval readiness and subsequently reexamined by the Congressional Research Service in 2012. Of those seven, this thesis accepted five as applicable to the U.S. Navy during the 2010-2017 scope of inquiry. Recognizing that “there is no guarantee that the next hollow force will look like the last one,”400 this study then presented evidence that two further indicators – excessive operational tempo and the effects of global climate change – must be added to any holistic examination of naval readiness during this period. In the case of the former, operational tempo directly damaged naval readiness from 2010 to 2017 and resulted in the loss of 17 lives – as many as were lost in the attack on the USS Cole. In the case of the latter, while it is among the Navy’s most severe future readiness challenges, climate change did not sufficiently impact naval capabilities to warrant acceptance as an indicator of unreadiness during the early- and mid-2010s.

#### Heg is already in decline.

Hans-Georg Betz, 21. “Uncertain Times in a World Without American Hegemony.” November 3, 2021. https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north\_america/hans-georg-betz-international-order-great-powers-american-hegemony-china-news-12512/

The failure of the G20 to arrive at a meaningful position on climate change ahead of COP26 is proof that the US is no longer a global leader. The international order is in deep trouble, and not only since the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not how things were supposed to turn out. The collapse of the “evil empire,” the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU were supposed to bring about a new era of stability and prosperity, the latter epitomized most prominently by China’s embrace of the market. Liberalism was supposed to reign supreme. In the grand battle of ideas, Marx had lost out, Hegel had won — or so his American acolyte, Francis Fukuyama, claimed. Fukuyama proclaimed that the “end of history” was at hand, and the cognoscenti and would-be cognoscenti on both sides of the Atlantic enthusiastically applauded. Three decades later, the world is in disarray. The attacks of September 11 were a drastic reminder that not everybody was sold on Fukuyama’s utopia. The financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers and, with it, the house of cards built on a derivatives market that had spun out of control exposed the irrationality of rational behavior — taking more and more risks simply because everybody else did so. Finally, COVID-19 has demonstrated how quickly the beautiful world of ever-expanding consumer choices, sustained by cheap labor in remote parts of the world, can grind to a screeching halt. Benign Hegemon It is too early to tell whether or not global turbulences have reached a point of no return. The prospects are not great, and that has a lot to do with the United States. There is a strong sense that America’s hegemonic position, which it assumed after World War II, is on the wane and, with it, the country’s “commitment to promoting a liberal international order.” Or, perhaps, the United States suffers from a severe case of “leadership fatigue” and no longer wants to play the role of the “benign hegemon.” The notion of the benign hegemon is derived from hegemonic stability theory, popular among some experts in international relations. The theory posits that order and stability in world affairs crucially depend on a Great Power capable of sustaining them and willing to do so. As Stephen Kobrin, of the Wharton School, has recently put it, “A stable, open economy requires a hegemon, a dominant power who can provide some of the necessary public goods, absorb costs, and order the system.” Although this pertains particularly to international economic relations, it can be applied to other areas, such as international security. Order and stability require, among other things, that the hegemonic power formulate and underwrite the rules that define and govern the interactions between states in the international system. This was the case in the second half of the 19th century when Great Britain assumed this role, providing and guaranteeing global public goods such as free trade, capital mobility and the British pound, backed up by the gold standard, as the global reserve currency. The system came to an end with World War I. The conflict left Britain weakened and largely unable to reassume its prewar role. The interwar period was characterized by turmoil and crises, paving the way for the rise of autocratic regimes, committed to establishing a new order on the ruins of the old one. They accomplished the latter, but the new order was not theirs to create. The new hegemonic power that emerged from the war was not Hitler’s Germany but the United States, which filled the void left by an exhausted Great Britain.

#### The aff reinforces insecurity by seeing an omnipresent terrorist and always failing state. The neg rejects the military-industrial-complex’s knowledge production that allows genocidal culture to continue by realizing that it is all constructed

**Morrissey 11** John MORRISSEY, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland, 11 [“Liberal Lawfare and Biopolitics: US Juridical Warfare in the War on Terror,” Geopolitics, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2011, p. 280-305, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

Reading Discourse and Agency

In the power–knowledge symmetry of the academic–military world, strategic studies discourses do vital geopolitical work: they prioritize, disguise, legitimize and characterize entire conflicts; they reduce political and cultural geographical knowledges of distant places; and they erase the signature of, and accountability for, “our” violence. In a world of euphemisms and neologisms, well paid mercenary soldiers become “contractors” or “security employees”; ungovernable spaces of abject violence and misery become areas currently experiencing “a slight uptick in violence”; and waterboarding becomes “simulated drowning”, not actual drowning interrupted or torture. As David Bromwich (2008) succinctly puts it, the “‘global war on terrorism’ promotes a mood of comprehension in the absence of perceived particulars, and that is a mood in which euphemisms may comfortably take shelter”. He points out that critical accounts of US foreign policy and its consequences and accountability are limited to popular academic works such as Chalmers Johnson's Blowback or Robert Pape's Dying to Win (Johnson 2000; Pape 2005).23

The reductive “imaginative geographies” of the military–strategic studies complex not only support the operations of US geopolitical and geoeconomic calculation in the Middle East; they also contribute to a pervasive and predominant cultural discourse on the region that has all the hallmarks of Orientalism (Gregory 2004; Little 2002; Said 2003; Shapiro 1997). National security “specialist” commentaries have long enunciated the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and linked it to the feared potential of new political and economic orders emerging in the region (Lewis 1995; Roberts 1995). Since the war on terrorism began, such sentiment has been relentlessly championed in broader popular media circles; a development that has had grave consequences. As Stephen Graham (2005:6, 8) notes, the result of the “combined vitriol of a whole legion of US military “commentators” who enjoy huge coverage, exposure, and influence in the US media” is a world in which whole populations are positioned as unworthy of any “political or human rights”: 24

In the construction of people as inhuman “terrorist” barbarians understanding little but force, and urban places as animalistic labyrinths or “nests” demanding massive military assault, Islamic cities, and their inhabitants, are, in turn, cast out beyond any philosophical, legal, or humanitarian definitions of humankind or “civilisation”.

Russell Smith (2003b) was in the minority in lamenting the standard and integrity of US reporting during the early stages of the Iraq War: “North American reporting, and in particular on the US television stations, has been cravenly submissive to the Pentagon and the White House”. As Smith dolefully observes, both the embedded and studio reporting of Fox, CNN and others “dutifully” used the “language chosen by people in charge of ‘media relations’ at the Pentagon”—describing, for example, the exploding of Iraqi soldiers in their bunkers as “softening up”, or referring to slaughtered Iraqi units as “degraded”. Reifying military sentiment rather than critical journalism resulted in the production and circulation of prioritized strategic and geopolitical discourses that worked to foster a reductive public understanding of the conflict (Pred 2007). In such a simplified discursive world, a close-up photograph of a battle-weary, frontline American infantry soldier—Marine Lance Corporal James Blake Miller—during the second Fallujah offensive in Iraq in November 2004 became the “Face of Fallujah” on CBS News, and on the front page of the Los Angeles Times, New York Post and more than 150 other American newspapers (Sinco 2007a). From the rubble and carnage of Fallujah, it was Miller's image that became “iconic”; not, as Naomi Klein (2004) points out, an altogether different and proportionately more relevant image—that of “a dead child lying in the street, clutching the headless body of an adult”. The photograph of Lance Corporal Miller was ultimately mobilized into a well established scripting of US national security strategy in which young American men and women each play a heroic part in the defense of freedom overseas for all those who enjoy it at home.25

The recent work of Simon Dalby, Stephen Graham, Derek Gregory and others is both insightful and urgent in illuminating the “huge discursive efforts” in the US-led war on terror in “constructing and reconstructing” key spaces of the Middle East “as little more than receiving points for US military ordnance” (Graham 2005:6; cf Dalby 2007b; Gregory 2004). As outlined earlier, there is of course a long history of the US military, and its strategic studies advisors, mobilizing abstract geostrategic discourses of the Middle East (Klein 1994). The lead-up to the Gulf War in 1991, for example, was a particularly fertile period for airing reductive military visions (Sidaway 1998); and there is a continuum of essentialist scriptings of the Middle East that extend back to at least the late 1970s when the military–strategic studies complex began to assiduously assert US geopolitical and geoeconomic designs for the region in the name of national security (Morrissey 2008). These strategic studies scriptings have collectively served to establish a register of ageographical spaces, have long spoken of terrains and not worlds, and have been typically indifferent to the lives of “Others” (Epstein 1987; Record 1981a; Ullman et al 1996).

Critical to our reading of the military–strategic studies complex, moreover, is the recognition that it does not operate outside of the political, decision-making process; as shown above in relation to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Upon taking up office in 1981, the Reagan administration actively consulted with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in planning an effective US geopolitical strategy for the Middle East, and promptly followed its recommendations (and those of its chief specialist, Jeffrey Record) in initiating, and budgeting for, US Central Command as a military necessity to defend US national interests in the Gulf (Record 1981a). The long-standing influence on US foreign policy of American pro-Israel lobby groups and think tanks has been recently demonstrated by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2006). Others have shown the influence of the Project for the New American Century on the current Bush administration's particular brand of aggressive foreign policy (Dalby 2006). And one of the architects of that policy, Donald Rumsfeld, as Secretary of Defense, was not averse to sitting down for panel discussions to review the findings of, for example, Brookings Institution surveys (US Department of Defense 2003).

It is important to remember too that many of the leading Pentagon and Congressional advisors on the Middle East, such as Kenneth Katzman, for instance, are typically also research analysts in strategic studies institutes (Katzman is an external researcher for the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College); thus enabling the “government–strategic studies” loop (Katzman 2006). Thomas Barnett, too, who worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation at the DoD from the end of 2001 to mid 2003 simultaneously held a professorship in strategic studies at the Warfare Analysis and Research Department at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. His combined DoD and strategic studies work culminated in the publication of his influential and commercially successful The Pentagon's New Maps in 2004, in which he envisages a new grand strategy for the USA in a post-Cold War and post-9/11 age: closing the gaps of neoliberal economic order across the globe (Barnett 2004; cf Dalby 2007a).

Such “academic” strategic scriptings of US national security have long proved a supporting and legitimating intellectual cache for military action; they have been instrumental in the advancement of what Bradley Klein calls a “cultural hegemony of organized state violence” (1988a:136). A recent case in point was provided by the current Commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, General David Petraeus. Writing in 2006, the much-heralded military saviour for the Iraq War did not just see an infantry surge as the key to success. He recognized too the importance of what has become a buzz word in US military circles in recent years, “culture”:

Knowledge of the cultural terrain can be as important as, and sometimes even more important than, the knowledge of the geographical terrain. This observation acknowledges that people are, in many respects, the decisive terrain, and that we must study that terrain in the same way that we have always studied the geographical terrain (2006:51).

A subsequent publication of a Professor of East Asian Studies at Oberlin College in Ohio, entitled On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge, variously echoed and held up Petraeus’ sentiments. In it, Dr Sheila Jager (2007:1) sets the tone for her appraisal of the importance of “culture” for the Iraq War thus:

Faced with a brutal war and insurgency in Iraq, the many complex political and social issues confronted by U.S. military commanders on the ground have given rise to a new awareness that a cultural understanding of an adversary society is imperative if counterinsurgency is to succeed.

Dr Jager was writing from, and for, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, where she was then a Visiting Fellow in National Security Studies. She concluded her analysis of the “uses of cultural knowledge” for the US military by suggesting that “perhaps it not too late [sic.] for culture to also rescue the United States from the strategic failures of the Bush Doctrine” (2007:24; emphasis added).26

As Derek Gregory (2008a:8) correctly notes, the recent development of “culture-centric warfare” did not emanate from “academics, military theorists or think-tanks”; it emerged largely from the “improvised tactics developed and shared by responsive commanders in the field”. However, the military's “cultural turn” was quickly supported, expedited and legitimized by strategic studies. For both Jager and Petraeus, the cultural terrain of the military landscape now needs to be increasingly studied—strategically. Moreover, as Gregory has also shown, the US military's cultural turn “does not dispense with killing” but rather is “a prerequisite for its refinement” (2008a:10). That the US military has reached a dangerously clinical appreciation of culture, and why knowledge of it matters in wartime, should shock us but it should not surprise us. What is even more troubling is that uncritical elements of the intellectual academy—from East Asian studies to geography, from international relations to psychology—are being increasingly mobilized in the service, support and sustenance of the military; developments that are of course entirely consistent with the increased neoliberalization of war and use of private contractors.

#### Assumptions that Korea starts a war are racist.

**Chung 14** ALEX H. CHUNG M.A. (UNSW) AFAIM B.A. (Hons) International Relations and Politics School of Social Sciences University of Notre Dame Australia (UNDA) Postcolonial Perspectives on Nuclear NonProliferation November 2014 Conference Paper for the ISAC-ISSS Joint Annual Conference 2014 14-16 November 2014 Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/ISSS%20Austin%202014/Archive/44aedf1a-f8b9-49ad-8411-1d43fecbd202.pdf

Liberal ideology legitimates **domination over the Global South**. This can be observed via liberal Western **discourse on nuclear proliferation** as it “legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognised nuclear powers,” (Gusterson 1999, p. 115). Much like neorealism, **rationality and objectivity is arbitrarily assigned to the West**, while the Global South or ‘Third World’ is **considered to be subjective, irrational, or even ‘rogue’ and therefore incapable of the responsibility of a nuclear arsenal**. The inherent Eurocentricism in liberal ideology **directly results in a “taken-for-granted politics that sides with the rulers, with the powerful, with the imperialists, and not with the downtrodden, the weak, the colonised, or the post-colonised**,” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006, p. 344)

For example, Iran has been demonised by the United States since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when citizens of the Islamic Republic laid siege to the US embassy compound in Tehran, and took fifty-two American hostages for 444 days (Zenko 2012). Their suspected nuclear weapons program and alleged sponsorship of terrorism have deemed them a ‘rogue state’ (BBC 2001; Munoz 2012). US President Obama issued a warning to Iran in a September 2012 speech to the UN General Assembly, stating unequivocally, “The United States will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon…It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations and the stability of the global economy,” (ABC News 2012). North Korea, an NPT non-signatory and nuclear state is perceived to pursue “alien objectives which are normative anathema to the rest of the ‘civilised’ international system,” **leading to the assumption that the North Korean state is acting fundamentally outside the norms of the global community, and is therefore clearly a “rogue state**” (Smith 2000, p. 115). Nicholas Eberstadt wrote that, “the North Korean regime is the North Korean nuclear problem,” (Smith 2000, p. 118).

These Eurocentric and racist assumptions in liberal IR theory have **led to obvious and problematic ‘double standards’ and inequities in the treatment of non-Western states**, exacerbated by the existing Northern dominated nuclear non-proliferation regime. While Iran has suffered debilitating economic sanctions over suspicions of an unconfirmed clandestine nuclear weapons program, Israel, one of only four NPT non-signatories, and the sole state in the Middle East that actually possesses nuclear weapons, has remained free from any meaningful, significant, or even symbolic international oversight (Steinbach 2011, p. 34). Warren

#### The aff reinforces insecurity by seeing an [omnipresent terrorist/ failing state]. The neg rejects the military-industrial-complex’s knowledge production that allows genocidal culture to continue by realizing that it is all constructed

Campbell and Murrey 14 – International peace and justice scholar, Professor of African American studies at Syracuse University; PhD, Oxford Professor (Horace and Amber, “Culture-centric pre-emptive counterinsurgency and US African Command: assessing the role of US social sciences in US military engagements in Africa,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 35, Issue 8, October 3, 2014, pp. 1457-1475, accessed online through Taylor and Francis)

The obscurity of the discourse on insecurity and terrorism, along with the intimate relationship between militarism and capital accumulation, have serious connotations for social science researchers involved in military efforts to expand intelligence, such as for Africom. In full-spectrum domination the emphasis is on military readiness, prevention and the employment of strategic cultural knowledge to destroy the enemy before s/he comes into being. The push for ever-more preventive interventions is based on the notion that the most effective way to win is to prevent, on your terms, the enemy from ever becoming an enemy. This can only occur through precise, accurate and intimate knowledge of the potential enemy’s culture, socio-politics and psychology: in effect, only by totally dominating every aspect of the potential enemy’s being. Hence, the US military doctrine of ‘full-spectrum domination’.

In full-spectrum dominance the aim is ‘to control the very force of becoming [a terrorist and all that is conflated within the rubric of ‘security threat’, including revolutionaries] by shaping an “environment” of [supposedly potential] insurgent formation. The promise of environmental control is that an enemy can be beaten before s/he has even become an enemy.’[52](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0052) The June 2011 Congressional report on US Africa Command reads, ‘Defense strategy is now evolving to look at conflict prevention, or “Phase Zero”’: an attempt to engage with ‘threats at their inception’. The acquisition and synthesis of cultural knowledge creates the basis for the ‘information superiority’ that allows for ‘dominant maneuver[s]’, ‘precision engagement’, ‘focused logistics’ and ‘full dimensional projection[s]’ that are key to its Joint Vision 2020 of pre-emptive counterinsurgency.[53](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0053)

These approaches are not novel. Military strategists have long been interested in understanding an enemy’s society and culture as a means of anticipating and controlling military engagements; this has been especially true in the case of asymmetrical warfare. They harken back to the work of the military officers engaged in the efforts to suppress anti-colonial movements in the 1950s in Africa and Asia. The pre-emptive counterinsurgency style is what French military scholar David Galula called ‘cold revolutionary war’,[54](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0054) and what British counterinsurgency scholar Frank Kitson referred to as the ‘preparatory period’ before anti-colonial movements even began to organise.[55](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0055) Contemporary US counterinsurgents and officials at the US Africa Command have adopted similar notions of anticipation and preparation so that ‘the defining conflict of American international relations…[has gone from] engaging and containing opponents to ensuring there cannot possibly be any opponents’.[56](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0056)

The first task of full-spectrum Phase Zero operations is the systematic collection and employment of (potential) enemy intelligence. In an article for Proceedings in 2004 Major General Robert H Scales Jr, US Army (Retired), wrote of Operation Iraqi Freedom, ‘Consensus seems to be building among [returned soldiers] that this conflict was fought brilliantly at the technological level but inadequately at the human level. The human element seems to underlie virtually all the functional shortcomings chronicled in official reports and media stories.’[57](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0057) These remarks underscore a shift that has occurred in US military engagement since late 2003: a ‘culture-centric warfare’ in which the knowledge of an enemy’s social and cultural behaviour, beliefs, motivations and methodologies is viewed as increasingly essential to determining military strategy.[58](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0058)

Pentagon officials, government representatives and pundits have embraced this culturally insightful form of US counterinsurgency, one that is concerned with ‘mapping’ and controlling ‘human terrain’ through nuanced cultural knowledge. ‘Human terrain’ refers to strategically mapping the features and dimensions of human groups for the purposes of determining the nature of military engagements.[59](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0059) Roberto González ([2009](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#CIT0027)) traces the roots of this language to a report from the US House on Un-American Activities Committee, in which the Black Panther Party was believed to ‘possess the ability to seize and retain the initiative through a superior control of the human terrain’.[60](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0060) Human mapping incorporates another counterrevolutionary principal proposed by Galula: the population is both a battlefield and a weapon.[61](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0061)

A second aspect of Phase Zero operations is the ‘capacity building of allies’, or actions taken to bolster popular opinion in favour of US policy through psy-ops (modern psychological warfare) and propaganda campaigns.[62](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0062) Galula identifies one strategic concern of counterinsurgency as the ability to ‘find the favorable minority, [and, particularly during the ‘Phase Zero’ or ‘cold revolution’ operations] to organize it in order to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority’.[63](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0063) Likewise, Kitson devoted a chapter in his book, Low-Intensity Warfare, to the analysis of the preparatory period before the development of an insurgency group. During this preparatory period the ruling party carefully plans and coordinates ‘an efficient intelligence organization’ capable of ‘psychological operations’ in order to ‘organize the populations’ in support of the regime in power.[64](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0064) US military strategists continue to draw from these ideas through practices of ‘winning the hearts and minds’.

In The Insurgents, Fred Kaplan describes the role played by the social scientists who graduated from the Department of Social Science at West Point, the prestigious US military academy, in further entrenching the relationship between the US military and US academies. After the failure of US counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Colonel Huba Wass de Czege – who served two tours as an infantry officer in Vietnam and who was primarily responsible for the military strategy that preceded Full Spectrum Operations (known as AirLand Battle) – worked to integrate top military brass (ie officers**)** with Ivy League institutions. The ostensible reason was to train and shape top US officer ‘judgement’. In The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today, Tom Ricks devotes an entire chapter to what he termed ‘Teaching Judgement’, ie how to influence the judgement of US military officers. According to this understanding of the history of the US military, before Vietnam the military depended on hardware and sophisticated equipment but did not know how to think. De Czege set out to teach officers ‘how to think’ as opposed to ‘only what to think about war.’[65](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0065)

For de Czege there was an intellectual gap in the military’s understanding of how to go to war. Linking up with top universities, he thought, would allow the military to tap into the thinking capabilities of the US university system; it would also ensure that all senior officers would have at least a masters degree from the top-ranked universities. To these ends, de Czege founded and directed the School of Advanced Military Studies (sams). To be eligible to enter sams, officers have to go through social science training in Ivy League universities such as Stanford or Princeton. After going through these top-ranked universities, the senior officers learn the counterinsurgency doctrines of Galula and Kitson and it was anticipated that the graduates would have a tremendous impact on the military by 2000. Indeed, sams became the networking base for the new coin and social science thinking and General Schwarzkopf brought in 82 graduates from sams for the first Gulf War, while General Tommy Franks mobilised other sams experts for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.[66](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0066)

Retired US General David Petraeus, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and former Commander of US Forces Afghanistan was similarly convinced that there should be close integration between the military and the academy. As a senior officer Petraeus earned a Masters of Public Administration (MPA) (in 1985) and a PhD degree in International Relations (in 1987) from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He later served as Assistant Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy and completed a fellowship at Georgetown University. Petraeus later completed the coin manual at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KA. David John Kilcullen, David Petraeus, John Nagl, Kavlev Sepp, Steven Metz and Eliot Cohen have since joined the pantheon of unsuccessful counterinsurgency specialists in the West (including Galula and Kitson), who failed in an earlier generation to halt self-determination projects in formerly colonised societies.[67](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0067)

In 2003 Pentagon officials and the former Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, laid out a contemporary brand of psychological warfare operations (‘psy-ops’) under the rubric of an Information Operations Roadmap. The roadmap identifies effective psy-ops as that those that ‘directly influence [foreign] decision-making’.[68](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0068) The Information Operations Roadmap is one component of ‘full spectrum dominance’, which entails psychological warfare, special operations, electronic warfare (ew or ‘fight the net’, which is warfare on internet production) and involvement in foreign journalism, for the purposes of mobilising a ‘favourable minority’ to speak on behalf of US national interests. The processes categorically outlined in the psy-ops document require a sophisticated level of intellectual competence, mobilising the US social sciences for information collection and on-the-ground support within the rubric of US Africom psy-ops.

The role of social science in full spectrum dominance

Research conducted at the behest of militaries on African peoples and societies has been destructive for African people and communities throughout history.[69](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0069) During the Cold War the dod commissioned studies to sustain what Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky call ‘manufacturing consent’ or the propaganda model.[70](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0070) Mark Solovey calls this relationship the ‘politics, patronage and social science nexus’.[71](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0071) According to this model, public support for social, political and economic policies is systematically constructed through a propaganda media machine. In the failed attempt to ensure US technological dominance during the Cold War, the dod racked up massive expenditures in the social sciences. Richard C Lewontin calls the period of the Cold War a ‘golden age for professors’, as dod funding saw university budgets increase twentyfold in constant dollars between 1946 and 1991.[72](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0072) These dod monies were also allocated to research in Africa and to leading research centres in the USA.[73](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0073) Government funding was augmented by private organisations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and by European governments, which also invested in social science research projects in Africa. Although the scope of dod funding for social science research during the period was extraordinary, it is often next to impossible to identify the exact details of studies funded. Not only are records of dod-funded projects unavailable to the public, but the cia deliberately leaked ‘disinformation’ for the purposes of camouflaging its actions.[74](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0074)

Feminists, PanAfricanists and peace scholars have been at the forefront in promoting an interdisciplinary social science work that seeks an alternative to genocidal politics and economics. In his book on the domains of matriarchy and patriarchy Cheikh Anta Diop writes of an anthropology with possible emancipatory implications.[75](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0075) This anthropology explores the legacies of matriarchy to combat masculinisation, militarism and violence in Africa. A distinction is made between the anthropology of masculinisation, militarism and violence and the anthropology of new family forms and the emancipation of women.[76](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0076) The relationship between exploitation, masculinity, violence and imperial domination have been taken up by feminist social scientists, whose scholarship has challenged male-centred realist conceptions of militarism, violence and ‘security’.[77](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0077)

It is clear from the statements of top officers and the annual reports of US Africa Command that social science research and ‘intelligence superiority’ is a dominant concern of the mission in Africa. To fill this research gap the US military, the Department of Education and the Department of State call upon US academics to conduct field research on a variety of cultural and socio-political subjects. The dod employs an understanding of culture as the unifying range of activities, ideas, beliefs and traditions among a group of people, which is transmitted and reinforced by members of that group. Our analysis draws from Amilcar Cabral’s conceptualisation of culture within the context of liberation. Cabral, an intellectual and freedom fighter, wrote on the importance of maintaining cultural identity for human emancipation and liberation movements: ‘the value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign domination lies in the fact that culture is the vigorous manifestation, on the ideological or idealist level, of the material and historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be dominated’.[78](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0078) Culture is an essential element of life and of community; as such, it plays a critical role in self-determination.[79](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0079) Knowledge of another group can facilitate cross-cultural understanding or it can be used to control, manipulate and exploit. The focus within Africom on ‘intelligence superiority’ is an illustration of efforts to know a population in order to anticipate and circumvent the potential development of (a wide range of) potential instabilities to market security.

US military funding of social science research is not particular to Africa: it is also central to military endeavour in the Middle East as well as in Central and South America. The funding takes particular forms in African nations and carries specific political consequences, particularly considering competing capitalists interests, which fuel large-scale accumulation by dispossession. There were 32 different research projects commissioned by Africom for 2011. A review of the research topics, compiled by the Directorate for Outreach of Africa Command and conducted by students at senior US professional military education institutions, reveals that research interests include (1) determining African perceptions and receptions to US Africa Command and the US military; (2) competition for Rare Earth Elements;[80](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0080) and (3) military-to-military support for African governments.[81](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0081)Additional subjects include studies on African governance, African militaries and the characteristics of West and Northern African terrorist activities.

Africom funded a study in 2011, for example, that looked at combatant sexual violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The study is problematic for its avoidance of a historical context and for its lack of acknowledgement of the culture of sexual violence inherent in militarism, including (even particularly) in the US military.[82](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0082) From the assertions during a presentation at the headquarters of US Africa Command in Stuttgart given by two of the lead researchers, Dr Lynn Lawry and Dr Michele Wagner, it is apparent that material from the study will inform Africom engagements with sexual violence treatment seminars for African military personnel. However, it is unclear what forms these interventions will take and how they will avoid re-traumatising sexual abuse survivors. Sexual violence as a component of warfare in the DRC has been widely researched and publicised before the commissioning of this project by Africom; it would seem that some research projects are most probably publicity campaigns to bolster Africom’s image as a humanitarian agency.

By considering the doctrine of pre-emptive counterinsurgency, the US military’s interest in culture-centric counterinsurgency, and the establishment of Africom with its focus on knowledge superiority, the US security establishment seeks to create an American-friendly climate through a combination of psy-ops and propaganda. One article, which is drawn from research commissioned by Africom, examines 11 African countries for convergent structural conditions, catalysts and triggers that might prove to be ‘potential fissures and stressors that might lead in the coming decade to significant social dislocation or political instability’.[83](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0083) The purpose of the report is to predict scenarios that ‘might converge to create the conditions for instability’.[84](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0084) The report’s authors position their findings within the context of ‘African Awakenings’ or the uprisings and popular political mobilisations across Africa that began in late December 2010 and continued through 2011. They write that, ‘the upheavals in North Africa since the beginning of 2011 underline the dangers of ignoring these core grievances’.[85](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0085) The emergence of powerful pro-people movements in Africa has considerable consequences for transnational capitalist interests, which have been able to accumulate enormous capital through mechanisms of dispossession. In the framework of Africom African popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes are merged into the discourse of perpetual threat, chaos and instability, becoming yet another factor contributing to the perceived instability of the continent.

These uprisings against authoritarianism – from Burkina Faso to South Africa to Tunisia to Cameroon – indicate the need for social science to assist the peoples of Africa in the processes of social empowerment and the attainment of a better quality of life. In response to the democratic movements in Tunisia and Egypt the US government was alternately hesitant and undecided in supporting the voice of the people, illustrating the fact that US foreign policy is more concerned with maintaining the status quo than with working on behalf of the human and economic rights of people around the world. Indeed, General Ham writes of the shift in strategic role of Africom during this period, ‘the dynamic security environments that followed the Arab Awakening have increased requirements for crisis response capabilities’.[86](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0086) There continues to be an ideological disconnect between the foundational discourse of American democracy – liberty, justice and the right to self-governance – and US geopolitical strategy and interests, as popular mobilisations and uprisings, including peaceful ones, contribute to the US security establishment’s calls for an ever-increasing crisis response.

Conclusion

In March 2011 nato started Operation Odyssey Dawn to ‘protect’ civilians in Libya as part of multinational military operations under the auspices of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973.[87](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0087) This included Tomahawk cruise missile attacks and eventually led to the extrajudicial killing of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The US-orchestrated ‘no fly zone’ in Libya was a means to co-opt the movement. ‘In Libya, the military intervention, supposedly to assist revolution, was used to corral and control the revolutionary process, ultimately making it militarily, economically and ideologically a vassal of the Western powers’.[88](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0088) A cursory review of the USA’s varied engagements with and responses to the ‘African Awakenings’ of 2010 and 2011 illustrate the need for detailed, site-specific knowledge to dictate the US response and then publicise that response to the international community. The State Department’s response to political uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain, for example, while markedly different, indicate that the primary concern was not the plights of nationals of the country in question. In fact, in the case of the nato-led intervention in Libya, the destruction of society provided the cover for US intelligence agencies to use eastern Libya as a base for the recruitment of Jihadists to fight in Syria. The same government that was supposedly waging a war on terror was mobilising Jihadists in Libya and manipulating the instability there to spread insecurity and warfare

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from Mali to Aleppo. The study of African culture and religion was central to US operations in this enterprise, at the same time that a perceived lack of knowledge in US response bolsters the calls for ever-increasing knowledge attainment (as per Downie and Cooke’s previously quoted assertion that, ‘the upheavals in North Africa since the beginning of 2011 underline the dangers of ignoring these core grievances’[89](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0089)).

For the US security establishment culture is a tool not for peacekeeping or humanitarian efforts, but for ‘human terrain mapping’ and for resource and market protectionism. In 1961 former President Dwight D Eisenhower warned of the military–industrial complex. Since that moment the US military machine has operated to the material interests of a particular class of individuals who would have the academy serve those corporate interests as well. Academics are constrained by material needs and responsibilities – increasingly so under pressure to produce and publish as funding dries up – but there is an equilibrium between individual career and intellectual freedom. There is hope in our current moment. Given the role of the US security establishment and intelligence community in Africa in supporting anti-democratic leaders and in helping in the assassination or ousting of pro-people and populist leaders, many social scientists are increasingly troubled by the allocation of dod monies for social science research.[90](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2014.946262#EN0090)

The social science of freedom and self-respect depends upon a new engagement between scholars in Africa and the USA. This engagement requires not only challenging but dismantling the military-industrial complex, US national security reform and neo-imperial projects like the US Africa Command. This dismantling should be integrated as a central concern within the movement for an alternative social sciences, which increasingly calls for focus on the intersections of climate change, gender, alternative forms of economic organisation and people’s everyday material needs within an increasingly dehumanising and destructive neoliberal global colonial power matrix.

### Advantage 3---1NR

#### Finishing this card.

Jay Blumler and Stephen Coleman 21. Jay Blumler is Emeritus Professor of Public Communication at the University of Leeds and Emeritus Professor of Journalism at the University of Maryland. Stephen Coleman (corresponding author) is Professor of Political Communication at the University of Leeds. “After the Crisis, A “New Normal” for Democratic Citizenship?” Javnost - The Public, 28:1, 3-19, DOI: 10.1080/13183222.2021.1883884

until others have made a move.

The inescapably global nature of the pandemic has shown the futility and risk of such an approach, casting doubt upon the pursuit of national solutions and pointing towards the urgency of appeals to transnational public agency. Faced with globally diffuse problems of viral contagion, climate change and market instability, the civic case for stretching the use and meaning of the term “we, the public” becomes compelling. This important shift in collective self-consciousness entails the adoption of what Nancy Fraser (2007, 21) refers to as “the all-affected principle”:

Today, … the idea that citizenship can serve as a proxy for affectedness is no longer plausible. Under current conditions, one’s conditions of living do not depend wholly on the internal constitution of the political community of which one is a citizen. Although the latter remains undeniably relevant, its effects are mediated by other structures, both extra and non-territorial, whose impact is at least as significant … In general, globalization is driving a widening wedge between affectedness and political membership. As those two notions increasingly diverge, the effect is to reveal the former as an inadequate surrogate for the latter.

It follows from Fraser’s analysis that “what turns a collection of people into fellow members of a public is not shared citizenship, but their co-imbrication in a common set of structures and/or institutions that affect their lives” (ibid, 22). The logic of the all-affected principle rejects the notion that only national publics can confer democratic legitimacy, as the latter depends upon registering the voices of all those who are potentially affected by a problem, notwithstanding their national labels. This amounts to a post-Westphalian conception of citizenship in which, rather than being fragmented by artificial political divisions, the public is characterised by its common vulnerabilities, experiences and capacities. Members of post-Westphalian publics will continue to disagree with one another, of course, but the public sphere within which such political disagreement takes place will correspond to the dimensions of the issues at stake.

To be clear, it is only through the emergence of a cosmopolitan public domain in which solidarities are rooted in common affectedness rather than national-legal identities that global challenges such as the pandemic and economic depression, as well as climate change and other environmental threats, can be tackled democratically. This does not amount to a utopian call for citizens to adopt an abstractly cosmopolitan stance. Already competing with discourses of nationalism and populism in contemporary societies are many millions of voices across the world who view social problems from the perspective of a universal humanity sharing a common home. Such people are more inclined “to take risks by virtue of encountering the ‘other’” and to possess “some ability to reflect upon and judge aesthetically between different natures, places and societies” (Szerszynskiand and Urry 2002, 470). By understanding that “[g]lobalisation has brought large swathes of the world’s population closer together” in overlapping communities of fate (Held 2003, 478), many contemporary campaigners for social justice frame their arguments in terms of a language of cosmopolitan sensibility. These include movements opposing the structural inequalities of transnational economic power (such as Occupy Wall Street), ecological depredation (the School Strike for Climate Change), institutional sexism (MeToo) and racism (Black Lives Matter). The effectiveness of these campaigns in bringing injustices to global attention does not entail abandoning national institutions and populations as if they no longer matter, but framing messages to affected citizens within a cosmopolitan context that celebrates openness to global heterogeneity, pluralism and nuance.

As the pandemic highlights the limitations of the Westphalian conception of “normal” by forcing people from across the world to face up to their interdependence, both in terms of the transnational porosity of contagion and the resources needed to contain it, it calls attention to the aptness of a “new normal” in which shared social problems are addressed on a new scale. This adjustment of scale calls into being new conceptions of the public, defined increasingly in terms of shared affectedness.

Given that the most urgent crisis facing the world in the aftermath of the pandemic will be the threat of global catastrophe caused by climate change, the world is increasingly dependent upon the practical effectiveness of calls to action that are couched in a language of citizenship that transcends state borders and prioritises shared affectedness. The challenge of co-ordinating moral and political responses with a view to enhancing the public’s global agency is now a prerequisite for even modest success of efforts to save the planet from systemically wrought depredation. Could the public that has begun to develop a consciousness of its collective global vulnerability during the pandemic act upon such awareness beyond the current crisis?

#### 1. The plan can’t make companies improve their infrastructure.

1ac Merk et al. 18. Olaf Merk leads the work on ports and shipping at the International Transport Forum (ITF) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As such, he directs policy-relevant studies on maritime transport and the ports sector. Olaf Merk is the author of more than fifty OECD publications including “The Impact of MegaShips” and “The Competitiveness of Global Port-Cities”.), Lucie Kirstein (Scientific Advisor at National Academy of Science and Engineering) and Filip Salamitov (Policy analyst for the IFT), 2018, "The Impact of Alliances in Container Shipping", International Transport Forum, https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/impact-alliances-container-shipping.pdf

Consumers can be expected to want resilient maritime transport chains, so that the delivery of their goods will not be disrupted. Various indicators highlighted above, such as schedule reliability, delays, increased transit times related to less direct port connections, seem to suggest that containerised maritime transport chains could indeed run more smoothly. In addition, global alliances pose risks for system resilience, due to the limited possibilities for risk diversification, and to the extent that they have contributed to vertical integration between carriers and terminal operators. Risk diversification by shippers is rendered complicated by alliances. The nightmare of shippers (and shoppers) is to lose cargo or not get cargo at its destination before a crucial time, e.g. Christmas. In order to mitigate risks, shippers have traditionally spread their cargo over different carriers. The dominance of alliances means that containers from different carriers can end up on the same ship. In doing so, alliances have reduced the possibilities for risk diversification. Most shippers now take this into account and use back-up options from carriers that are not in the same alliance, but the choice wears thin. The lack of supply chain visibility is not helping efforts to diversify risk. An example of the limited visibility is the lack of transparency on what alliance services are and their characteristics. Almost none of the carriers indicate clearly if their services are operated by the carriers themselves, either as sole operator, through a vessel sharing agreement with competitors, or if the service is a slot charter operated entirely by their competitors. Shippers have in most cases no way to know who will move their cargo and it is often not clear which of the alliance members are operating an underlying service. Moreover, carriers rarely use the same service names across alliances, vessel sharing agreements and slot charter services, making cross-carrier comparisons difficult for shippers, possibly on purpose. The exception is THE Alliance where alliance members all use common service names. Finally, there is no standard for the information provided, e.g. different definitions and codes for ports and terminals, different calculations for transit times etc. (SeaIntel, 2018; 364). Due to this limited visibility, shippers are frustrated in their efforts to design diversification in their supply chains. In addition to alliances, vertical integration risks also reduce system resilience. Integration of shipping, terminal handling and hinterland transport could mean that whole transport chains are in the hand of just a few players, creating huge leverage for cyber-attacks, especially if parts of the chain are digitally connected. This became painfully evident during the NotPetya attack that hit Maersk ships and terminals (Box 7). Vertical integration could be considered to be related to the emergence of alliances. As service differentiation for the sea-leg is difficult in alliances – as the product is basically the same – one of the few remaining possibilities for individual carriers to differentiate is via vertical integration. Box 7. Cyber security and risks associated to vertical integration On 27 June 2017, a major cyber-attack began hitting firms mainly in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The attack is suspected to have started when hackers compromised the update server of Ukrainian tax accounting software company M.E.Doc so that it would distribute a malware referred to as “NotPetya” throughout its network. The malware further propagated itself notably via an exploit using a vulnerable Microsoft Windows network protocol. After analysis of the encryption routine of the malware, experts from Kaspersky came to the conclusion that the attack, although appearing as a ransomware attack, did not allow victims to recover their data even after paying the ransom, and the aim was therefore suspected to be directed at major disruption instead of financial gain for hackers (Ivanov and Mamedov, 2017). The carrier Maersk was presumably contaminated by this malware via software used by one of its offices in Ukraine. Maersk was forced to shut down many of its operating systems to stop the attack from spreading. The company was unable to process new orders and cranes were operated manually at some of its 76 container ports. The disruption caused major delays and led to rerouting of several vessels to ports not, or less, affected (Odell et al./FT, 2017). At least 17 terminals operated by APMT got infected by Maersk’s central IT infrastructure (Reuters, 2017). A number of terminals were unable to identify which shipment belonged to whom and therefore needed to clear cargo manually. The largest Indian port JNPT operated by Maersk’s APMT was forced to shut down and the terminal Maasvlakte II in Rotterdam stopped operations completely for a full week, which led to a highly congested service level. According to Maersk’s annual report for 2017, the attack mainly impacted Maersk Line, APM Terminals and Damco. The effect on profitability was estimated to be around USD 250-300 million, with the vast majority of the impact related to Maersk Line in the third quarter (Maersk, 2018). Maersk estimated a 20% drop in volume and lost out on carrying 70 000 40-foot containers within the two weeks of the attack. Besides lost revenue, the attack also involved high costs of rebuilding its IT infrastructure. At the moment of the cyber-attack, Maersk did not own any cyber risk insurance. The company reported that 4 000 new servers, 45 000 new PCs, and 2 500 applications had to be reinstalled (Chirgwin/The Register, 2018). Actual impacts on Maersk’s performance could be higher than reported and probably stretch beyond the second half of 2017 (Porter/Lloyd’s List, 2017a). In April 2018, analysts speculated that the attack could have cost Maersk group over USD 500 million in expenses and lost profit. Others situate the cost between USD 400-500 million because the effect from the attack continued in the fourth quarter of 2017 and led Maersk to make investments in new infrastructure and insurances. Furthermore, the cyber-attack could have had an extended impact on market shares until the first quarter of 2018 (Beck/ShippingWatch, 2018). Although for most affected terminals it took a few days before they could resume operations completely, shippers were affected by delays of up to two months, because Maersk reportedly had difficulties in allocating new slots and tracking and assigning correct data to containers. The impact was widely felt by interviewed shippers and Lloyd’s List reported a similar observation that nearly two months after the attack, Maersk was still dealing with containers in transit at the time of the attack (Porter/Lloyd’s List, 2017b). One of the interviewed shippers reports having received additional demurrage invoices due to complications and delays caused by the cyber-attack, which suggests the carrier might have tried to shift part of the costs of the attack to their consumers. Maersk’s global coverage, as well as strong horizontal and vertical integration in the sector further facilitated the knock-on effect of the cyber-attack. Companies who are reliant upon common IT infrastructure will logically suffer business interruption simultaneously when that infrastructure is compromised. Since supply chains are highly interconnected and even more so with increasing automation and digitalisation, this can result in an insecure operating environment even for those firms that make cyber security a priority. However, there is not only interdependence in IT infrastructure, but also in the utilisation of common assets. According to SeaIntel analysis, 20 other carriers transported containers on-board Maersk vessels around the time of the cyber-attack (SeaIntel, 2017; 319). MSC was the most affected with 23 vessel sharing agreements and four slot-charters, followed by Safmarine and Hamburg Süd. The most affected outside the 2M alliance and Maersk ownership was CMA CGM, with six vessel sharing agreements and four slot charter agreements with Maersk. The shipping sector is the backbone of international trade and ports are a vital part of every country’s infrastructure. Any major disruptions in supply chains can therefore have impacts on the overall economy. The scale of the cyber-attack and the many interconnections that exist vertically and horizontally in this industry could transform the collateral and rather accidental damage on a firm that was presumably not directly targeted, into a systemic risk for global trade.